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Inside the Mahmoud S. Trial #01: The Opening Statements

TRIAL OF Mahmoud S.

Stockholm District Court – Stockholm, Sweden

Trial Monitoring Summary #01

Hearing Date: October 20, 21, 22 and 24, 2025 

CAUTION: Some testimony may include graphic descriptions of torture, rape or other violent acts.  

Note that this summary is not a verbatim transcript of the trial; it is merely an unofficial summary of the proceedings.  

Throughout this summary, [information located in brackets are notes from our trial monitor] and “information placed in quotes are statements made by the witness, judges or counsel.” The names and identifying information of witnesses have been redacted. 

[Note:  SJAC provides a summary of the proceedings while redacting certain details to protect witness privacy and to preserve the integrity of the trial.]

Trial Monitoring reports of the Mahmoud S. trial are a result of a partnership between the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre and the University of Stockholm, Sweden. 

SJAC’s first trial monitoring report details days 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the trial of Mahmoud S. in Stockholm, Sweden. The first week of the trial detailed the opening statements of the Prosecutor and the Defense. The trial was open to the public in most parts. Only a few sections of the trial proceeded behind closed doors due to sensitive information that was presented

Day 1 – October 20, 2025

The Swedish Preliminary Investigation

Mahmoud S., a Palestinian born in 1970 and nicknamed Abu Hadid, lived near Yarmouk until 2012. He left Syria in August 2013 and arrived in Sweden on 11 November 2013, later obtaining Swedish citizenship in September 2017.

The investigation of Mahmoud S. has contained over 200 interviews. The interviews have been conducted in Sweden and abroad, mainly in Germany and France, through a joint investigation team (JIT). Evidence includes reports from the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism – Syria (IIIM), United Nations (UN), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and NGOs as well as the Caesar files.

The Prosecutor maintained that Mahmoud S. has been allied with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), the Free Palestine Movement (FPM), and the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

On 1 November 2023, the German Court of Appeal sentenced Moafak D. to life imprisonment for serious war crimes. This case provides important context, illustrating how another member of these groups has been held accountable for similar offenses.

Charges (Prosecutors)

Since at least the spring of 2012, a non-international armed conflict has been ongoing between the Syrian regime and regime-allied militias on one side, and several armed groups in Syria on the other. Mahmoud S. was, at some point during the spring of 2012, recruited and became a member of, or otherwise allied himself with, a regime-loyal armed militia group in Yarmouk, southern Damascus – such as PFLP-GC or its “people’s committees,” and the FPM.

Together and in coordination with others, Mahmoud S. committed the acts described below (points 1 and 2) in Syria between 13 July 2012 and 31 July 2013.

The demonstration in Yarmouk on 13 July 2012

On 13 July 2012, Mahmoud S., acting together and in concert with other persons associated with regime-loyal militias and members of the police or security services, intentionally injured and killed several civilians on Palestine Street and Quds Street in Yarmouk. The perpetrators coordinated an attack using live automatic weapons against civilians who were participating in a demonstration against the Syrian regime or were present nearby. Mahmoud S. was part of the coordinated attack against civilians, including victim NN 18, P1, who acted as a medic. He contributed to the strength of the attack and personally fired at civilians. About ten people were killed, including [redacted name] F1, [redacted name], F2, and [redacted name] F3, and several others were injured, including [redacted name] P2, [redacted name] P3, and [redacted name] P4.

The northern checkpoint (December 2012 – July 2013)

On 16 December 2012, the Syrian regime bombed several civilian targets in Yarmouk using MiG aircraft, including schools and a mosque. Shortly thereafter, Syrian regime forces and security services, supported by regime-loyal militias such as the PFLP-GC and FPM, established a partial siege of Yarmouk and set up checkpoints. This partial siege forced Yarmouk residents to undergo checks at a checkpoint near the Bashir Mosque (the Northern Checkpoint) in order to enter or exit the camp, including for essential supplies.

Between December 2012 and July 2013, Mahmoud S., as a member or associate of a regime-loyal militia, served at the Northern Checkpoint, where a large number of people were unlawfully deprived of their liberty. Together and in concert with others affiliated with regime-loyal militias, Syrian forces, and the security services, he intentionally killed civilians and subjected them to severe suffering, including psychological and physical torture, by having them detained at the checkpoint, held in nearby facilities, and later transported to security service detention centers, where they were tortured while in custody.

