SJAC’s Analysis of Atrocities Committed in Latakia and Tartous

Overview

On March 6, 2025, a group of pro-Assad insurgents ambushed members of the new government’s General Security forces near Jableh (Latakia governorate), killing more than 13 members. Pro-Assad groups launched several similar attacks on the new government’s security forces in Latakia and Tartous the same day, killing dozens. The attacks prompted the interim government led by Ahmed Al-Sharaa to send reinforcements to the area. In the hours that followed, unofficial and informal calls for mobilization resulted in various armed factions heading to Latakia and Tartous, including Syrian National Army Factions that operate nominally under the Ministry of Defense. Between March 6 and March 10, hundreds of civilians (mainly Alawites) and detained fighters were executed, and homes and other civilian property were looted and/or burned. 

The events of March 6 - March 10 likely represent the most concentrated period of violence that Syria has witnessed in years. SJAC has not independently verified the casualty counts, but circulating estimates assert that at least 800 civilians have been killed, with other sources estimating more than 900. Initial reporting from SJAC documenters suggest that a large portion of civilian casualties have been discovered near Banias (Tartous governorate) with some reporting nearly 150 civilians executed. Other areas with significant casualties include Jableh and rural areas of Latakia and Tartous governorates. The retaliatory violence also extended to neighboring provinces, including villages near Masyaf (a diverse area in Hama governorate), where various factions killed civilians and burned property. 

By March 10, the interim government’s Ministry of Defense announced that military operations on the coast had ended, with a ceasefire put in place, but some media have reported that violations continue to occur, such as the alleged murder of a family in their home in Qardaha, Latakia governorate. 

SJAC will continue to evaluate open-source evidence and the testimony of those who witnessed the attacks in Latakia, Tartous, and Hama, with a plan to publish a full investigation discussing this evidence in the coming months. In the short term, SJAC seeks to provide clarity on three aspects of the events:

1. The actors involved;
2. The misinformation and lack of nuance in online reporting about the violence;
3. The degree to which Al-Sharaa’s interim government holds responsibility for the violations committed. 

Actors 

Following the initial ambushes that killed members of the new government’s General Security personnel near Jableh on March 6, three types of actors responded to the attacks. The actions and behavior of these groups towards civilians on the coast vary significantly.

Government Forces 

The first group to respond were the interim government’s forces operating under the Ministry of Defense and the General Security Directorate. The bulk of this group is made up of HTS fighters and the newly recruited General Security personnel. Although several videos appeared showing members of the General Security carrying out summary executions, according to SJAC documenters and open-source evidence, these fighters appeared to be the most disciplined and least likely to have engaged in violations against civilians. SJAC also received reports that members of the General Security forces attempted to help rescue or protect civilians on the coast from being killed by actors from other groups. 

Government-Affiliated Armed Factions 

Another party to respond were factions that are part of what was known as the Syrian National Army, such as the Hamzat and Suleiman Shah/Amshat divisions, who came to Latakia and Tartous from northern Syria. Members of these factions have committed violations against civilians in Afrin, Al-Bab, and elsewhere in northern Syria for several years. They are known for engaging in arbitrary arrests, kidnapping, extortion, looting, and other housing land and property violations. Both factions were part of the “Military Victory Conference” in late January, where they all agreed that Al-Sharaa will become the interim president of Syria. In February, Al-Sharaa made a visit to Afrin, with promises that the factions would be incorporated under the new government’s Ministry of Defense. SJAC and other observers assess that these factions were responsible for a considerable part of the brutality - executions, looting, burning of property - that has occurred in Latakia, Tartous and Hama since March 6. 

Foreign Fighters 

The final group engaged in the response consists of foreign fighters, including Chechyans, Uyghurs (Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria), and Arabs from outside Syria, including Algerians and Egyptians. Video footage shows some of these fighters making religiously-motivated calls for the killing of Alawites as they allegedly headed towards Latakia. Foreign jihadist fighters are suspected of committing serious crimes, namely summary executions. SJAC is still in the process of collecting and analyzing this evidence. 

