
Inside the Hasna A. Trial #3: Final Submissions by the Defense, Rebuttal of Injured Party Claim, Rebuttal and Surrebuttal of Prosecutor and Defense Teams
District Court of the Hague – Schiphol Judicial Complex, The Netherlands
Trial Monitoring Summary #3
Hearing Date: October 17, 2024
CAUTION: Some testimony includes descriptions of torture.
Note that this summary is not a verbatim transcript of the trial; it is merely an unofficial summary of the proceedings.
Throughout this summary, [information located in brackets are notes from our trial monitor] and “information placed in quotes are statements made by the witness, judges or counsel.” The names and identifying information of witnesses have been redacted.
SJAC’s 3rd trial monitoring report details day 3 of the trial of Hasna A. in the Schiphol Judicial Complex in Badhoevedorp, The Netherlands. On this trial day, the Defense Team made their final submissions, Plaintiffs’ Counsel made their rebuttal and injured party claim and the Prosecutor and Defense Teams made their rebuttal and surrebuttal respectively. Last, the Accused presented their “final word”.
Day 3 – October 17, 2024
On this trial day, the proceedings began at 10:05AM at the Schiphol Judicial Complex, Badhoevedorp, the Netherlands before the International Crimes Chamber of the District Court of the Hague. There were notably fewer public spectators than the previous two trial days in the gallery. There also seemed to be no members of the press in the Courtroom [they had been present on the other days, see Trial Report 1 and 2].
Opening of the Third Trial Day
The Presiding Judge opened the proceedings for the day by welcoming Hasna A. and telling her that while her lawyers would lead the Defense’s Final Submissions, she should pay attention and ask questions if anything was unclear. The Judge then welcomed P1 who was present in the courtroom again and P2 who joined online. The Judge then provided the plan for the day, elaborating that in the morning the Defense would share their Final Submissions, followed by in the afternoon rebuttal by the Plaintiffs’ Counsels and the Prosecution, surrebuttal by the Defense Team and the “final word” from the Accused.
Defense’s Final Submissions
Dr. André Seebregts opened the Defense’s submissions by noting that P1, P2 and many Yazidis’ troubled past and experiences had touched him and his colleague, and that the Defense’s submission was not intended to take away or undermine from those horrible experiences. Seebregts clarified that their submission was intended to show another side to the facts and evidence pertaining to this crime. He began by highlighting his client, Hasna A.’s, personal circumstances relying on the Tripartite Report [addressed on day one, see Trial Report 1]. He elaborated that Hasna A. had a very heavy history and that at 7 years old Hasna A. already had shown signs of weak development and inadequacies that were not typical of her age. He put forward that she was seriously disturbed and had a low IQ (which was more limited than what is initially expected from Hasna A.). Seebregts elaborated that the report suggested that Hasna A. had at a young age been sexually abused by her cousin. He also stated that at 18 years old Hasna A. had lived on street and had a relationship with a man to get food and a place to sleep. Seebregts noted that the report stated that Hasna A. had highly avoidant coping behavior in which she could not see the consequences of her actions and that prior to her very quick radicalization Hasna A. was barely engrossed in religion. Counsel stated that he was not making the statement that Hasna A. was a victim and that for any wrongful acts committed Hasna A. deserved punishment. Nevertheless, Counsel posited that Hasna A. was partly a victim given her abuse, low IQ and naïve believability. Counsel explained that Hasna A. did not find a war zone paradise and that upon arrival she slowly realized this reality. Seebregts asserted that the Prosecution’s description on the position of women in IS [see Trial Report 2] did not align with the experience of Hasna A. He cited P2’s statement in which Hasna A. ’s ex-husband was known for having been with another woman and eventually marrying her after he and Hasna A. divorced. Prior to elaboration on the facts pertaining to the slavery charge, he posited that the Defense’s submission would provide nuanced and balanced aspects to the evidence and charges.
