Inside the Majdi N. Trial #5: Testimony of Context Witness Thomas Pierret, University Supervisor of Majdi N. in France

TRIAL OF MAJDI N.

Court of Assize – Paris, France

Trial Monitoring Summary #5

Hearing Date: May 5, 2025   

CAUTION: Some testimony may include graphic descriptions of torture, rape or other violent acts.  

Note that this summary is not a verbatim transcript of the trial; it is merely an unofficial summary of the proceedings.  

Throughout this summary, [information located in brackets are notes from our trial monitor] and “information placed in quotes are statements made by the witness, judges or counsel.” The names and identifying information of witnesses have been redacted. 

[Note: SJAC provides a summary of the proceedings while redacting certain details to protect witness privacy and to preserve the integrity of the trial.]

[Note: Rather than publishing the trial reports of the Majdi N. case in chronological order, SJAC has organized them thematically and coherently based on the content of the hearings, making the material more accessible by highlighting key issues and connections across the proceedings.]

SJAC’s 5^th trial monitoring report details day 03 (afternoon) of the trial of Majdi N. in Paris, France. On this trial day, Context Witness Thomas Pierret, W3, senior researcher of the CNRS (French National Centre for Scientific Research) in comparative politics with a focus on Syria, relayed that he met Majdi N. twice in Istanbul in August 2015 and in 2017 as part of his research. Witness Pierret then met him in France before his arrest. Witness Pierret recounted he valued the work of the Toran Center where Majdi N. had worked in Turkey. He believed the Accused was an outsider in Jaysh Al-Islam in terms of sociological profile and believed he joined the group because of his personal connection to Zahran Alloush, and not because of ideological motives. Witness Pierret did not perceive Majdi N. as someone who played an important role inside Jaysh Al-Islam when it came to decision-making on the ground. Witness Pierret described Jaysh Al-Islam as a Salafist movement with no highly systematized political ideology. Regarding the attack of Adra Al-Omaliya عدرا العمالية, Witness Pierret stated it had been attributed either to the regime or to rebel groups, and there was no definitive version.

May 03 – May 05, 2025

Afternoon Session

The proceedings started at 2:36 PM.

Witness Thomas Pierret said to have seen Majdi N. in Istanbul twice, in August 2015 and in 2017. Witness Pierret saw Majdi N. a third time after the latter’s arrival in France for his studies. Majdi N. worked for Witness Pierret as an unpaid trainee at the University of Aix-en-Provence.

Witness Pierret was sworn in.

Presiding Judge Lavergne’s Questioning of Witness Thomas Pierret

Questioned about the circumstances of Majdi N.’s arrival in France, Witness Pierret explained Majdi N. wanted to study political science and contacted the witness in 2018. In 2019, Majdi N. informed Witness Pierret that he had obtained a merit scholarship called Erasmus for his good results [at the University in Istanbul]. This scholarship program entailed a few weeks' long internship adapted to the student's personal motivations. Majdi N. dealt with visa issues, and when he eventually arrived in France, the seminars he wished to attend were already over. As a consequence, he mainly worked on his research project on military operations of an armed group (not Jaysh Al-Islam) in central Syria, around Homs, and conducted lots of interviews with its leaders to understand what had happened.

Presiding Judge Lavergne reported Majdi N.’s good results during his studies in Turkey and Hungary and his interest in political questions. He wondered if Witness Pierret had any idea about Majdi N.’s projects after his stay in Aix-en-Provence. Witness Pierret said he knew Majdi N. had planned to join a Master’s program and had conducted an interview with King’s College London. 

Witness Pierret considered Majdi N. to be easy to reach at that time, since he was a spokesperson of Jaysh Al-Islam. Journalists and researchers knew him, as well as spokespersons in other Syrian groups. Witness Pierret confirmed he met Majdi N. before the death of Zahran Alloush on December 25, 2015.

Presiding Judge Lavergne asked Witness Pierret to describe Majdi N.’s personality. Witness Pierret was struck by Majdi N.’s analytical skills that were not necessarily common among people of the opposition. For instance, Majdi N. gave Witness Pierret some ideas for comparing the command structures of different factions. Witness Pierret had conducted interviews with other spokespersons who would provide prephrased responses, but Majdi N. shared true analysis.

Presiding Judge Lavergne wondered if Witness Pierret knew about Majdi N.’s other activities besides his role as spokesperson, which Witness Pierret denied. After his resignation from Jaysh Al-Islam, Majdi N.’s role in the Toran Center increased, Witness Pierret relayed [the Toran Center was a research center located in Turkey and linked to Jaysh Al-Islam. Majdi N. likely headed the Center while he resided in Turkey. The Toran Center was repeatedly referred to during the trial]. Witness Pierret added that this Center produced concrete analysis on recent political developments, just like American or European think-tanks. From the years 2016-2017, centers of this type proliferated. Witness Pierret had little information on links between the Toran Center, Turkey, and Jaysh Al-Islam, but Turkey provided work authorization and likely benefited from those unofficial intermediaries. When asked by Presiding Judge Lavergne, Witness Pierret did not know if the former head of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Force [redacted name], F27 has had a role in the center.

Presiding Judge Lavergne inquired about Majdi N.’s situation between 2015 and 2017. Witness Pierret had no direct discussion with Majdi N. at that time and only knew he changed his name and dedicated himself to research without a partisan affiliation. Questioned about the cause of Majdi N.’s resignation from Jaysh Al-Islam, Witness Pierret stated the interview with [Israeli journalist] Elizabeth Tsurkov, F32, was the trigger, but believed it was a pretext and there were deeper underlying factors. It seemed to him that Majdi N. was an outsider in Jaysh Al-Islam in terms of his sociological profile. In contrast, the profiles of Jaysh Al-Islam members were rather homogenous, made up of merchants both religious and devout, while Majdi N. joined Jaysh Al-Islam due to his personal connections, particularly his link to Zahran Alloush. After his death, Majdi N. did not have particular ties with the rest of the group, Witness Pierret reported.

