Inside the Majdi N. Trial #4: Testimony of Context Witness Michel Duclos, W2, on the Reconciliation between France and the Assad Government before the Uprising

TRIAL OF MAJDI N.

Court of Assize – Paris, France

Trial Monitoring Summary #4 

Hearing Date: May 5, 2025   

CAUTION: Some testimony may include graphic descriptions of torture, rape or other violent acts.  

Note that this summary is not a verbatim transcript of the trial; it is merely an unofficial summary of the proceedings.  

Throughout this summary, [information located in brackets are notes from our trial monitor] and “information placed in quotes are statements made by the witness, judges or counsel.” The names and identifying information of witnesses have been redacted. 

[Note: SJAC provides a summary of the proceedings while redacting certain details to protect witness privacy and to preserve the integrity of the trial.]

[Note: Rather than publishing the trial reports of the Majdi N. case in chronological order, SJAC has organized them thematically and coherently based on the content of the hearings, making the material more accessible by highlighting key issues and connections across the proceedings.]

SJAC’s 4^th trial monitoring report details day 3 morning of the trial of Majdi N. in Paris, France. On this trial day, Context Witness Michel Duclos, the former French Ambassador to Syria between 2006 and 2008, provided a description of the sectarian divisions in Assad’s Syria and extensively described the links between the Assad regime and the Alawite community. Michel Duclos further described the significant role he played in rebuilding dialogue between Paris and Damascus. As part of his duties, he paved the way for the invitation of President Bashar Al-Assad to France in July 2008. He relayed the motives behind that invitation, stating that he himself remained very critical toward Assad’s government. 

Day 3 – May 5, 2025

Morning Session

The proceedings started at 9:47 AM.

Witness Michel Duclos stated that he was born in 1949 and is now retired. He did not know the Accused or have professional relations with him, nor did he know or have professional relations with the Civil Parties.

Mr. Duclos was sworn in.

Mr. Duclos introduced his testimony by emphasizing that Syria is a country close to his heart, even though he does not know Arabic. Mr. Duclos served as Deputy Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations in New York from 2002 to 2006. During that time and following the assassination of [Lebanese Prime Minister] Rafic Hariri, he contributed to negotiations on the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and on the withdrawal of foreign troops, particularly Syrian, stationed in the country.

In 2006, he was appointed Ambassador to Syria at a time when political dialogue between Syria and France was nearly non-existent. This gave him time to travel extensively throughout the country in the first months. He observed what he called an Ottoman sociological structure, marked by a complex tapestry of minorities. In such an environment, people needed time to open up, Mr. Duclos recalled. Nevertheless, he quickly gained access to individuals within Bashar Al-Assad’s inner circle.

After the election of French President Sarkozy, Mr. Duclos played a significant role in rebuilding dialogue between Paris and Damascus. His contributions paved the way for the symbolic invitation of President Assad to France on the Bastille Day celebrations on July 14, 2008.

Mr. Duclos became well acquainted with the Syrian authorities, particularly the intelligence services. The military did not play a significant role. In Mr. Duclos’s view, the Syrian regime relied on a dual form of legitimacy. On one hand, it was a totalitarian system inspired by the Soviet Union, whose institutions mimicked democratic structures but were run by a single ruling party. On the other hand, it relied on a clan-based matrix of power: the regime was in reality controlled by the Assad family and relied on the Alawi community while extending some degree of power-sharing to certain Sunni families. The Council of Ministers effectively consisted of the President, his brother, and his brother-in-law—all under the watchful eye of their wives.

Mr. Duclos recounted there were at least seven main intelligence agencies, of which one was headed by the President’s brother and another by Ali Mamlouk, a key figure of Syrian intelligence [who was convicted of crimes against humanity and war crimes in France in May 2024, see SJAC trial’s reports here]. The regime also leaned on powerful businessmen. A third, more distant circle of power included senior civil servants, the military, and religious figures.

Addressing religion, Mr. Duclos’s impression on the ground was that Syria was not particularly secular. He mentioned the muezzin’s call to prayer that was overwhelmingly loud, and the fact that religion was ubiquitous. The Syrian President spent a significant amount of time in churches and other places of worship to manage the regime’s relationship with religious groups, Mr. Duclos added.