Seebregts began by positing the facts and context that the Defense regarded relevant for the slavery charge. He explained that in February 2015, when she was 23 years old, Hasna A. traveled with her 4-year-old autistic son to Syria and ended up unexpectedly in a Madafa. Counsel highlighted that Hasna A. described the Madafa as a prison (P1 had stated that Hasna A. had said this too) and that the only feasible way for Hasna A. to escape the Madafa was to marry. Counsel provided that after 4 months living in the Madafa she married Abu Zubair and shortly after their wedding Hasna A. met P1 in June 2015. Counsel described Hasna A. in this period as a 24-year-old, who had married to leave the Madafa and to have access to what a husband could provide as in the Caliphate a husband was required in order to lead a better life. Counsel described that ideological justifications were conceived and normalized in daily life within the Caliphate. Seebregts continued that the statements by P1 and P2 were a delicate problem given that they had both suffered immensely and experienced significant injustice, but that this did not mean that they always told the truth. Counsel argued that the statements made by P1 and P2 had been subject to leading questions and were thus not the truth. He posited that the later statements made at the Dutch Court Commissioner by P1 and P2 were not the truth and thus those incriminating statements should not be used as supporting evidence.
Counsel Seebregts continued that in P1’s statement at the Dutch Court Commissioner, P1 had stated that she was there to get her rights, and that Hasna A. was the reason P1 had lost two daughters. Seebregts continued that since Hasna A. was from IS and P1’s daughters had died at the hands of IS, the Defense understood that P1’s trauma and subsequent recollection would make P1 transfer the blame to Hasna A. He continued that he understood that P1’s frustration that had led her to hold Hasna A. and IS responsible but Seebregts also posited that Hasna A. was not responsible for the suffering from P1. He elaborated that it could not be established that P1’s cleaning, preparation of food, care for Hasna A.’s son and housework was because of Hasna A.’s instruction. Counsel cited Hannah Arendts [a German American historian and philosopher] who considered one’s acts central to the determination of one’s guilt. Seebregts provided that this understanding was important to keep in mind in the case of Hasna A. He stated that it was important in the determination of Hasna A. ’s guilt to only consider her acts and not the bigger atrocities.
Counsel continued that P1’s statements had shifted notably since her initial interviews. He posited that when P1 was rescued by Yazda, she had not made a statement but that there was documentation of her rescue the day before on November 8, 2015 [this document was introduced to the Case File by the Defense on the first trial day when the Prosecution requested extension of the period of Hasna A. ’s charge of slavery as a crime against humanity against P1, see Trial Report 1]. Counsel continued that P1’s first statement was made to CIJA, was 9 pages long and had mentioned lots of people but not Hasna A. He asserted that in her second statement to UNITAD in 2022, the first mention of Hasna A. was made by P1 and stated that Hasna A. had stayed in Abu Ahmad and P1’s house only once from June to the beginning July 2015. Conversely, in her statement to the Dutch Court Commissioner P1 stated that Hasna A. had stayed 10 times at their house ranging from a week to 10 days to 15 days, according to Counsel.
He continued that it seemed as though Hasna A. and P1 had only known each other for 2 and half months as Hasna A. was married in 2015 and P1 escaped Raqqa and spent 40 days in Aleppo prior to her rescue. Counsel highlighted that in P1’s statement to the Dutch Court Commissioner P1 had stated that she had spent 1 month in Aleppo prior to rescue, whereas to UNITAD she had stated it was 40 days. Seebregts elaborated that if P1 had been rescued on November 7, 2015 (given the Yazda document) she must have left Raqqa around September 28, 2015. According to the counsel, Hasna A. had left at least a month prior to P1’s escape as Hasna A. had sent a message on September 1, 2015, that she was in Iraq. Counsel elaborated that in Hasna A. ’s interview with the Dutch police she had stated that she had spent a month in Mosul and a month somewhere else in Iraq (she did not know where) and had been to Iraq twice (once in September and once in December 2015). Counsel concluded that Hasna A. and P1 could not have known each other more than 10 weeks from Hasna A. ’s wedding in May (and moved in with P1 10 days later) to her definite location in Iraq on September 1, 2015.