Presiding Judge Lavergne mentioned a video interview with an American journalist organized by Majdi N. where Zahran Alloush was questioned about democracy and values. Witness Pierret dated the interview to June 2015 and stressed the Syrian rebels were about to win the war at that time, so they wanted to show themselves in the best light. At the same time, they were aware of the many questions the diplomatic missions had toward Islamist-oriented groups. Witness Pierret had no information on Majdi N.’s role in international negotiation forums. He also noted that unlike other factions, ISIS had no intent to negotiate with anybody.

Presiding Judge Lavergne then mentioned another video called “the Position of Zahran Alloush toward Democracy” where Zahran Alloush expressed to a Syrian audience a completely different discourse on democracy, instead criticizing it sharply. Presiding Judge Lavergne said it could be perceived as duplicity [The French term “double discours” is translated as “duplicity” in all trial reports. This expression was repeatedly used by the Prosecution and the Civil Parties’ Counsels during the trial. It points to the idea that an individual conceals his real intent and adapts his discourse depending on the audience, telling the truth and revealing his true views only to specific people, but lying to others. The ‘double discours’ also echoes the Islamic concept of Taqiyya تقيّة, or dissimulation, which is regarded as the act of maintaining secrecy or mystifying one's beliefs when one's life or property is threatened]. Defense Counsel Ruiz intervened to stress that the duplicity was a view of the Civil Parties. Witness Pierret asked for the date of the video, which was unknown. Prosecutor Thouault emphasized that in this video, Zahran Alloush said that it was possible to adapt one’s speech depending on the audience.

When questioned about Majdi N.’s links with organizations promoting human rights and fighting war crimes, Witness Pierret declared he knew very little and had only heard about an article published after Majdi N.’s arrest that mentioned such meetings.

Regarding the Defense witnesses from the NGO Geneva Call who could not come, Witness Pierret had little to say, besides the fact that he had learned about Majdi N.’s arrest from [redacted name], F20, a lawyer from the same organization who organized trainings on international law for Syrian organizations (see Trial Report #21).

Presiding Judge Lavergne inquired about Majdi N.’s background. Witness Pierret stated Majdi N. was born in 1988 and spent a part of his life in Saudi Arabia before moving to Damascus, where he started studying medicine. At the outbreak of the Syrian conflict, Majdi N. was captain, Witness Pierret said. However, Presiding Judge Lavergne corrected the witness and explained that Majdi N. became known as Captain Islam Alloush in Jaysh Al-Islam, but was a sergeant when he served in the regime’s official army, which the Defense confirmed. During his military service in the Syrian Army, Majdi N. took classes at Homs Military Academy, Witness Pierret reported. He further stated that Majdi N. left the Syrian Army in 2012 to join Jaysh Al-Islam. Witness Pierret had no details on Majdi N.’s military skills.

The Defense Counsel dated the defection of Majdi N. from the Syrian Army to December 2, 2012, and the Prosecution mentioned a document dating it to November 28, 2012. Presiding Judge Lavergne concluded that the defection likely occurred in November 2012.

Presiding Judge Lavergne wondered if the Free Syrian Army (FSA) immediately intended to engage in combat or first meant to protect civilians. Witness Pierret affirmed its first unit emerged in 2011 to protect civilians, as the regime still held a predominantly favorable tactical position. The only thing the FSA could do was prevent security forces from entering [liberated territories] and help civilians to enter such areas without being shot at. Then, as both the regime’s repression and the rebellion intensified, the rebels’ discourse shifted towards overthrowing the regime.

Presiding Judge Lavergne asked if FSA espoused secular and generally tolerant convictions. Witness Pierret considered the term “secular” was not adapted to the context, and FSA was rather non-ideological. They presented themselves as the armed wing of the revolutionary movement, without seeking to replace the protesters. During the first year of the conflict, there was essentially nothing other than the FSA. In 2012, Islamist factions that no longer identified with the FSA label began to emerge, as they rejected the national framework from the outset, positioning themselves within a transnational logic. Other groups adopted a more ambiguous and shifting stance. The Supreme Military Council of the FSA was created during the Antalya conference [on December 7, 2012]—a project backed by the US to end rivalries between regional allies and coordinate support for the Syrian rebellion. Jaysh Al-Islam initially took part, but withdrew after a few months, presumably because they did not receive what they had expected, particularly in terms of fair distribution of resources. When asked by Presiding Judge Lavergne, Witness Pierret confirmed some groups were directly sponsored by regional states, bypassing central command of the FSA.

Presiding Judge Lavergne questioned Witness Pierret about the consequences of such fragmentation between the armed groups. To Witness Pierret, the ideological one-upmanship among the various factions was driven by several factors: the massacres; the bombings; the open intervention of Iran and Hezbollah starting in the spring of 2013, which gave the conflict a sectarian dimension; and the US response—or lack thereof—as well as opposition to the West and what it represents in terms of values. There were also specific dynamics within the Syrian political opposition that prevailed over the Saudi-backed clients began to gain the upper hand over those supported by Qatar, and in response, Qatar encouraged its clients fragmentation to escalate their rhetoric and posture. Starting in 2013, relations between factions grew increasingly tense. Fragmentation became apparent to escalate their rhetoric and posture. Starting in 2013, relations between factions grew increasingly tense. Fragmentation became apparent at every level, due to the stalemate of the conflict and the increasingly unlikely prospect of victory. The rise of ISIS, which at the time appeared powerful and unstoppable, pushed many rebel groups to engage in ideological overbidding as a first reaction. to escalate their rhetoric and posture. Starting in 2013, relations between factions grew increasingly tense. Fragmentation became apparentclients to escalate their rhetoric and posture. Starting in 2013, relations between factions grew increasingly tense. Fragmentation became apparent at every level, due to the stalemate of the conflict and the increasingly unlikely prospect of victory. The rise of ISIS, which at the time appeared powerful and unstoppable, pushed many rebel groups to engage in ideological overbidding as a first reaction.