Mr. Duclos reported leaving Damascus in 2008. In 2011, he was struck by the incredible images of a demonstration taking place at the Umayyad Mosque. He described the regime’s reaction as entirely in line with its DNA: unprecedentedly brutal and cruel. Mr. Duclos reported that he tried to convey the message to members of the inner circle that the people were not inherently opposed to Assad, and that there was no need for repression. “If they get the chance, they’ll turn against us,” they had replied.

Mr. Duclos highlighted the presence in Syria of an elite educated in France. In the country’s first protests, people emphasized the importance of unity. The uprising spread largely as a reaction to the regime’s violent repression. From the very first demonstrations, Assad chose to respond with force, aiming to avoid a scenario like Egypt or elsewhere during the Arab Spring.

What ultimately saved the regime was, in Mr. Duclos’s view, the combination of Hezbollah and Iran’s intervention, the lack of Western support to the opposition, and later, Russian airstrikes. The increasing dominance of Islamist factions explained why European support for the opposition ultimately faded, Mr. Duclos added. After the US pullback in 2013, much of the opposition turned toward Islamist groups. 

Presiding Judge Lavergne’s Questioning of Michel Duclos

Presiding Judge Lavergne wondered if religious affiliation played a role in the regime's strategy for maintaining power. To Mr. Duclos, it was used both domestically and internationally. Internationally, the regime portrayed itself as the protector of Christians and minorities in general. France viewed the country largely through the lens of Christian communities, the Alawis, the Kurds, and more recently, the jihadists. But when you live there, Mr. Duclos emphasized, the dominant sociological reality is Sunni.

To Mr. Duclos, the Sunni urban bourgeoisie should have been at the core of political power. However, according to a deeply rooted tradition, what mattered to them most was commerce and private affairs; they did not engage in politics. To many Sunnis, [Hafez] Al-Assad’s coup did not hinder them from continuing to operate within those spheres. One of the main challenges for organizing the opposition stemmed from the fact that the country’s natural elite lacked a culture of political leadership, Mr. Duclos analyzed.

On the domestic level, Mr. Duclos pointed out that the civil war of the late 1970s and early 1980s—particularly the conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood—had left a deep mark on the country. The massacre of Hama gave Sunnis the feeling that they had been definitively defeated and reinforced the belief among the Alawis that their time had come to rule the country. Among the latter, this belief was accompanied by a strange sense of illegitimacy, and a persistent fear that the vanquished would one day seek revenge. As for Sunnis, Mr. Duclos observed a religious revival, partly resulting from the Gulf countries’ influence, but also the psychological impact of their defeat. Mr. Duclos further explained that the Kurds were poorly treated by the central government and thousands of them had no official identity documents. One might have expected Assad to be more conciliatory toward the Kurds and the defeated Sunnis of Hama, but Mr. Duclos noted that never happened.

The regime made constant use of the "Islamist threat" argument, Mr. Duclos added. If young people were caught watching even vaguely Islamist videos, they would be immediately arrested and tortured.

Upon Mr. Duclos’s departure in 2008, his general impression of the country was that everything was under control. Yet there were growing fears of food riots in the suburbs of major cities, he added.

Presiding Judge Lavergne inquired if some religious communities were taken hostage and if there were also Alawi opponents of the regime. Mr. Duclos confirmed the latter, describing the complex game of loyalty management by the Assad regime with the Alawi community. The idea was that Alawis should not become too wealthy, since they were the foot soldiers of repression. If they had too much prosperity, they might have preferred to open businesses rather than enforce the regime’s will. As a result, once the regime reached a certain threshold of mass violence against the population, the Alawis had no real choice but to align themselves with the regime, as they were fully aware that any future revenge would likely be brutal.

Mr. Duclos shared to the court an anecdote that illustrated the relations between religious communities in Assad’s Syria: A French parliamentary delegation visited Damascus to study sectarian divisions. For this occasion, a Shia representative hosted a dinner for around 250 guests, including Christians, Sunnis, Druze, Kurds, along with Alawis. All of them publicly claimed there were no sectarian divisions in Syria. After the dinner, during a visit to the Shia shrine of Sayyidah Zaynab السيدة زينب, the Sunnis commented that the Shia had terrible taste, the Christians said the place looked awful, and others murmured that they simply had to coexist with them. In Mr. Duclos’ view, hypocrisy masked deep-seated tensions. The core strategy of Assad was to exploit mutual fears between religious communities, he concluded.