Mahmoud S.’s involvement included regular service at the Northern Checkpoint, where, using his knowledge of Yarmouk and its residents, he helped identify civilians for the security services to detain on suspicion of disloyalty to the Syrian regime. His actions led to the detention of several civilians, including [redacted name] P5, and [redacted name] P6. He also personally arrested civilians, including the [redacted information]-year-old [redacted name] P7, and escorted them to nearby facilities for further transfer to the security services’ detention centers.

Through these acts – directed against civilians entitled to special protection under the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law (IHL) – Mahmoud S. committed serious violations of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and universally recognized principles of IHL applicable in armed conflicts. The act was committed in connection with the armed conflict in Syria. The war crime is considered aggravated, as several people were killed and injured. Alternatively, Mahmoud S. may be considered to have aided and abetted the commission of aggravated war crimes through advice or assistance as described above.

Legal basis (points 1 and 2)

Chapter 22, Section 6, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Swedish Penal Code (as in force before 1 July 2014), Chapter 23, Section 4 of the Swedish Penal Code, Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Articles 4 and 13 of Additional Protocol II.

Position on the Question of Responsibility (Defense)

Mahmoud S. denied all criminal allegations against him. He also rejected any claims for damages. He argued that Syrian law governs his actions. The Prosecutor noted that Syria ratified the Geneva Conventions in 1953 and Additional Protocol I in 1983, but not Additional Protocol II; however, large parts of Protocol II are considered customary international law.

Regarding the demonstration, Mahmoud S. claimed that he did not act in coordination with the police or militias (FSA) and did not coordinate or participate in the killing of civilians. He was unable to provide witnesses at this stage.

Regarding the checkpoint, Mahmoud S. denied any responsibility, asserting that he did not serve there, did not arrest or identify opponents, and did not act in concert with others. He also denied any form of advice or assistance that could implicate him.

The Defense announced that all these points will be clarified during the hearing on Friday, October 24, 2025.

Yarmouk

Between 2011–2018, Yarmouk was the site of a complex non-international armed conflict involving state and non-state actors. Regime-loyal militias, including PFLP-GC, FPM, and the People’s Committees, operated alongside the Syrian army, while groups such as FSA and Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis opposed them. By 2013, the Syrian army had besieged the camp, imprisoned 18,000 people and caused at least 194 civilian deaths. ISIS later seized control, and in 2018 a regime-loyal forces retook the area. The Prosecution linked Mahmoud S. to this offensive based on photo and video evidence placing him at the location at the time of the event, which forms part of the context for the war crimes charges against him.

List of FPM Members

The SCM (Syrian Centre for Media and Freedom of Expression) has compiled a list of the command structure of FPM members. The Prosecutors focused on some individuals on the list, highlighting high-ranking members with whom Mahmoud S. was allegedly connected. These connections were supported by photos, social media friendships, and contact information from his phones. Media reports (Al-hajar al-Aswd and Zaman al-Wasl) also identified Mahmoud S. as a member of FPM. They also provided the case of Moafaq D. as evidence, where a German court sentenced a high-ranking FPM member to life imprisonment for serious war crimes (1 November 2023), illustrating the potential legal consequences for FPM members involved in comparable activities. 

Day 2 – October 21, 2025

The Demonstration: Point 1 of the indictment

The Prosecutor went through the situation in Yarmouk leading up to the demonstration on July 13, 2012. The Prosecutor described how 14–17 Palestinian children were kidnapped and tortured to death. The Assad government was pointed out to be responsible for the killing which led to the large protest on the day in question. 

Video footage from the demonstration was presented, showing how the large crowd moved in Yarmouk. The video footage later showed how the crowd was being shot at and people were fleeing for their lives, seeking shelter in the area. The Prosecutor argued that the attack was highly planned and coordinated by the Syrian Security Services, which used regime-loyal militants as PFLP-GC to carry out the attack. The Prosecutor claimed that there were sniper positions out around the demonstrators in order to shoot them; this was pointed out as evidence to show that the attack was planned and coordinated. 

The Prosecutor noted that conflicting information has been reported regarding the number of fatalities resulting from the demonstration. The day after the incident, Syrian sources reported 11 deaths, while the United Nations later concluded that 10 individuals had been killed. Initial information received by the Swedish Court suggested 12 deaths; however, the Court established that one of the individuals listed, [redacted name] P2 – a Plaintiff in this case, was in fact alive but injured during the events. The Court also determined that one of the deceased, [redacted name] F2, had been recorded twice. Based on these findings, the Court concluded that the total number of deaths amounted to 10.