Incorrect and Imprecise Coverage 

The fact that heinous atrocities occurred from March 6 onward is undisputed. However, various pro-Assad groups engaged in online disinformation campaigns, as they have since the fall of the regime in December 2024, with the goal of further enflaming divisive narratives. These groups posted fake videos and videos of executions from earlier in the conflict, claiming that they represented ongoing violations targeting civilians and minorities in Latakia and Tartous. Fact-checking entities also identified sources claiming that civilians, including many Syrian Christians, had been executed - claims that turned out to be false. In multiple cases, Christians reported to have been killed later posted to social media confirming they were indeed alive. Religious leaders from Syria’s Christian community also dismissed claims that Christians were being targeted in mass killings. 

In addition to disinformation, some journalists and international actors responding to the events have circulated simplistic narratives, such as U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s post on X, which framed the events as a matter of “radical Islamic terrorists” attacking minorities in Syria. Such narratives lump together all actors operating on behalf of the new government – labeling them all as religious extremists motivated by deep-seated hatred and violence. Sectarian rhetoric has been a prominent feature of the entire post-Assad landscape, and these events are no exception, but observers must note that for the most part, attacks in Alawite areas are not driven by raw religious hatred between groups. 

Rather, they are the result of various factors, namely the former regime’s practice of actively exploiting sectarian differences to consolidate power over the last 54 years. Reconciliation after this sort of prolonged divisive governance does not happen overnight. 

Another major factor driving revenge attacks since the fall of the regime is the lack of an effective transitional justice process by the interim government that would provide full justice and accountability for those responsible for violations committed under Assad, given the assumption held by many Syrians that Alawites are broadly affiliated with the Assad regime. 

Interim Government Bears Responsibility  

Al-Sharaa made two public speeches about the events on March 7 and March 9, during which he claimed that security forces were not permitted to be excessive in their response and promised that those responsible for atrocities would be held accountable. Nevertheless, available evidence and relevant international legal framework(s) indicate that the interim government bears responsibility for the events that occurred. Geolocated video footage suggests that government forces were involved in at least one indiscriminate military attack, where unguided bombs were seen being pushed out of a helicopter onto a civilian area in Jableh, Latakia governorate. 

The interim government, which acts on behalf of the Syrian state de facto assuming all its functions, has admitted that some of those fighting on its behalf have committed violations against civilians, although the General Security claimed that the individuals it had arrested were part of an “undisciplined group.” 

The recorded violations committed by those persons or entities (de jure or de facto) affiliated to the Syrian interim government constitute internationally wrongful acts, and they are attributable to the (Syrian) state. 

According to the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, the conduct of any State organ, including individuals or entities exercising any functions, is considered an act of that State, regardless of that organ’s character or position within the organization of the State. An ultra vires act, an act beyond an entity’s legal authority, would not absolve the State from its responsibility. According to the international law of state responsibility, “[t]he conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.” 

The interim government is, therefore, responsible for all the violations committed by individuals or groups under its control, and is legally required to immediately stop these violations, (genuinely) hold the perpetrators accountable, and prevent the commission of further violations. 

Al-Sharaa has taken some public steps towards accountability for the violations, although SJAC assesses that these steps will have limited impact without some modifications. In his speech on March 9, Al-Sharaa claimed that anyone “whose hands were stained with blood” would be held accountable and that no one would be above the law. He also announced the formation of a 7-person fact-finding committee to investigate the events that took place on the coast. The group is tasked with submitting a report to the President within 30 days. In a March 11 press conference, committee spokesman Yasser Al-Farhan promised to submit the investigation results to the judiciary, including a list of likely perpetrators. SJAC notes that the Syrian judiciary is not currently functioning and is, therefore, ill-equipped to facilitate accountability for these violations. 

Recommendations

 Given the current lack of potential for accountability via the judiciary, SJAC recommends that the interim government release the fact-finding committee’s findings publicly. SJAC urges that the interim government exercise transparency in its dealings with the perpetrators, including those who the General Security has already arrested. Steps taken to ensure accountability should be transparent, and charges and trials should be public.

 SJAC also recommends that the interim government allow independent monitors into Latakia and Tartous to investigate the atrocities. Allowing an independent investigative body, such as the UN Commission of Inquiry, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, or the International Committee of the Red Cross, would demonstrate a good faith effort on the part of the government to investigate the atrocities and hold perpetrators accountable. Finally, SJAC requests that the interim government urgently work towards creating a formal, efficient transitional justice process that can earn the confidence of Syrians. Without such a mechanism, revenge attacks will continue to occur, as people may feel compelled to take matters into their own hands.

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