Samir Al-Sheikh Bail Hearing - Remains a Flight Risk

Trial Monitoring reports of the Samir Al Sheikh trial are a result of a partnership between the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) and the Loyola Justice for Atrocities Clinic (LJAC) at LMU Loyola Law School (Los Angeles). Apart from trial monitoring, SJAC also supports authorities seeking to prosecute atrocity crimes committed in Syria by conducting investigative work and connecting witnesses with prosecutors (“case building”). SJAC's trial monitoring team does not share information with SJAC's case building team. Therefore, the latter only has access to the published reports available to the general public.

INTRODUCTION

On March 4, 2025, Defendant Samir Ousman Alsheikh (“Defendant” or “Alsheikh”) filed a Second Application for Reconsideration of Detention Order (“Second Application for Reconsideration”), together with a Memorandum containing his legal arguments and supporting documents, several of which were either redacted or filed under seal. The United States opposed the Application on March 20, and Alsheikh filed a reply on March 27.^[1]

On Thursday, April 3, 2025, at 1:30 PM, the hearing on the Application (“Bail Hearing”) was called before District Court Judge Hernán D. Vera of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.^[2] A Pretrial Services officer, Tatiana Garcia, was present, along with an Arabic interpreter who spoke directly in real-time to the Defendant through a headset. Joshua O. Mausner, Assistant United States Attorney and Chief of the Organized and Violent Crime Section of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California, and Patrick Jasperse, Trial Attorney with the Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section of the U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division appeared on behalf of the United States (“Plaintiff” or “United States). Nina Marino and Jennifer Lieser appeared on behalf of the Defendant Samir Ousman Alsheikh.

Five of what appeared to be Alsheikh’s family members sat in the first row on the defense side of the courtroom: a woman who appeared to be approximately the same age as Alsheikh, and two men and two women who appeared to be in their late 20s to mid 30s. Their presence was more subdued than at the prior bail hearing, where the entire courtroom had been filled with the Defendant’s extended family, including grandchildren. The family members in attendance were visibly emotional throughout the hearing. No one else attended the hearing in support of either side.

II. DESCRIPTION OF PROCEEDINGS

A. Defendant’s Argument

Through his attorney Nina Marino, Alsheikh asserted that changed circumstances warranted reconsideration of the detention order, consistent with the legal framework outlined in the Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Second Application for Reconsideration of Detention Order.^[3] The primary change cited was the collapse of the Syrian regime, which undermined the Government’s previous claims that the Defendant retained ties or influence through former regime connections. Ms. Marino argued that since the fall of the regime, many former officials had been arrested or fled, putting them in “no position” to assist the Defendant and that the Government provided no evidence that any fugitive leaders cared about the Defendant’s case in this fallen regime.

The core of the defense argument centered on the Defendant’s strong familial ties in the United States and the Defendant’s characterization as a family man. Ms. Marino emphasized that the Defendant’s immediate family, several of whom were present in the courtroom, had long-established lives in the United States. She described the Defendant as someone whose life in the United States revolves around his family and argued that this relationship provided a compelling reason for him to remain in the country and comply with any release conditions.

The tone of the argument shifted from sharply critical to solemn as Ms. Marino described how the Defendant’s son had “abandoned his career” and the daughter had “sacrificed an Egyptian vacation” in order to support the Defendant when he was first detained. As she spoke, the family became visibly emotional, although the Defendant did not look at them.

Furthermore, Ms. Marino stated that the Defendant’s family had pledged their “entire net worth” to secure his release and described this commitment as a reflection of the family’s belief in the Defendant’s character and their shared understanding of the consequences of non-compliance. She described the family dynamic as “strong and true,” stating that “[t]his is not a family that takes family obligations lightly.” She further stated emphatically that the Defendant would not flee and risk “bankrupting” his family.

Regarding posing a danger to the community, Ms. Marino noted that the conduct underlying the government’s allegations occurred over 20 years ago in “foreign land where foreign laws prevailed.” She also pointed out that many of the identified witnesses had continued to speak publicly as activists, both before and after the Defendant’s detention, which she suggested undermined the claim that they were in fear.