Further, the Prosecutor proceeded to list the injured individuals and presented medical certificates documenting their injuries. The Court proceeded with a closed session to safeguard sensitive information presented.

The Checkpoints: Point 2 of the indictment

The Prosecutor presented a report outlining the function, use and staffing of the checkpoint located at the northern entrance of Yarmouk. According to the report, the checkpoint was tasked with controlling the movement of individuals entering and exiting the area and with verifying their identities against a list of persons wanted by the authorities. The stated purpose of the checkpoint was to identify and apprehend individuals affiliated with rebel groups.

The Prosecutor noted that a large number of civilians were detained at this checkpoint and subsequently transferred to detention centers and prisons operated by the Syrian Security Services. To support these statements, the Prosecutor proceeded to display video footage and photographic evidence depicting the checkpoint in question and its operations.

Human rights organizations have produced analytical reports concerning the checkpoint at the northern entrance of the Yarmouk camp, where Mahmoud S. is alleged to have worked.

According to these reports, two local Palestinian factions controlled the checkpoint. The first was the PFLP-GC, led by Ahmad Jibril, F4. The second was the FPM, led by Yaser Qashlaq, F5. Civilians were permitted to leave the camp only between 8:00 AM and 3:00 PM on specific days, and many were forced to wait for several hours at the checkpoint to either enter or exit the camp.

The Action Group for Palestinians of Syria (AGPS), in its daily situation reports, documented multiple arrests at the checkpoint. Several reports also mentioned masked individuals acting as informants, whose actions led to the arrest and physical abuse of civilians. Mahmoud S. has been reported to have been masked while operating at the checkpoint.

The Prosecutor also presented geolocation evidence, including photographs and video material depicting the layout and conditions of the northern entrance to Yarmouk, as it appeared at the relevant time.

Mahmoud S. involvement

The Prosecutor alleged that Mahmoud S., as a member of or in association with a regime-affiliated armed militia, regularly operated at checkpoints where individuals, primarily civilians, were abducted, unlawfully detained, and in several cases killed. It further alleged that Mahmoud S., as a part of this checkpoint, subjected civilians to inhumane treatment and suffering, including acts amounting to torture.

According to the Prosecution, Mahmoud S. participated in the identification and control of civilians with the intent of arresting those perceived as disloyal to the regime and subsequently transferring them to the custody of Syrian government authorities.

The Prosecutor held that the Syrian Security Services exercised control over the area through regime-affiliated militia groups. Mahmoud S. is alleged to have held a position of authority within one of these groups and to have exercised this authority by identifying and arresting individuals suspected of being affiliated with rebel forces. The Prosecutor further asserted that Mahmoud S. transferred detainees to the Syrian Security Services, where several of them were subsequently executed.

Day 3 – October 22, 2025

Syrian Security Services

The Prosecutor proceeded to describe the structure of the Syrian Security Services and its various branches. Particular emphasis was placed on the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID). The MID operated through several sub-branches, including Branch 215 (Raids Branch), Branch 227 (Area Branch), and Branch 235 (Palestine Branch) – the latter being associated with PFLP-GC. These branches have been documented as engaging in systematic and organized violence, which, according to the Prosecution, was widely known to Mahmoud S. and to the Syrian population at large. The Prosecutor claimed that Mahmoud S. was well informed and fully aware of the type of torture and ill-treatment that awaited the individuals he arrested at the checkpoint and subsequently handed over to the Syrian Security Services.

Branch 227 has been particularly linked to human rights violations, including torture and executions, with approximately 20% of the victims documented in the “Caesar” photographs traced back to this branch. Branch 235 has similarly been associated with torture, sexual violence, and abuse, including cases involving female detainees.

Beyond the inhumane living conditions – described by the Prosecutor, with reference to various reports, as part of a deliberate system of torture designed to break the individual – systematic torture was reported to occur on a daily basis. Interrogations routinely involved torture aimed at extracting information or forced confessions. Techniques included electric shocks, burnings, and beatings, as well as more systematized methods such as the “Doulab,” where the victim was forced into a tire and beaten; the “Besat-ar-Reeh” or “flying carpet,” in which the victim was strapped to a board and assaulted; and the “Shabeh,” where the detainee was suspended by the wrists, either from the front or back. It was also reported that torture occurred arbitrarily in cells and hallways, causing constant fear of being the subject of torture amongst the detainees.

Day 4 – October 24, 2025

Statement of facts by the Defense

On the fourth trial day, the Defense addressed that the case largely lacks concrete evidence and is primarily based on witness statements about events that took place thirteen years ago. The case heavily relies on information collected by third parties, with the Swedish investigative authorities becoming involved only at a secondary or third stage. These sources of evidence are hardly possible to investigate.