When questioned about the siege of Eastern Ghouta, Witness Pierret affirmed that this region was a priority to the regime at the moment when it was at its weakest, confined to the center of Damascus. The regime lacked the manpower to retake the territory, so it resorted to laying siege to the area to impose an organized famine. Presiding Judge Lavergne stated this situation also gave rise to a specific kind of economy from which some benefited. Some members of intelligence services and some leaders inside the besieged area started cooperating among themselves via tunnels. Replying to Presiding Judge Lavergne, Witness Pierret reported three categories of war profiteers: military leaders; rebel factions; and intermediaries such as businessmen.

Presiding Judge Lavergne asked if Majdi N. told Witness Pierret about battles where rebel factions managed to seize significant territories and maintain lines of communication to prevent the siege. Witness Pierret confirmed this, mentioning the battle of Al-Otaiba العتيبة in April 2013, a city which is a gateway toward the northern desert. This battle marked the beginning of the siege of Ghouta. Witness Pierret believed Majdi N. arrived in Turkey after that defeat.

Questioned by Presiding Judge Lavergne, Witness Pierret said Majdi N. did mention his supervisory role in Jaysh Al-Islam's military training camps. Witness Pierret said recruitment in armed factions initially did not appear challenging because of popular mobilization fueled by feelings of rebellion and hopes for victory, combined with the considerable funding available to these factions. Witness Pierret recounted he heard about child recruitment only after the counts against Majdi N. were released in the press. He had first heard of that practice in documentaries, but not regarding Jaysh Al-Islam. He then became aware of the phenomenon of organized recruitment of minors in other groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra جبهة النصرة and the Revolutionary Youth Movement حركة الشبيبة الثورية but was not aware of a specific branch dedicated to this task within Jaysh Al-Islam. Responding to Presiding Judge Lavergne, Witness Pierret had no information on the role Majdi N. could have played in propaganda.

Regarding Majdi N.’s view on ISIS, Witness Pierret stated an open war resulted in ISIS almost being completely driven out of Eastern Ghouta. Referring to Witness Pierret’s statement before the Investigative Judge, Presiding Judge Lavergne explained that Majdi N. considered it difficult to explain why the fight against ISIS was necessary, since it was also a rebel group and killing a Muslim complicated one’s access to heaven. Witness Pierret confirmed Majdi N. mentioned difficulties to convince Jaysh Al-Islam of the need to fight ISIS, but these difficulties seemed to have been overcome in practice. Presiding Judge Lavergne referred to videos where Jaysh Al-Islam slit the throat of ISIS combatants, which Witness Pierret was not aware of. However, Witness Pierret recalled scenes staged by Jaysh Al-Islam of executions of ISIS fighters.

Presiding Judge Lavergne inquired about people being placed in cages in [Douma] markets as a reaction to attacks by the Syrian government on liberated areas [see also Trial Report #15 and Trial Report #19, among others]. Witness Pierret confirmed government bombings had killed several dozen civilians at the central market [of Douma], after which Jaysh Al-Islam placed civilians they were holding as prisoners in cages. When asked about Majdi N.’s statement to the Investigative Judge on the prison system, Witness Pierret reported they had talked together about the most famous one, At-Tawba, and in particular about discipline and sanctions. Witness Pierret had no information about civilians being captured during military raids like in Adra Al-Omaliya. Presiding Judge Lavergne asked Witness Pierret if he was aware of massacres of civilians motivated by sectarianism, Witness Pierret recalled fairly contradictory accounts on what happened in Adra. To his knowledge, there has never been a detailed report. The attacks had been attributed either to the regime or to rebel groups. There was no definitive version, although some accounts referred to massacres with sectarian motivations. Witness Pierret did not study the work of the Pinheiro Commission [Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic]..

Presiding Judge Lavergne referred to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM)’s documentation of rebel strikes on civilian areas in Damascus and Aleppo held by the regime, and Witness Pierret confirmed these had occurred. Presiding Judge Lavergne described it as a logic of retaliation, and Witness Pierret agreed, saying rebel strikes were an indiscriminate response to bombings, but incomparable in scale. In contrast, there is nothing left today of rebel neighborhoods, Witness Pierret emphasized.

When questioned about developments in Jaysh Al-Islam after Zahran Alloush’s death, Witness Pierret mentioned two important phases: a fratricidal and self-destructive battle on the eve of the regime's recapture of Ghouta in the spring of 2018; and then a relocation of Jaysh Al-Islam to northern areas held by the Turkish army. At that time, Jaysh Al-Islam joined the Syrian National Army (SNA), which had emerged in 2017 and had already incorporated several formerly FSA groups. Jaysh Al-Islam thus became a component of the SNA, and all incorporated factions remained autonomous. These different factions now command the new Arab Syrian Army [after the fall of the Assad government], and a division is headed by a member of Jaysh Al-Islam, Witness Pierret explained.

Presiding Judge Lavergne wondered if Witness Pierret had an idea of how the justice system functioned when Jaysh Al-Islam was in control of Eastern Ghouta. Witness Pierret stated that Jaysh Al-Islam’s main rivals supported the idea of a judicial authority independent from rebel factions, whereas Jaysh Al-Islam pushed for its own body, which resulted in a permanent struggle. The Unified Judicial Council was an attempt to establish a body independent from factions, but it did not survive tensions. Regarding the so-called Shoura Council, Jaysh Al-Islam’s advisory body headed by [redacted name], F28, Witness Pierret reported the Shoura’s role was similar to a Cabinet, i.e. to advise leaders on decision-making. Witness Pierret said issuing fatwas was not the Shoura’s main mission. In some factions where such a Council also existed, the Shoura was dedicated to political and military issues, and another body was more strictly dedicated to religious matters.  Some groups, like ISIS, could seek to impose a moral order without any clear appointed body.