In addressing flight risk, Ms. Marino asserted that the Defendant had no financial resources of his own nor a remaining home in Syria. She argued that the notion that the Defendant would flee to a foreign country such as Russia or Iran without documentation was merely speculative, and that the Government had not met its burden of proving the Defendant poses a flight risk.

Ms. Marino concluded by requesting the Court to release the Defendant on bond.

B. Government’s Opposition

Counsel for the United States, Joshua Mausner, began his arguments by providing factual background of the Defendant. He stated that the Defendant previously served as a police officer, intelligence officer, and a prison warden for the Damascus prison, and that he ordered and personally participated in acts of torture during his tenure. Mr. Mausner listed specific methods allegedly used, including the “flying carpet” torture device, beatings with electric cables, “crucifixions,” and burnings. Mr. Mausner further noted that the Defendant was later promoted by Bashar al-Assad to serve as a governor of an oil-rich region, underscoring his senior position within the Syrian regime. After retiring, the Defendant relocated to the United States, where he allegedly committed immigration fraud by concealing his connection to acts of torture. 

In addressing the legal standard, Mr. Mausner reminded the Court that Magistrate Judge Donahue had already found the Defendant to be both a flight risk and a danger to the community, and that the defense’s current arguments were based on “recycled evidence” that had already been considered at previous bail hearings. He pointed out that although the Defendant had presented bail resources during a prior reconsideration hearing, the Court had still denied release.

Mr. Mausner further argued that since the first detention hearing on August 30, 2024, a superseding indictment had been filed, adding charges including allegations of torture, which now exposed the Defendant to a potential life sentence. Mr. Mausner contended that this significantly increased the Defendant’s incentive to flee and triggered the statutory presumption in favor of detention found at 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2) and (3).

Regarding the collapse of the Syrian regime, Mr. Mausner contended that this fact did not meaningfully alter the Defendant’s risk profile. He argued that the defense could not simultaneously disavow the Defendant’s ties to the Assad regime and also claim those ties no longer matter because the regime had fallen. Mr. Mausner also emphasized that Syria still has no extradition treaty with the United States, and the Defendant’s family allegedly has a $300,000 house in Syria.

Mr. Mausner also pushed back on the defense’s focus on family support and financial pledges, stating that such factors did not mitigate the Defendant’s danger to the community. Mr. Mausner stated that the witnesses were ordinary Syrian citizens imprisoned for minor infractions such as traffic violations, not “activists” like the defense argued, and were allegedly subjected to torture by the Defendant. Mr. Mausner noted that several victims had only come forward after learning the Defendant was detained in the United States, and that this had given them “confidence” to share their experiences. Mr. Mausner noted that additional victims had continued to come forward since then, and that interviews with U.S. agencies were ongoing.

Mr. Mausner concluded by arguing that the presumption of detention applied and had not been rebutted.

Throughout the Government’s arguments, the Defendant was largely expressionless, staring straight ahead and occasionally fidgeting with his wrist restraints. He cleared his throat several times, particularly when the Government referenced acts of torture, but otherwise avoided making eye contact with the judge, the attorneys, or his family.

C. Defendant’s Reply

On reply, Ms. Marino reiterated the Defendant’s prior arguments, emphasizing that the Government’s position was “cofounded by the existence of the regime,” which she argued no longer existed. She again characterized the idea that the Defendant could flee to Russia or Iran as implausible, asking rhetorically whether he was “just going to walk into Russia,” and dismissing the concern as speculative.

Her tone during this portion of the argument was notably more condescending, and Judge Vera appeared less engaged, watching with a neutral expression. Ms. Marino further argued that Magistrate Judge Donahue “did not get to learn about [the Defendant’s] family properly” in the prior hearing, though the earlier proceeding had centered heavily on the family’s presence and support.

Moreover, Ms. Marino briefly referenced the Defendant’s phone contacts, stating that the mere presence of names of former Syrian officials in a contact list does not establish communication. Ms. Marino remarked that she herself “barely knows whose numbers are in [her] phone.”