Presiding Judge Lavergne inquired about the functioning of the justice system, to which Mr. Duclos replied with an anecdote from the civil and commercial courts: A judge once said he knew the person was right but had to accept the other party’s offer anyway. Moreover, criminal justice was completely under the regime’s control, Mr. Duclos claimed. While Mr. Duclos was in office, the French Minister of Justice had expressed his ambition to travel to Damascus, but Mr. Duclos advised against it, because France could not lend legitimacy to Syria’s judicial system.

Referring to what could be called an “abandonment” by the West in 2013, Presiding Judge Lavergne questioned Mr. Duclos on whether he would describe it as a turning point in the Syrian revolution. Duclos confirmed and explained that Assad used chemical weapons for the first time in 2013 because he had lost control of Eastern Ghouta. After the British withdrew from enforcing the so-called red line [expressed by President Obama on the use of chemical weapons], the Russians then offered the Americans a way out by pretending the Syrian regime would give up its chemical weapons, so that America would not need to strike. No one could truly believe this offer, Mr. Duclos commented, and yet it was accepted.

Questioned if Western intervention would have changed the course of events, Mr. Duclos explained the two opposing arguments. On the one hand, the Franco-American strike after a renewed use of chemical weapons by the regime had no real impact [so, a Western intervention would have had no impact as well]. On the other hand, the Western failure to act in 2013 changed the nature of the opposition, since it gave Islamists the upper hand and convinced Russia to commit to a military intervention. Thus, the 2013 withdrawal reinforced the regime’s backers, both politically and militarily. So yes, it was a decisive turning point, Mr. Duclos believed.

Presiding Judge Lavergne recapped that the only force that existed [after that] was the Islamist movements. Mr. Duclos agreed but said he never considered the Islamist opposition a real political force, because “Syrians are not fanatics.” The best example was, in his eyes, Ahmad Al-Sharaa who was building a form of national Islamism quite characteristic of the Syrian mindset.

When questioned about the regime presenting itself as a bulwark against the Islamists, Mr. Duclos responded that the regime [on the contrary] systematically targeted young, educated people from major cities who were considered the most "Westernized" and had little religious background. This strategy was implemented on the advice of Russia, Mr. Duclos believed. As a result, the opposition was significantly weakened, and many of its members were pushed back into traditional religious reflexes. At the same time, the regime released jihadists from prison, Mr. Duclos added.

Presiding Judge Lavergne inquired about the regime’s attitude toward ISIS. Mr. Duclos reported that the regime never fired a single shot against Syrian territories controlled by ISIS. The Russians claimed to intervene against ISIS, but they never actually targeted them and left that to Western forces. Meanwhile, the Russians focused on suppressing the uprising.

Presiding Judge Lavergne asked Mr. Duclos to describe the opposition’s attempt to unify the various armed factions that had emerged after 2011. Mr. Duclos said that the attempt never succeeded, due in part to the sociology of the country: Syrians usually took up arms to defend their village or their neighborhood, so the idea of a regional or national organization was difficult to instill. Moreover, by defining zones of combat and of non-combat through ceasefire agreements, the regime and the Russians managed to divide the opposition. Mr. Duclos then mentioned the reasons behind the fall of the regime, among them the war in Ukraine and the events in Israel, which left Russia and Iran with fewer resources to dedicate to supporting Syria.

Presiding Judge Lavergne asked who the main international actors were and what role they played in Syria. Mr. Duclos responded that the Russians worked with the Turks and the Iranians. Through an agreement with Russia and Iran, the Turks secured their control over their own zone. President Macron attempted to engage, Mr. Duclos reported, speaking with both the Russians and Gulf countries. Mr. Duclos himself regularly traveled to Moscow, but believed the Russians were never truly interested in a political resolution process. Syria was effectively being managed by the Russia–Turkey–Iran trio. Mr. Duclos further explained that some countries hoped to normalize relations with Assad, but even when extremely weakened, Assad never made a single concession. The process went in circles, and eventually the Russians grew tired of it and quite likely considered replacing Assad, but realized that he and his family controlled everything.

Civil Parties’ Counsels Questioning of Michel Duclos

Counsel Baudouin asked if Mr. Duclos could share his insights on jihadist groups during the years he was stationed in Damascus and wondered what Sharia [Islamic law] represented in Syria. Mr. Duclos believed the Islamist opposition was not the driving force behind the uprising at first, but over time, they became the soul of the revolt. As for the notion of jihad, Mr. Duclos only mentioned that in Eastern Ghouta, some people acted very badly in the name of Islam.