Civil Parties’ Counsels Questioning of Witness Thomas Pierret

Counsel Bailly mentioned Witness Pierret’s description of Jaysh Al-Islam as a quietist Salafist group which later evolved. Witness Pierret explained he did not categorize it as a jihadist group because some jihadist concepts were absent: Jihadists believe armed struggle is legitimate at all times and in all places, whereas Jaysh Al-Islam believes that many conditions must be met before engaging in armed struggle, especially against an Islamic regime. Doctrinally speaking, Jaysh Al-Islam is clearly a Salafist religious movement, Witness Pierret emphasized. However, Salafism is not a political ideology but a religious one, so Jaysh Al-Islam had no highly systematized political ideology. This was useful for raising funds from various entities in the Gulf: Some preachers were clearly pro-Saudi, generally advocating obedience to the ruling power and only making an exception for Syria. Jaysh Al-Islam also received support from Sururist networks associated with Muhammad Surur Zayn al-Abidin محمد سرور زين العابدين, a group nowadays considered diabolical, Witness Pierret said. There was no need to develop a more systematic ideology, he concluded.

Counsel Bailly referred to an analysis by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change entitled ‘If the castle collapses: ideology and objectives of the Syrian revolution’ and dated 2015 that was found on Majdi N.’s phone. The analysis classified rebel groups depending on several objectives, among them: 1) to defeat Bashar Al-Assad; 2) to defeat ISIS and international Jihad; 3) to create an Islamic State and an Islamic legal system; and 4) to establish democracy and protect minorities. Counsel Bailly put forward that Jaysh Al-Islam and ISIS both sought to defeat the regime and establish an Islamic State, and in addition, Jaysh Al-Islam also wished to defeat ISIS. To Witness Pierret, Jaysh Al-Islam never had any ambition outside Syria and its default position was to consider that Islamic regimes are legitimate and cannot be overthrown by force, besides in exceptional cases.

Counsel Bailly mentioned a charter adopted on November 22, 2013 by the Islamic Front الجبهة الإسلامية, an organization that descended from the Syrian Islamic Front الجبهة الإسلامية السورية and the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front جبهة تحرير سوريا الإسلامية (see Trial Report #4). Article 10 of the charter stated, "Politics without religion is unacceptable secularization." Counsel Bailly inquired about Jaysh Al-Islam’s intent to establish an Islamic State. Witness Pierret emphasized the necessity to re-contextualize. To him, this document reflected a momentary ideological escalation. Its subtitle is “The Project of the Umma.” A few months later, the Revolutionary Honor Charter [of the Fighting Brigades] ميثاق شرف ثوري للكتائب المقاتلة [signed in 2014 ]contained many fewer categorical references to Islam.  clearly aimed to establish Islamic law, which was typical of Islamist movements, but the desire to establish an Islamic State can be interpreted in very different ways, Witness Pierret argued. Islamists generally distinguish between two interpretations of democracy. The first interpretation, which is a system allowing an elected parliament some power over the executive, is acceptable to them. However, they reject the second interpretation, i.e. a system where people can pass laws contradicting religious law.

Counsel Bailly then alluded to Zahran Alloush’s hope to establish an Islamic State governed by Sharia. To Witness Pierret, all regimes seeing themselves as Islamic refer to Sharia but are organized very differently. Their only common point is [the source of] legislation. Witness Pierret agreed that Jaysh Al-Islam’s tendency is the most conservative in Islam and is influenced by Gulf ideology. They have no problem operating within a nation state without challenging its borders [i.e. without acting on an international scale].

Referring to scholar Ziad Majed [Professor at the American University in Paris], Counsel Bailly wondered if Witness Pierret agreed with his characterization of Jaysh Al-Islam’s similarities with ISIS’s societal practices and the regime’s detention practices. Witness Pierret believed there were differences in scale. ISIS carried out a genocide against the Yazidis and executed 700 people of the Al-Shaitat Tribe [الشعيطات], among other things. Counsel Bailly asked if he meant there was a difference in the scale of horror, to which Witness Pierret replied: “We can all agree that committing genocide is on an entirely different scale. What I'm referring to is scale, not severity.”

Counsel Bailly quoted Witness Pierret’s statement to the Investigative Judge that Jaysh Al-Islam was not formed to commit war crimes but to fight the regime. Witness Pierret confirmed, adding that this intention did not prevent them from committing war crimes afterwards. Counsel Bailly wondered if Jaysh Al-Islam had another agenda beside Bashar Al-Assad’s fall. Witness Pierret said they shared an ideology intending to create a State based on Sharia, but that did not constitute a war crime. Replying to Counsel Bailly, Witness Pierret defined a war crime as acts in contradiction with rules of International Humanitarian Law. Counsel Bailly then read article 3-1.(d) common to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (“the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”). Counsel Bailly then addressed the subject of human shields, quoting Witness Pierret who had said that putting civilians in cages was shocking but was not a crime; rather, it was for communication purposes. Witness Pierret clarified: His understanding of a human shield was to use civilians to protect a military target, not placing them in non-military areas. understanding of a human shield was to use civilians to protect a military target, not placing them in non-military areas.

The Civil Party Counsel requested the projection of a video of civilians from the Alawi community who were put in cages, exhibited in the streets of Douma, and interviewed by their jailers to present their situation. Counsel Bailly stated the video was dated to November 2015 and shared by the Syria Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM), and added that Jaysh Al-Islam declared to have had nothing to do with this video. Defense Counsel indicated the video had been shared by Russiatoday.

Witness Pierret noted these people in cages presented themselves as civilians and called for an end to the regime and Russia’s bombings of Eastern Ghouta. There were martyrs on all sides, he concluded.