The Defense further argued that none of the witness statements can be technically verified, and that many of the individuals collecting statements are driven by activism. The Defense acknowledged that reports from the UN and Human Rights Watch (HRW) have established that serious war crimes have been committed in Syria, both by regime-affiliated and opposition forces.

Referring to the well-known saying “when war comes, truth is the first casualty,” which the Defense argued is reflected in the judgment, the Defense urged the Court to be cautious when drawing conclusions in the context of a civil war. As there is no reliable evidence establishing the Accused’s guilt. The Defense concluded that the Court should adhere to the principles of legal certainty and acquit the Accused.

Mahmoud S.’s involvement in regime-loyal forces

The Defense emphasized that none of the reports issued by reliable and independent organizations, such as the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA), OHCHR, IIIM or HRW, mentioned Mahmoud S. His name does not appear in any of these sources. Upon request from the Swedish police, none of these organizations were able to confirm that the Accused had been affiliated with any allied group in Yarmouk. The only media outlets in which he is mentioned are pro-oppositions platforms, classified as such in the report Syria’s New Media Landscape on pages 8 to 10 (Middle East Institute, 2016, Syria’s New Media Landscape). The Defense emphasized that the report stated that these sources are driven by activism, and can therefore not be viewed as independent or objective sources.

As an example of media platforms which cannot be considered reliable, the Defense mentioned the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM), which has provided information to the Swedish police. Their reports are largely based on communications with activists, anonymous testimonies, and witness statements obtained in 2023 following contact initiated by SCM. In short, these reports rely primarily on open sources that, according to the Defense, cannot be regarded as reliable. SCM had, for example, alleged that Mahmoud S. had engaged in arbitrary detentions at the roadblock in 2015. The issue with this allegation was that Mahmoud S. was in Sweden during that period. Thus, false allegations have been made against him on the same media platform which is now used for the prosecution.

The Defense also emphasized that there is no evidence indicating that Mahmoud S. has ever been affiliated with the FPM or any other regime-loyal forces, despite claims by some media outlets, such as Al-Hajar al-Aswad and Zaman al-Wasl, suggesting otherwise. Mahmoud S. had resided in Yarmouk until 2012. He had never been a member of the FPM or any pro-regime group, nor of any oppositional group such as jihadists or other Islamist organizations.

While some of his friends and acquaintances were connected to regime-loyal groups, this cannot be taken as evidence that he himself was involved. The fact that he appears in photographs with certain regime supporters during the time period 2017 to 2018 does not itself indicate that he is pro-regime or that they were close friends. Regarding the video footage from 2018 showing the Accused dancing with a weapon, it does not provide any grounds for conclusions concerning the alleged offenses. Dancing and posing with weapons are, particularly during celebratory occasions, a common cultural practice in the Middle East.

There are numerous videos and photographs from the demonstration on July 13, 2012. Although some individuals have been identified in photographs and video recordings from the event, Mahmoud S. does not appear in any of them.

Video footage from Yarmouk between 2012 and 2013 shows that opposition militia groups were present in the area. The videos also reveal that there were violent clashes between various oppositional and regime-loyal groups within Yarmouk. Yarmouk was attacked both from within and outside. None of the available or documentary evidence, such as internet material, YouTube videos or reports from Amnesty International, suggests that Mahmoud S. was involved in the events. Some individuals in the forces have been able to be identified from the footage. However, Mahmoud S. was not among them. In the Swedish National Operations Department (NOA) report, Mahmoud S. was mentioned as a possible match for the “masked person” seen in photographs from the checkpoint. SCM reported that there had been one or several masked individuals, and Mahmoud S. was identified as one potential suspect among a total of 29 persons. AGPS, which identified Mahmoud S. as one of the masked individuals acting as informants, is conducting a campaign against war crimes in Yarmouk and has encouraged individuals to come forward afterwards with testimonies concerning Mahmoud S.

The Defense also noted that false information about Mahmoud S. has been widely circulated on social media, particularly on Facebook. For instance, he was falsely accused of participating in a massacre that occurred in 2014, after he had already fled to Sweden. Mahmoud S. was also wrongly alleged to be the father of a boy shown posing with weapons, despite not having a son. The Defense emphasized that this wide range of false information is largely driven by activism.

 

The trial of Mahmoud S. will resume on Wednesday November 5, 2025.

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