Mr. Duclos further stated that Ahmad Al-Sharaa developed a national political agenda and added that no one could really tell if, “deep down in his conscience,” he remained a jihadist. Mr. Duclos wondered if, after all, [former French president] General de Gaulle was deeply democratic. He emphasized that what mattered was Ahmad Al-Sharaa's capacity to embrace broader political responsibility.

Presiding Judge Lavergne intervened to suggest it may have been important for the various armed factions to present an image that aligned with secularism, individual freedoms, and democratic values in order to receive support. Mr. Duclos did not know what criteria the French Directorate General for External Security (DGSE) used to decide which groups to support or not, but being democratic was not a major criterion since that is not a common concept in these countries.

In some opposition-held areas, ordinary Syrian citizens began to rediscover democratic practices and set up local committees, but Mr. Duclos regretted that this experience did not last long. To Mr. Duclos, it was hard to say there are "democrats" in Syria, because there is very little historical experience with democracy. But democratic aspirations do exist, he stressed, such as a desire to defend certain rights and gains, and to take part in decision-making.

When questioned by Counsel Baudouin about Sharia, Mr. Duclos mentioned the supposedly secular constitution under the Assads which already contained a reference to Sharia. In the Interim Constitution, that reference was actually strengthened, but in other parts of the text, it was mitigated. Implementing Sharia did not appear to Mr. Duclos to be one of Mr. Al-Sharaa’s main priorities.

Prosecution’s Questioning of Michel Duclos

Prosecutor Thouault wondered if an opposition existed before 2011, and what its political agenda was. Mr. Duclos responded that discontented people formed the basis of the opposition. They were young unemployed individuals in the suburbs of major cities and did not represent political opposition. Like everywhere, dissidents in prison or recently released also tried to gather. At the [French] Embassy [in Damascus], an Arabic-speaking staff member was in charge of maintaining contact with these opposition figures. “We did not believe they could achieve anything,” Mr. Duclos commented, but they continued such contact. The opposition figures were often divided among themselves—since there was no real political life, fragmentation was inevitable, Mr. Duclos concluded. Prosecutor Thouault asked what role these figures played in the mobilization in March 2011. To Mr. Duclos, it was a rather weak one, since the uprising was spontaneous.

Questioned about the formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and its relation to Islamist groups, Mr. Duclos said that some factions were used as tools by Turkey, once the Western powers were no longer involved in the fight. He did not have specific details about the origins of the FSA but confirmed that from August 2013 onward, secular groups lost ground to the Islamists.

Prosecutor Thouault mentioned the formation of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front جبهة تحرير سوريا الإسلامية in September 2012 which brought together different factions, including Jaysh Al-Islam, and then became the Syrian Islamic Front الجبهة الإسلامية السورية in December 2012 (see also Trial Report #5). Prosecutor Thouault stressed that the Front became the most significant alliance of the Syrian opposition, whereas the FSA was a coalition of apolitical military factions that later lost influence due to fragmentation and a lack of coordination. Mr. Duclos confirmed this characterization and said he had no information about Jaysh Al-Islam.

Prosecutor Thouault questioned Mr. Duclos on the importance of Eastern Ghouta for the regime. Mr. Duclos responded that in addition to its geography [proximity to Damascus], the very radical orientation of Jaysh Al-Islam [which controlled this region] might have been a particular concern for the Syrian regime. Prosecutor Thouault asked for details about the incidents in Daraa that sparked the popular uprising. Mr. Duclos recounted that it started with demonstrations at the mosque, but the real trigger was graffiti drawn by children. The security services arrested them and pulled out their fingernails. After that, some families went to Damascus to see Assad. The president initially refused. The next day, he changed his mind and said he would receive them, but he was told, “Sorry, they are no longer presentable—they were tortured overnight.” Mr. Duclos recalled that his Syrian friends did not have a strong political awareness at the beginning, but when they saw people being shot, they became opponents.

Prosecutor Thouault addressed the Syrian regime’s tactic of granting amnesty and releasing jihadists who later became warlords. She quoted an article by a Swedish journalist [Aron Lund], where he mentioned the crackdown of Assad’s secret police on Sunni fundamentalists around 2008 and the arrest of Zahran Alloush in 2009, apparently for his Salafist beliefs. Lund added that hundreds of violent jihadists were granted amnesty in the wake of the Arab Spring, and Zahran Alloush arrived home just in time to join the emerging opposition in Douma.