The content of the video was translated in court [not verbatim]:

• A colonel addressed the camera: “I have been detained for 3 years, I am from the Alawi community. My fate will be the same as that of those people the regime is bombing. Two hundred martyrs died in two days. I am asking the regime: why the bombing? I live here, I have not been mistreated. We want the regime to stop bombing because Syrians are killed and we will have the same fate. Rebels have placed us in more than 100 cages, among civilians. If civilians are killed, the same will happen to us. Stop all this! We thought we belonged to the regime, but the regime sold us. (Question from a journalist.) Do you think the regime will stop? Since three years, the regime did not care about us; now we are asking for mercy.”
• Another man said: “I am from Latakia. We want the regime to stop bombing because we haven’t done anything and we sit in cages.” Another man interrupted, “We don’t sit—we have been placed in cages and scattered all over the Ghouta.”

Witness Pierret responded that he had seen pictures of the cages but had never seen this video.

Counsel Bailly then inquired about other crimes attributed to Jaysh Al-Islam and started with the massacre of Adra Al-Omaliya. Witness Pierret had nothing to say about it. Concerning the kidnapping of the four Syrians activists known as the 'Douma four', F21, F22, F23 and F24, Witness Pierret said families submitted documentation supporting their accusation against Jaysh Al-Islam. Witness Pierret had no information on Jaysh Al-Islam’s use of prisoners to construct tunnels. Regarding the recruitment of children, Counsel Bailly noted that in Witness Pierret’s opinion, it did not exist. Witness Pierret commented he might have been a bit categorical and was not there to verify, but in 2013, it was not very difficult to recruit [adults] due to [financial] resources and voluntary enrollment. Presiding Judge Lavergne emphasized Witness Pierret did not exactly declare [to the Investigative Judge] that there was no recruitment of children, but that he was surprised when he learned about it after Majdi N.’s arrest and had never heard of it before.

Counsel Bailly asked if living conditions inside the Ghouta were extremely difficult, which Witness Pierret confirmed, and then alluded to a state of necessity for families [to send their children to] Jaysh Al-Islam, who paid a combatant 200 to 300 dollars a month. Witness Pierret knew those groups had the ability to finance combatants and received funding from different sources, private or state actors. External funding was very important at that time, Witness Pierret continued, but from 2014, the funding dried up, and a siege economy began to develop. The borders remained a source of income for the fighters who controlled them. Witness Pierret had heard about demonstrations by the population against the methods of Jaysh Al-Islam, who controlled checkpoints and financed themselves that way. The checkpoint of Al-Wafideen الوافدين was maybe the most important one, Witness Pierret concluded.

Counsel Bailly mentioned a study of Bellingcat describing smuggling as a significant source of income and mentioning the importance of tunnels. Witness Pierret agreed, adding this study was among the best ones on rebel factions’ dynamics in the Ghouta. Counsel Bailly wondered if Zahran Alloush could have left Eastern Ghouta easily despite the siege, which seemed a bit categorical to Witness Pierret. The regime would have caught him earlier if he could, Witness Pierret thought. Zahran Alloush went to Turkey in 2015, and his outings were shrouded in secrecy. Responding to Counsel Bailly, Witness Pierret indicated tensions arose among armed groups specifically because of these revenues.

Counsel Bailly referred to a note by the DGSE [Directorate-General for External Security, the French external intelligence agency] dated January 28, 2016 stressing that Jaysh Al-Islam had established a stronghold—albeit besieged—that generates substantial revenues to such an extent that it was not necessarily in its interest to conclude a provisional ceasefire. The opening of Al-Wafideen checkpoint resulted in a drop in prices. This war economy made Zahran Alloush appear as an objective ally of the regime, the note concluded. To Witness Pierret, this was an overstatement. Counsel Bailly referred to a testimony [of a member of Jaysh Al-Umma] that stated the regime took 30% and Jaysh Al-Islam 30% on the cost of all goods that came in. Witness Pierret found this testimony plausible, because after the Russian intervention, it became clear that the regime would win, and the group shifted its focus to much more local objectives, trying to save what it could.

Counsel Bailly then mentioned a press article dated February 24, 2017 affirming that men had to join Jaysh Al-Islam to be able to work, so that Jaysh Al-Islam obtained a kind of monopoly over employment in Douma. Witness Pierret was not certain what that referred to; Jaysh Al-Islam was probably the main organization capable of distributing resources, but it was not the Soviet Union where one organization controlled the entire economy.

Presiding Judge Lavergne intervened to point out that humanitarian convoys were never permitted access in the Ghouta. The Defense stressed that it was the regime who blocked them.

When questioned about his perception of Zahran Alloush, Witness Pierret recalled he was detained for matters related to preaching.

Counsel Bailly requested the projection of the [previously mentioned by Presiding Judge Lavergne] video of Zahran Alloush to a Syrian audience [called Zahran Alloush and Democracy], transmitted by Witness Rahim Shahoud, W12. The content was translated into French in Court [and direct translation in English is available on YouTube]. In this video, Zahran Alloush argues that democracy brought injustice and despair in Muslim countries, and that is the reason why he rejects it. He also claims that the only truth is in Islam and that they will not join another path, even if the opposing camp contains the whole world.

Counsel Bailly wondered if that speech left room for many alternatives [beside implementing radical Islam]. Witness Pierret agreed that it did not, adding that it took place in winter 2014 and could not be compared to the interview of 2015 because the context was quite different. Among the factors of radicalization [of Jaysh Al-Islam and Islamist factions] Witness Pierret had already listed, he had forgotten one: the coup in Egypt against the democratically elected government of the Muslim Brotherhood supported by the West. For the Islamists who had believed in democracy, this was proof that democracy was a sham.

Counsel Bailly inquired on the reason why Majdi N. chose the name Islam Alloush.  Witness Pierret replied that he had not talked about it with Majdi N., but the reason seemed quite transparent.

