The Syrian Government Must Investigate the Targeting of Alawite Civilians in Homs

Multiple times per week since early 2025, SJAC has received reports about Syrians, both men and women, being killed by “unknown gunmen” or found dead bearing gunshot wounds. Based upon interviews conducted by SJAC documenters with Syrians on the ground, as well as media reports, a few distinct patterns emerge. This article aims to provide context on one pattern of violence that has ebbed and flowed from January to early May 2025 and that has shown no signs of stopping: the killing of Alawite civilians in Homs city and surrounding areas. Though SJAC was unable to confirm every incident, reports suggest that Alawite victims are being targeted based on their sect. These killings are driven in part by some Syrians’ assumption that most Alawites were affiliated with the Assad government, or at least tacitly supported its actions during the conflict.

With this article, SJAC seeks to highlight the apparent pattern of violence against Alawite civilians and urge the authorities to investigate these acts and the motives driving them. The state has a responsibility to investigate crimes that violate the fundamental right to life and particularly those committed based upon discrimination as these violate protections afforded by the Constitutional Declaration and the Syrian Penal Code. SJAC strongly condemns these killings and calls on the transitional government to prosecute the perpetrators and prevent similar attacks, considering that the potential backlash could lead to mass displacement and/or widespread violence similar to the atrocities that occurred in Syria’s coastal governorates in March 2025.

Reports of civilians, often Alawite individuals, being killed by “unknown gunmen” or “unknown masked men” have been circulating weekly since early 2025. In contrast to the ongoing revenge killings of both Sunni and Alawite individuals with suspected involvement in the Assad military/intelligence, the deaths of these civilians are not tied to their direct involvement in past atrocities but to their sectarian identity. SJAC assesses that many of these incidents amount to sectarian revenge killings because they are committed based on a perception that Alawites have some affiliation with the regime. These attacks targeting civilians in Alawite-majority neighborhoods indicate that some Syrians still view all Alawites as involved with the Assad regime and complicit in the regime’s actions earlier in the conflict.

Reports show that these incidents are concentrated in specific geographic areas. While similar incidents have occurred in Latakia and Hama, these incidents appear to be most prevalent in several neighborhoods in Homs city and nearby areas of Homs governorate. The sentiment that Alawites are by default complicit in the Assad regime’s atrocities is likely stronger in Homs city compared to other areas of Syria, given Homs city’s unique history during the conflict. There, thousands of Sunni civilians were displaced after being exposed to gross forms of violations - including several massacres - that were sometimes committed by their neighbors from an Alawite background.

Masked Gunmen Fire at Random in Alawite-Majority Neighborhoods

SJAC documenters assess that since a large portion of these victims are Alawites, these random attacks may indicate that Alawites are specifically targeted. Witnesses increasingly report unknown masked gunmen on motorcycles firing at homes in Alawite-majority neighborhoods, killing and wounding civilians on the streets, inside their homes, or sitting on their balconies. SJAC has not verified the identities of the perpetrators.

Since late April, SJAC has received multiple reports of these incidents, including a woman who was killed and her husband injured in Homs city’s Karam Al-Zeitoun neighborhood when unknown gunmen on a motorcycle fired on their home while the victims were sitting outside. “Unknown militants” reportedly shot and killed an Alawite man, Ali Asef Ibraim, while he was standing near his home in the Al-Nuzha neighborhood of Homs city in April as well. Another woman, Sahar Ibrahim, was killed in early May in a similar incident in Karam Al-Loz neighborhood. Karam Al-Zeitoun, Karam Al-Loz, and Al-Nuzha neighborhoods, along with Wadi Al-Dahab, are Alawite majority neighborhoods.

Alawite Civilians Kidnapped, Bodies Found Days Later

In dozens of other cases since early 2025, Alawite men and women have been kidnapped from areas near their homes or workplaces, and their bodies are reportedly found several days later bearing gunshot wounds. For example, two brothers, Mohammad and Amjad Samer Shaddoud, were kidnapped near the Al-Asil roundabout in Homs city while returning home from work. Five days later, the two men were found dead in Hama governorate. In another case, five Alawite men from a single family were found dead after being kidnapped from their home in the Alawite-majority Al-Sabeel neighborhood in early April. SJAC documenters have received reports of numerous other similar cases between February and early May 2025. 

These persistent killings, which target Alawite-majority areas or Alawite civilians, reflect several major obstacles to stability and transitional justice in Syria. Though SJAC documenters note that the transitional government has some security presence in areas of Homs city where killings have occurred, this security presence is not an effective deterrent against violent attacks on civilians. In social media posts announcing the deaths, a significant portion of those commenting imply that the transitional government and its security forces have condoned or even facilitated these murders. Despite the presence of General Security checkpoints at the entrances to the city, documenters report that Syrians have doubts about the transitional government’s ability and/or willingness to prevent such attacks, which further contributes to a general attitude of distrust and fear.

 If these killings continue unchecked, potential outcomes could be devastating. For example, SJAC notes that a potential motivation for some sectarian killings in Homs may be to force displacement of Alawites from the area. In recent months, protests have occurred in Homs featuring chants like “Homs is for the Sunnis, Alawites - get out!” (حمص للسنة، العلوية اطلعوا منها). A major displacement of Alawites to the coastal governorates could facilitate even further division in Syria and reduce prospects for peaceful coexistence between Syrians of different sects. Continued killings of Alawites in Homs city could also spark an armed response from Alawite communities, causing widespread violence similar to what occurred on the coast in early March 2025, or on a more limited scale in Jaramana and Sahnaya in April/May 2025. 

 Conclusion 

The transitional government has made multiple outward commitments to achieving “civil peace” in recent months, including organizing a commission to investigate the atrocities on the coast. While these actions are positive, the government must follow through on its responsibilities to citizens to appropriately investigate all violations - including the apparent targeting of Alawites in Homs city - hold perpetrators accountable, and ensure that such killings are not allowed to continue unchecked. 

Beyond that, Al-Sharaa and the transitional government should prioritize putting a stop to the killing of Alawite civilians in Homs. The likely consequences of continued killings are mass displacement, division, and widespread violence. This could undermine efforts to create a stable Syria governed by justice and the rule of law. Considering the results of  sectarian-motivated killings in other post-conflict environments, such as the killing and mass displacement of Sunni civilians in Shi’a-majority areas in Iraq, Syria’s transitional government should recognize the opportunity it currently has to investigate and prevent further killing of Alawite civilians before the situation escalates further. 

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