Mr. Duclos commented that Assad’s policy toward religion had varied over the years. [While serving as Ambassador], Mr. Duclos recounted he met with an Alawi minister who expressed fear of being overwhelmed by Islamists. Starting in 2008, the regime took a harder line, and some religious leaders stopped meeting with him. The regime then effectively lost control. “When you saw a leader you admired who dared to oppose the regime, you would naturally want to join him,” Duclos added.

Prosecutor Thouault referred to an article dated December 21, 2016 [the trial monitor was unable to verify this was the correct date] by the same Swedish journalist where he alluded to the July 18, 2012 bombing that targeted the regime's crisis cell and concluded that Liwa Al-Islam used the attack to consolidate its authority. Prosecutor Thouault asked Mr. Duclos to comment on this article’s findings. Mr. Duclos suggested it was possible that the regime itself was behind the attack, as the individuals who were killed had previously fallen out of favor, including Assef Shawkat [Bashar Al-Assad’s brother-in-law and head of the Military Intelligence]. One reason for Shawkat’s disgrace was probably his high international profile.

The estimation of more than 600,000 dead and tens of thousands missing over the course of the Syrian conflict seemed consistent to Mr. Duclos. Prosecutor Thouault inquired about the current situation in Syria. Mr. Duclos believed the establishment of the new government brought a general sense of relief, and even the Alawi community had no real regrets. Mr. Al-Sharaa received broad support and managed to find the right words and gestures to convince a large majority of Syrians.

Now, however, Mr. Al-Sharaa relies on an armed force of at most 30,000 men, among whom are elements he does not fully control. His power structure remains extraordinarily fragile, Mr. Duclos emphasized. It is very concerning that the United States has so far refused to lift sanctions, he continued. Moreover, the Israeli government has adopted a stance which aims at sowing chaos: It bombed Damascus after expanding the Israeli military zone beyond the Golan [a region in Syria which has been occupied by Israel since 1967]. The Syrian government does not want war with Israel, and the Syrian people themselves no longer have the will to fight, Mr. Duclos stated. Mr. Duclos then stressed that the current government is not very representative of Syria’s diversity, with only one woman and one Kurd in office. This is an extremely fragile situation, he summarized.

Prosecutor Thouault inquired about Mr. Duclos’s view on the French authorities' efforts to promote a peaceful transition. Mr. Duclos relayed that France sent a diplomat quickly after Assad’s fall, followed by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and her German counterpart. Mr. Duclos believed it had not been the best idea for the French delegation to visit the Christian patriarch first; he would have advised visiting the Umayyad Mosque instead. Mr. Duclos then mentioned guarantees requested by the European Union before lifting sanctions and praised the effort of the French Presidency to liaise with Ahmad Al-Sharaa and rebuild relations with Syria.

Defense Counsel Ruiz addressed the court to explain the Accused regularly stands up to walk in the dock due to physical issues and that it should not be interpreted as a lack of interest in the proceedings.

[15-minutes-break]  

Defense Counsel’s Questioning of Michel Duclos

Counsel Ruiz wondered if Mr. Duclos could give a definition of a jihadist group. Mr. Duclos said there is no definition, but to him, a jihadist is someone who wages religious war to expand Islam. The second aspect is use of violence, which distinguish jihadists from Islamist groups. Questioned about the adjective ‘fundamentalist,’ Duclos said it applied to all religions. Counsel Ruiz wondered if Bashar Al-Assad used the term ‘terrorist’ to define a certain type of opponents, or if it was used for all. Mr. Duclos explained that only a few opponents were not described as terrorists.

Counsel Ruiz asked if, as an Ambassador, Mr. Duclos received training on the laws of war, which Mr. Duclos denied. However, he often dealt with that concept, particularly while serving as Deputy Permanent Representative of France in New York. Counsel Ruiz explained that in laws of war, the right to kill is regulated by international conventions. He asked if inside Syria, these concepts were known and accepted. Mr. Duclos replied that the Syrian government did not respect any kind of law and certainly not the laws of war. As for the opposition, that was precisely one of the things the Embassy tried to instill, he added.