Counsel Bailly asked if, in their discussion, Witness Pierret avoided topics that could potentially jeopardize his relationship with Majdi N. Witness Pierret confirmed it was partly true. When they met [in France], they mostly talked about Majdi N.’s research project and never discussed sensitive topics. It was a default position Witness Pierret had with people he met for his research. It might be a professional flaw, Witness Pierret added. He concluded he wouldn't ask the same questions a journalist would. Counsel Bailly summarized that Witness Pierret did not ask tough questions because he risked losing sources and getting insincere answers. Witness Pierret commented he knew only what people agreed to tell him and questioned them on his subjects of interest.

Counsel Baudouin then alluded to several crimes related to Jaysh Al-Islam previously mentioned in the trial and concluded by asking Witness Pierret how he viewed this group. Witness Pierret said he would not necessarily link these various atrocities to an ideological foundation but more to circumstances. Other groups in the Syrian rebellion were accused of numerous atrocities, but their ideology was completely undefined. There is no doubt that Jaysh Al-Islam tolerated fewer and fewer differences over time, Witness Pierret concluded.

Counsel Baudouin indicated Majdi N.’s role as spokesperson in the Islamic Front and wondered if Witness Pierret felt that his functions and investment went beyond that, quoting Majdi N.’s words, “I believe no one has made as much effort as I have for Jaysh Al-Islam.” Witness Pierret replied that in 2015, Majdi N. had an official position, and in 2017, he didn’t talk about Jaysh Al-Islam at all. His roles within the political office of the Islamic Front were consistent with his roles in Jaysh Al-Islam. The Islamic Front was essentially a media operation aiming at attracting funding through the creation of a common label that the Gulf countries were very eager for.

Last, Counsel Baudouin asked if the Toran Center could be considered the emanation of Jaysh Al-Islam. Witness Pierret had no information on who was pulling the strings behind the Center but reported that such organs produced work whose relevance to the groups that created them was relative. For example, [the Toran Center published a study on] the evolution of Jabhat Al-Nusra's discourse, which was high quality research, but had no direct relevance to Jaysh Al-Islam. A center that produces quality research no longer serves as a propaganda tool, whereas a center that focuses solely on propaganda wouldn’t be taken seriously, Witness Pierret summarized.

Prosecution's Questioning of Witness Thomas Pierret

Prosecutor Havard inquired if Witness Pierret conducted specific research on Jaysh Al-Islam. He replied that he sometimes referred to the group in comparison with others, like in the article “Salafis at War in Syria: Logics of Fragmentation and Realignment.” Witness Pierret further explained he redirected his research after Majdi N.’s arrest for psychological and ethical concerns and now works on his previous subject: religious institutions in Syria. When asked if he had received pressure or criticism [after Majdi N.’s arrest], Witness Pierret confirmed he did.

Responding to Prosecutor Havard, Witness Pierret confirmed he of course regretted having supported Majdi N.’s Erasmus project.

Questioned on his trips to Syria, Witness Pierret explained he has not returned there since the outbreak of the conflict and has conducted most of his work in Turkey through remote interviews or open sources.

Regarding the number of combatants, Witness Pierret said that the figures announced by the rebel groups should be treated with caution, and estimated Jaysh Al-Islam at its peak numbered between 5,000 and 10,000 fighters. Prosecutor Havard stipulated that a declassified document from the French military estimated the number of fighters in Jaysh Al-Islam at 8,000 and in the Islamic Front at 60,000. Witness Pierret considered the creation of the Islamic Front to primarily be a media operation aiming at projecting an image of strength, which may have led to an inflation of the number of fighters.

Prosecutor Havard referred to an article on the war economy relating to the important industrial productions Jaysh Al-Islam relied on. Witness Pierret confirmed the group possessed factories where weapons or other goods related to warfare were produced, and he had visited some.

Prosecutor Havard requested the projection of a picture where a non-conventional weapon banned by the laws of war was visible. According to Witness Pierret, this model had a very limited range and was mainly used on the front line. These types of weapons were developed for siege warfare: They had a larger explosive charge, a much shorter range, and obviously very limited accuracy. Prosecutor Havard asked the court to display other photos of weapons and factories producing uniforms. Defense Counsel Ruiz wondered if some weapons were illegal, which Prosecutor Havard confirmed.

Prosecutor Havard quoted the previously mentioned report of Bellingcat that stated Jaysh Al-Islam was by far the most capable when it came to weapons manufacturing. Many weapons were obviously too large to have been smuggled in, and the organization was able to produce its own ammunition. Witness Pierret confirmed Jaysh Al-Islam’s singularity regarding weapons production and explained that with two factors. The groups located in Northern Syria did not need to produce weapons, as they could bring them in from Turkey. On the contrary, Jaysh Al-Islam had a need, but also the necessary level of organization and discipline to achieve that. Funds were reinvested in a significant way, unlike in other groups. Witness Pierret reported Jaysh Al-Islam had small units in Aleppo and [another unclear location] that were relatively insignificant compared to other groups in these regions.

Prosecutor Havard referred to the previously mentioned 2015 talk with Zahran Alloush where he stated that democracy was a complete aberration to him and that he trampled it underfoot, adding that a prophetic principle allowed Muslims to lie to their enemies. Prosecutor Havard then mentioned another speech of Zahran Alloush to Jaysh Al-Islam’s leaders where he said, “There is one message for the internal audience, and another for the external audience.” Prosecutor Havard concluded by asking Witness Pierret what the aim of this duplicity was. Witness Pierret explained that the late-2013 speech was not strictly private and reflected the public position at the time. By 2015, the situation was different. Witness Pierret stressed Jaysh Al-Islam had a very authoritarian approach to politics in Eastern Ghouta but added that even a speech could be binding—when you address foreign state actors capable of exerting pressure, they might not necessarily force you to be democratic but can constrain you in other ways. The discourse [toward Western audiences] took place in a context where a rebel victory still seemed plausible. The rest is speculation, Witness Pierret concluded, confirming Zahran Alloush hoped to play a national role.