Finally, Ms. Marino concluded by emphasizing that the Defendant “has nowhere to go” and that “this is where his family is.” She argued that the Defendant lacks connections, financial means, or resources abroad, and therefore has no motivation to flee. Instead, she asserted that the Defendant had a “strong motivation” to fight the torture charges, and that he should be permitted to do so from home, with his family.

D. Closing Observations Before the Court Took the Matter Under Submission

Following the conclusion of defense counsel’s reply, Judge Vera thanked both parties for their arguments and acknowledged the presence of the Defendant’s family in the courtroom. Overall, Judge Vera allowed counsel for both sides to present their positions without significant interruption, signaling a willingness to give each party the time they needed to be fully heard. Throughout the proceeding, Judge Vera maintained a measured and attentive demeanor, watching the attorneys closely and listening carefully to each argument. While he asked only a few targeted questions, his body language including serious expression, steady eye contact, and subtle reactions, reflected active engagement with the issues presented.

At the close of the hearing, the Pretrial Services officer verbally indicated that location monitoring may be a viable condition of release, though no written recommendation was available on the docket at the time. Judge Vera took the matter under submission and did not issue a ruling from the bench.

III. OUTCOME

On April 21, 2025, the Court denied Defendant’s Application, finding that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community.”^[4]

The Court first noted that “[r]econsideration of a defendant’s detention order may be granted only on new information or a change in circumstances ‘that has a material bearing on the issue whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.’”^[5] Pretrial detention of a defendant was permitted where it could be demonstrated that the defendant was a flight risk or where there was “no assurance that release [was] consistent with the safety [of] another person or the community.”^[6] Only one of the conditions needed to be met, not both.^[7]

Moreover, where the charges against the defendant fell into a statutorily enumerated category, there was a rebuttable presumption against detention.^[8] In addition to the presumption for detention, the court was also required to consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person seeking release; (3) the history and characteristics of the person; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant’s release.^[9]

Here, the Court found that, “[w]hile the dissolution of the Syrian regime does somewhat mitigate Defendant’s potential risk of flight, it does not eliminate it” because Alsheikh “could still go back to Syria, where he has a home and family, including a child and grandchildren.”^[10] Or, if he was afraid of retribution by rebel forces in Syria, he could go to a third country that was friendly to the former regime, such as Russia, perhaps by leveraging his contacts with the former regime.^[11] Though the Court “did not take lightly the significant sureties offered by Defendant’s family” as security against a bond, the charges against the Defendant included “serious crimes of torture, evincing a danger to the community and to the witnesses that spoke out against him publicly.”^[12] It was “much more plausible” that those witnesses “likely only felt comfortable coming forward publicly because Defendant is in custody.”^[13] In that regard, the Court could consider harm to potential witnesses in “a community of non-U.S. citizens” as well as U.S. citizens.^[14]

[1] The case is United States v. Samir Ousman Alsheikh, U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Case No. CR 24-00483-HDV.

[2] The Defendant’s two prior applications for pretrial release on bond had been heard by Magistrate Judge Patricia Donahue.

[3] The Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Second Application for Reconsideration of Detention Order set forth the governing legal standard as follows: “Reconsideration of a defendant’s detention order may be granted only on new information or a change in circumstances ‘that has a material bearing on the issue whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.’ 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); see also United States v. Villegas, 587 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that consideration centers on whether there is any qualitatively different information with a material bearing on the only issue that matters for the Bail Reform Act – the risk of defendant’s non-appearance at court proceedings or of their danger to the community if released).” Def.’s Mem. Supp. of Second Appl. For Recons. Of Det. Order. 3, Mar. 4, 2025.

[4] (In Chambers) Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Order Denying Defendant’s Application for Review/Reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s Order Setting Conditions of Release/Detention, C.D. Cal. Case No. CR-24-00483-HDV-1 (April 21, 2025) (“Order”), at 4.

[5] Order at 2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)).

[6] Order at 2 (citations omitted).

[7] Order at 2.

[8] Order at 2 (citations omitted).

[9] Order at 2 (citing United States v. Hir, 517 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008)).

[10] Order at 3.

[11] Order at 3-4.

[12] Order at 3-4.

[13] Order at 4 (emphasis added).

[14] Order at 4.

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