Counsel Ruiz referred to an article by Mr. Duclos dated 2018 where he explained that fighters from the Ghouta belong to religious conservative tendencies. Counsel Ruiz asked if the inhabitants of Eastern Ghouta had any particular characteristics, and what role they played in the Syrian revolution. Mr. Duclos repeated they were religiously conservative, “but that does not make them Islamists,” he stated. Counsel Ruiz wondered if Mr. Duclos distinguished between Islamist-inspired movements and Islamist movements. Mr. Duclos replied that as a diplomat, he chooses his words carefully.

Counsel Ruiz referred to an article by [French researcher] Gilles Dorronsoro where he described various reasons people engage in Islamic movements and asked Mr. Duclos to comment. In Mr. Duclos’s view, people were attracted to Islamism after the deception caused by the 2013 withdrawal of the West and added it even reached young people who were not necessarily aligned with that ideology.

Counsel Ruiz wondered if movement of this type could also be multi-confessional. “That’s what we said,” Mr. Duclos replied. Counsel Ruiz stressed that he allowed himself this approximation [using the term multi-confessional] because there have already been many approximations since the beginning of the trial. Mr. Duclos added that at the beginning, the revolt was indeed multi-confessional. He was not there when the fighting intensified, but he believed that this characteristic did not remain for very long.

Questioned on the existence of a political Islam and/or a purely religious Islam in Syria, Mr. Duclos responded that religious leaders began expressing their opposition to Shia Islam [i.e. Alawis] after some time. As for official Syrian Islam, it was moderate, Mr. Duclos stated. However, what was happening inside the mosques was harder to assess, he finished.

Counsel Ruiz referred to Mr. Dorronsoro’s book [Syria: Anatomy of a Civil War] where he affirmed that since the 1970s, Islam has become the language of protest, and wondered if Mr. Duclos agreed. After Hama, the Sunnis turned toward religion, Mr. Duclos replied, and confirmed the Syrian revolution followed this trend. Counsel Ruiz claimed that some researchers said Islam was a common language in the protests where different currents coexisted, which Mr. Duclos confirmed.

Counsel Ruiz insisted that researchers do not express doubt when advancing the hypothesis that Islam allows for a feeling of unity. He mentioned and quoted from an interview with a revolutionary in 2013 [source unspecified], where the person explained that he was not a practicing Muslim, but Islam gave the people a feeling of unity. The person added that the use of the flag with the Shahada [Islamic declaration of faith] in white letters on a black background, which is used by movements that are not necessarily radical, shows the power of jihadist symbolism. Invoking God is a source of comfort for fighters confronted with violence, the person added. Counsel Ruiz wondered if engagement in Islam could soothe the fear of death. Mr. Duclos considered it a question that went beyond his expertise.

Counsel Ruiz asked if the Syrian revolution was, above all, a form of revenge by the defeated, or a political movement with confessional components. Mr. Duclos said the regime perceived the revolution as the revenge of yesterday’s defeated. However, he believed it was more of a popular revolt, with indeed different feelings and objectives.

Counsel Ruiz noted that neither the Russians nor the Syrian government fought ISIS and asked who did. The Americans, Mr. Duclos replied. Counsel Ruiz followed up and asked if groups like Jaysh Al-Islam also fought ISIS. Locally, they did, Mr. Duclos responded, but ISIS was defeated thanks to the international coalition.

Counsel Ruiz asked if the war between ISIS and Jaysh Al-Islam was only a territorial war, or could also be explained by the fact that Jaysh Al-Islam did not share the death-driven vision of ISIS. Mr. Duclos again stated it was beyond his expertise and could imagine there was a nuance between Jaysh Al-Islam and ISIS, but not a fundamental one. Yet there is one, Counsel Ruiz emphasized; ISIS is considered a terrorist organization, and Jaysh Al-Islam is not.

Counsel Ruiz wondered if a feeling of abandonment could have instilled a perception that the Syrian population was alone and that only armed groups could defeat Bashar Al-Assad. Absolutely, Mr. Duclos stated, adding that the Syrian people partly radicalized out of despair. Questioned about what he meant by “radicalized,” Mr. Duclos referred to the adoption of harsh and violent attitudes, and the consideration of no path forward other than armed struggle. Counsel Ruiz suggested it could be a logical reaction when one is being gassed and the international community does nothing, which Mr. Duclos agreed on.