Prosecutor Havard then mentioned a UN report on children in armed conflicts dated October 2018 which examined the period from November 16, 2013 to June 30, 2018. It reported 1,112 cases of recruitment by the Syrian government's forces, 1,068 by the Islamic State, 415 by the Kurds, including the SDF, 101 by pro-government militias, 213 by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), and 103 by Jaysh Al-Islam. [The report further shed light] on five boys associated with Jaysh Al-Islam in the city of Douma who were wearing military uniforms and had received weapons training in May 2017. Witness Pierret stated he had no knowledge of that UN report.

Prosecutor Havard argued that Witness Pierret seemed to not be interested in the crimes committed by Jaysh Al-Islam and had facilitated Majdi N.’s arrival in France [without first inquiring about his involvement in such acts]. Witness Pierret replied that did not mean he was uninterested but expressed that he did not perceive Majdi N. as someone who had an important decision-making role on the ground. In 2019, it had been two to three years since he had held those functions, and he had since chosen a new career. Prosecutor Havard wondered if Witness Pierret knew about the British University’s refusal of Majdi N.’s application, which Witness Pierret did.

Prosecutor Thouault then read a passage from French researcher Gilles Dorronsoro’s book ‘Syrie: anatomie d’une guerre civile’ [Syria: Anatomy of a Civil War] where it was written that the revolution transcended sectarian divisions but gradually, sectarian logic took hold. According to the author, Islam was used by protesters both as a source of meaning and because armed groups sought to attract funding. There was also a need to maintain coherence between discourse and actions. Islam defined the space of legitimate action. Witness Pierret agreed with that statement.

Prosecutor Thouault wondered about the reasons behind rivalries emerging from 2016 onwards among rebel factions. To Witness Pierret, there were three elements to consider: resources; rivalries between alliances and counter-alliances; and ideological factors.

Prosecutor Thouault mentioned Majdi N.’s interview on a pro-opposition radio station on October 1, 2013 after ISIS’s expulsion from Eastern Ghouta, where journalist Kamal Ben Turki referred to a statement by [redacted name]: “If ISIS fights the regime, then they are friends of Jaysh Al-Islam,” to which Majdi N. replied, “The colonel of Jaysh Al-Umma did not join Jaysh Al-Islam; he wanted to sow discord between our brothers in ISIS and us.” Asked by the journalist on his view on the fighting between Jaysh Al-Islam and ISIS, Majdi N. declared, “We deplore media wars. In my opinion, these wars don’t really exist—it’s the media that creates them.” Prosecutor Thouault commented that Jaysh Al-Islam seemed to not be in direct opposition to ISIS, based on its spokesperson’s statements, and wondered if the distancing which occurred a year later was due to ideological reasons. Witness Pierret recounted that at that time, no one was openly against ISIS—not even officers from the FSA supported by the United States. Rebel groups were in a sort of wait-and-see position, somewhat paralyzed by the situation, and didn’t dare confront a group whose influence was growing rapidly. Still, by the end of 2013, ISIS tried to take control of the border areas and all rebel-held territories. Once rebels realized that, the decision was made on January 1st, 2014 to go to war against ISIS—and that included Jaysh Al-Islam. Prosecutor Thouault understood the rebels’ decision as a matter of survival.

Prosecutor Thouault finished stressing Witness Pierret did not know Majdi N. much before accepting him for an internship. Majdi N. mentioned having joined another brigade, Liwa Al-Baraa, [Majdi N. joined this brigade right after his defection from the Syrian Army but only stayed there for a short period of time. See Trial Report #9] which to Witness Pierret’s knowledge was more aligned with the FSA tendency. Witness Pierret confirmed he knew one of its leaders, called [redacted name], F3.

Defense Counsel’s Questioning of Witness Thomas Pierret

Counsel Ruiz first announced the Defense would ask no questions after such a long hearing. Presiding Judge Lavergne replied that there would be no other occasion.

Counsel Ruiz asked how Witness Pierret took the French National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor’s Office’s (PNAT) remark on his lack of interest in Jaysh Al-Islam’s crimes and his support to Majdi N.’s arrival in France. Witness Pierret stated he did not feel particularly comfortable. Counsel Ruiz explained that bringing him to France was not, in itself, an offense.

Counsel Ruiz wondered if Witness Pierret knew how many interviews Majdi N. conducted in a day, and Witness Pierret supposed there were many. Counsel Ruiz inquired if the title of captain was a military one, or served propaganda purposes. As his title [in the Syrian military] was sergeant, Witness Pierret supposed the title of captain was propaganda. [During his research on factions], Witness Pierret had not really heard any other references to ranks of a regular army.

Counsel Ruiz asked if it was common for a spokesperson to be based in another country. Witness Pierret indicated that the political and media office of Ahrar Al-Sham was in Istanbul, and that was the norm. Counsel Ruiz asked if a distinction between the political office and the spokesperson [of a faction] could be made, which Witness Pierret ignored, explaining that these relatively new structures did not have entirely clear organizational charts. Mr. Pierret added that Mohamed Alloush was the head of Jaysh Al-Islam’s political office and acted as a kind of foreign minister.

Referring to Witness Pierret’s second encounter with Majdi N. in Istanbul, Counsel Ruiz wondered if the Accused explained to Witness Pierret how he used to receive information. Witness Pierret replied he had not. Responding to Counsel Ruiz, Witness Pierret confirmed that spokespersons used to receive talking points they had to stick to in their communications. Mr. Pierret stressed that for security reasons, representatives of rebel groups gave appointments in parks or public places in Istanbul—never at their homes or in offices. Witness Pierret added that they never discussed Majdi N.’s activities in Jaysh Al-Islam. Counsel Ruiz underscored that some said to have seen Majdi N. in Syria in August 2015 and after his resignation [in 2017], whereas Witness Pierret declared to have met him in Istanbul in these periods. Witness Pierret knew about another spokesperson of Jaysh Al-Islam called [redacted name], who was based in the Ghouta and took over Majdi N.’s function [after he left for Turkey]. Counsel Ruiz described that one spokesperson was inside, and Majdi N. was 800 kilometers away and received information from the inside.