Counsel Ruiz related that Mr. Duclos was among those who invited Bashar Al-Assad on July 14, 2008 to France, even though it was already clear who he was. “Was it a very bad idea to invite him?” Counsel Ruiz asked. Mr. Duclos explained he had not been enthusiastic about the idea. What France had in mind was to stabilize Lebanon, since French policy in the Levant had always prioritized Lebanon. [Then-President] Sarkozy and [Minister of Foreign Affairs] Kouchner believed that, in order to help Lebanon, there was a need to engage in dialogue with Damascus. Following that, an agreement on Lebanon was reached with Damascus, and it then seemed natural to invite Assad to Paris in July 2008. Mr. Duclos recalled having been skeptical, but ultimately, he carried out the responsibilities assigned to him and tried to ensure there was not too much enthusiasm for that normalization. But yes, he was part of it, Mr. Duclos admitted. Later, Mr. Duclos would always claim [France] should not reconnect with Bashar Al-Assad since he had betrayed more than once.

Counsel Ruiz referred to the documentary shown in court the previous week, where Claude Guéant [former General Secretary of the Élysée] said that had he known who Bashar Al-Assad really was, he would not have invited him. “Is he mocking us?” Counsel Ruiz asked. Mr. Duclos recounted that after his appointment [as French Ambassador to Syria] in the summer of 2006, [Then-President] Jacques Chirac took him aside at the ambassadors’ conference and told him Syria was a murderous regime, and he would never forgive them [for the death of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri]. “But sooner or later, we’ll have to reconcile with them. Your role is to start rebuilding those ties,” President Chirac added. Later, the President’s advisor on the Middle East told Mr. Duclos that as long as Chirac remained president, there would be no normalization, but reconciliation may happen after Chirac leaves office. So, Mr. Duclos started rebuilding connections. As for Claude Guéant, he had visited Bashar Al-Assad on several occasions. “Did he really believe Assad was a different person?” Mr. Duclos wondered.

Mr. Duclos stressed he had changed policy but not his analysis, which is exactly what is expected of a civil servant. He confirmed to have played along with the normalization process, but emphasized its limits. For instance, Mr. Duclos never supported judicial cooperation, considering the Syrian judiciary was far too corrupt. Mr. Duclos considered it legitimate to give Bashar Al-Assad the opportunity to change, and noted Assad had had many reasons to distance himself from Hezbollah—but had chosen not to.

Counsel Kempf wondered if the situation of political prisoners was addressed in France’s preparatory meetings with President Assad. Mr. Duclos confirmed they of course did, particularly during the meeting at the Élysée on July 12, 2008. Sarkozy first had a one-on-one with Assad, and when they returned, Sarkozy said they had agreed on four points: the third was human rights. Mr. Duclos affirmed it was part of the terms of resuming relations.

Counsel Kempf brought up the massacre at Sednaya prison a week before July 12, and he asked Mr. Duclos to tell the court what it was. Mr. Duclos said there had been a revolt in that prison, and traveling to Paris was a way for Bashar Al-Assad to return to the international fold. He thus postponed the assault and ordered the repression of the revolt upon his return. Counsel Kempf stressed he had a different timeline, since Amnesty International mentioned the massacre of 27 prisoners as of July 7. It was not contradictory, Mr. Duclos replied, reckoning the main part of the assault took place afterward.

Questioned about the guarantees obtained by France on human rights, Mr. Duclos declared Mr. Sarkozy had assented that Assad would not speak about human rights during the press conference. As for the consequences of the meeting on the ground, Mr. Duclos acknowledged that it led to only a few releases of prisoners from Sednaya.

Counsel Kempf referred to Mr. Duclos’s book, which mentioned that after the great reconciliation of July 2008, Mr. Duclos had made efforts to rekindle economic relations. Mr. Duclos explained that Bashar Al-Assad’s visit in France hardly allowed French companies to secure contracts in Syria. Mr. Duclos’s belief was that the real leverage was business, because as clannish and totalitarian as the regime was, trade still mattered — “they were Levantines,” Mr. Duclos noted. Developing economic relations could lead to improving the rule of law, Mr. Duclos believed, since for business to thrive, the rules of the game must be respected. Counsel Kempf wondered if he could have obtained the release of prisoners from Sednaya by bringing the French petroleum company Total to Syria. Not directly, no, Mr. Duclos acknowledged, arguing the idea was to get the local elites accustomed to economic exchange, in order to gradually make progress. However, [France’s] main interlocutor ended up being the President’s cousin, which sent a very clear message. All the contracts ultimately fell through, and by 2011, it was clear that the attempt to revive relations had failed, Mr. Duclos recounted.

Counsel Kempf wondered if Islamist prisoners could be considered victims of the carceral archipelago. Mr. Duclos agreed and added that these formerly imprisoned Islamists were mainly opposition leaders and they were not particularly mistreated in the Syrian prisons, since they came out in good shape. Counsel Kempf responded that neither were they treated with particular respect, which Mr. Duclos could not deny. However, Mr. Duclos believed that they could not have been in such a bad condition, since they immediately returned to the fight after their release. Abuses might have stopped in preceding months, but they could have been tortured years earlier, Mr. Duclos clarified. Responding to Counsel Kempf, Mr. Duclos said it was unlikely that these prisoners had had a fair trial, if they’d even had a trial at all.

Counsel Kempf inquired about the comparison between Syria and the Spanish war [that Mr. Duclos presumably made in his book]. Mr. Duclos explained that the lack of support to Republicans allowed the nationalists to take over [in Spain]. In Syria, by failing to back certain elements in the opposition, the West effectively let the Russians, Iran, and Hezbollah bring about the regime’s victory. In both cases, it amounted to a green light for the eventual victors. Counsel Kempf asked who the "Republicans" in the Syrian civil war were. Mr. Duclos answered that France struggled to identify groups with shared values, since the regime had already eliminated the urban youth who might have been its natural allies. Mr. Duclos wondered to what extent such opposition trends with shared values even existed.

Responding to Counsel Kempf, Mr. Duclos was unsure if there was a clearly defined doctrine in French diplomacy, but in his view, it was legitimate to use armed force against Bashar Al-Assad. Mr. Duclos did not know if it was legal from the perspective of international law.

Counsel Kempf quoted a passage from Samira Al-Khalil’s, F22’s, book [one of the Douma 4 kidnapped by Jaysh Al-Islam] describing the siege of Douma on October 1, 2023, where the author mentioned a little girl leaving school who, after the fall of a shell, left this world before ever reaching the 7th grade. "May God curse the Nobel Prize, and every prize in the world,” Al-Khalil wrote. Counsel Kempf explained the author referred to the Nobel Price obtained by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 2013 and ask Mr. Duclos to comment. Mr. Duclos considered the OPCW’s win an absurd decision. The Russians convinced the Americans they had secured Syria’s renunciation of chemical weapons, but it was extremely naive to Mr. Duclos, since the regime obviously cheated.

Counsel Kempf asked why targeting hospitals and schools did not constitute a red line. Mr. Duclos stressed that the whole idea of a “red line” was typically American. Neither the French nor the Germans ever used that term. Mr. Duclos considered it shameful to draw a red line over chemical weapons, but not over daily bombings, and believed [then-American President] Barack Obama did not really care about Syria.

Counsel Kempf referred to Nahed Badawy, ناهد بدوي who stated in a separate context that she feared the radical Islamist groups but reckoned that they protected people from the state’s brutal repression. Counsel Kempf asked if some Islamist armed groups contributed to protecting Syrian civilians. Mr. Duclos said he would not go so far as to say they protected the population. He had been the first to condemn [the West’s] inaction, but he believed what happened was not only the fault of Obama and [then-French president] Hollande.

Responding to Counsel Kempf, Mr. Duclos confirmed he knew French diplomats Franck Gellet, Henri D’Aragon, Mathilde Michel, and Pierre Le Goff who had all given their business cards to Majdi N. Mr. Duclos considered they could have had an interest in a relationship with the Accused and added that seeking contact with someone involved in the Syrian situation was part of their job. That did not imply support or sympathy, he added. So, some diplomats did find it useful to stay in touch with Majdi N., Counsel Kempf emphasized. Ambassador Franck Gellet even wrote down his personal mobile number by hand—which might suggest a desire for a closer or more direct line of contact, Counsel Kempf noted.

Civil Parties’ Counsel Bailly intervened to stress that Samira Al-Khalil, F22, belonged to the group of activists kidnapped by Jaysh Al-Islam, and criticized the Defense’s attempt to justify Jaysh Al-Islam's crimes by highlighting the atrocities committed by Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. Counsel Ruiz replied that he did not want the Defense’s work to be caricatured.

The proceedings were adjourned at 1:42 PM.

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