Questioned about the underlying motives of Majdi N.’s engagement with Zahran Alloush, Witness Pierret thought it was rather for personal reasons than ideological ones. Witness Pierret did not think Majdi N. had Salafist convictions at all. Counsel Ruiz referred to Witness Pierret’s statement that he had found a halal restaurant for one of their meetings, but Majdi N. did not care about keeping halal. Witness Pierret commented that a Salafist from strict obedience would likely have asked if the meat was halal.

Responding to Counsel Ruiz, Witness Pierret did not recall any mention by Majdi N. of other close colleagues he had inside Jaysh Al-Islam beside Zahran Alloush. Counsel Ruiz stated the interview with the Israeli researcher [Tsurkov, F32] was just a pretext to resign, and Witness Pierret added it was possibly also used by Jaysh Al-Islam’s leadership to sideline him.

Counsel Ruiz wondered why these spokespersons were kept safe abroad instead of being close to the operational area. To Witness Pierret, that’s how they could get in touch with researchers, diplomats, etc. He confirmed it was obviously for security reasons and also because communications via Skype from the inside were far less effective than meetings abroad.

Counsel Ruiz wondered if offices in Jaysh Al-Islam were compartmentalized, or if they communicated with each other, which Witness Pierret ignored since he had never observed the internal structure of these groups.

Counsel Ruiz then addressed Majdi N.’s image abroad, quoting Yassin El Haj Saleh ياسين الحاج صالح [see his presentation in Trial Report #1] who considered him “insignificant” and alluded to Majdi N.’s lifestyle differing from that of Mohamed Alloush [that Majdi N. had fewer financial resources]. Witness Pierret repeated he doubted Majdi N. had a decision-making role, arguing that his lifestyle was not particularly wealthy. To support his point, he recounted that [in France], Majdi N. couldn't settle in Aix-en-Provence [a town that is known to be expensive], and ended up in Noailles [a popular neighborhood in central Marseille], in a place he described as uninhabitable.

Counsel Ruiz again quoted Witness Pierret’s testimony: “Some photos of [Majdi N.] circulated, including some that were staged,” and asked what he had meant by that. Witness Pierret explained these photos were not actually taken in a combat context. For example, a photo of Majdi N. with a weapon was taken for communication purposes. Witness Pierret did not know if Majdi N. actually participated in combat or not, but that particular photo didn’t seem to have been taken during combat.

Summarizing Majdi N.’s role, Counsel Ruiz stated he was outside, receiving information that he would pass on to the press, and it was not possible to determine whether he had actually participated in combat, which Witness Pierret agreed on.

Defense Counsel Kempf referred to the battle of Al-Otaiba in April 2013, and Witness Pierret’s statement that Majdi N. became spokesperson after this date. Counsel Kempf wondered if it could be considered that Majdi N. was not in Eastern Ghouta anymore after June 2013, which Witness Pierret confirmed.

Counsel Kempf noted that Majdi N. started his studies at Istanbul University on October 8, 2015, while the video presented by the Civil Parties showing civilians in cages was dated November 2015. He cited Article 8 (xxiii) of the Rome Statute confirming using civilians as human shields constituted a war crime if they were used to protect military targets. Presiding Judge Lavergne interrupted, stressing that in his opinion, the Geneva Conventions did not authorize exhibition of civilian prisoners that way. Referring to Zahran Alloush’s speech on democracy, Counsel Kempf wondered if Islamist movements were by essence opposed to democracy. Witness Pierret repeated the distinction he made between procedural democracy and [inaudible] democracy [see above: Witness Pierret’s response to Counsel Bailly on page 6] and affirmed not everyone shares the same view of procedural democracy.

Counsel Kempf asked if, in that same speech, Zahran Alloush’s mention of Algeria referred to the interruption of the electoral process in 1991 won by the Islamists. It was obvious to Witness Pierret that it was, since Alloush also referred to Egypt, where a democratically elected Islamist group was ousted. Counsel Kempf took this occasion to recount the Egyptian context after Mohamed Morsi's election and the massacre of 800 to 1,000 people in the Rabaa Square by Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi. There has been no use of universal jurisdiction to prosecute those responsible for these crimes, Counsel Kempf regretted.

Questioned if he could explain what a Sharia faculty was, Witness Pierret stated it is a faculty for religious studies and differs from a faculty of law, Sharia referring specifically to Islamic law. The studies focus on all religious sciences, such as Quran exegesis, interpretation, etc., Witness Pierret continued. Those faculties typically train public school teachers and judges in Islamic private law. Witness Pierret confirmed family law in Syria was governed by Sharia before the revolt. Counsel Kempf commented the explanation from former ambassador—Witness Michel Duclos—saying that Syria was secular seemed a bit dubious.

Counsel Kempf quoted a source [reference inaudible to the trial monitor] which stated: “Excluded from the judiciary for decades, the ‘Ulama have made a strong comeback in the liberated areas [...] to inspire a popular consensus around a law based on Sharia.” Witness Pierret thought it was difficult to say in a country which never experienced free elections, but that public opinion in Syria was mostly religious and conservative. That also explained Islamists' relationship with democracy: Many were convinced that most Syrians would vote in favor of a system based on Sharia, Witness Pierret thought.

Counsel Kempf mentioned Majdi N.’s admission to pursue a master's at King’s College London the year after his arrest and regretted that based on press allegations about a man presumed innocent, a researcher like Witness Pierret had chosen not to continue working on his research topic.

The proceedings were adjourned at 9:09 PM.

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