Despite confusion in Hasna A. ’s timeline and departure to Iraq, all the moments that P1 had stated to the Dutch Court Commissioner that Hasna A. had stayed at their house was not possible or feasible within the 10 weeks, according to Counsel. The Council also noted that to UNITAD, P1 had not recognized a photo of Hasna A. which would not make sense if she had seen her more than 10 times. Counsel argued that to UNITAD P1 did not know of the possible slavery charge against Hasna A. whereas to the Dutch Court Commissioner P1 knew that the case was being investigated. He argued that P1’s motive for providing a false statement was because she wanted someone from IS to face justice for the suffering her daughters experienced.
Counsel quoted P1’s testimony during her right to speak the day prior [see Trial Report 2] in which she had said that she wished that Hasna A. would get a life sentence and never be free. Counsel argued that P1’s statement to the Dutch Court Commissioner that Hasna A. had stayed with her 10 times and was treated badly was not true and was more likely that P1 had been very scared and didn’t dare to say anything as Hasna A. had testified. Counsel then elaborated on P1’s statement to UNITAD (when she did not know about the alleged charges against Hasna A.) in which P1 had stated that Hasna A. did not get mad, had a normal character but was dirty and washed chicken herself. P1 had also stated to UNITAD that she was happy that she did not have someone like Hasna A. in her own home but that otherwise they were not arguing. Counsel provided that the most likely version of the truth was that Hasna A. did not do much, was not clean, lazy, and not smart but that otherwise she let P1 take care of [redacted name]. Counsel also argued that this statement cleared Hasna A. of guilt given that Hasna A. not doing household tasks because she was lazy was not the same as giving instructions to P1. Counsel concluded that P1’s statements to the Dutch Court Commissioner were thus exaggerated to make Hasna A. seem more guilty than what was true. He clarified that statements by P1 that Hasna A. had stayed with her more than once, had gotten mad at her and given her instructions had no standing in the case.
Seebregts continued that P2’s statement at the Dutch Court Commissioner was also not entirely the true. He noted that to UNITAD, P2 had very specifically recalled that Abu Abdullah had only used physical violence against her once because she had told other women that she liked another man. In her UNITAD statement she had also mentioned that he had raped her (Counsel said that this illustrated the truth in her statement to UNITAD because P2 had mentioned this). Counsel highlighted that when asked by the Dutch Court Commissioner whether Abu Abdullah had hit her, P2 had stated he had regularly hit her. He also stated that in P2’s statement at UNITAD she had stated that Hasna A. had moved in with them for 2 weeks and had regularly visited them. He also highlighted that when asked at UNITAD whether Hasna A. had ever given her instructions, P2 had answered no; when asked how Hasna A. was with P2, P2 had stated “she was fine with me”. At UNITAD P2 had also been asked whether she had ever seen Hasna A. give instruction to other Yazidis, P2 had stated that she did not know, she had never seen anything. P2 had stated at UNITAD that Hasna A. and P2 were not angry with each other and that Hasna A. had a normal character. Counsel argued that there were notable similarities between P1 and P2’s statements to UNITAD. He emphasized that to UNITAD, there was no cause for prosecution against Hasna A. yet and they were both safe whereas at the Dutch Court Commissioner, both Plaintiffs were aware of the investigation against Hasna A. for slavery as a crime against humanity. He posited that Hasna A. was the only Dutch person mentioned in their statements and that he had been present as Hasna A. ’s lawyer in the interviews. He argued that P2 certainly knew of the criminal case against Hasna A. when she made her statement to the Dutch Court Commissioner.
Seebregts closed his part of the submission by highlighting that P1 and P2 had both made much more incriminating statements when they knew of the case against Hasna A. He stated that for P2 at UNITAD she had stated that Hasna A. stayed with her for 2 weeks whereas to the Dutch Court Commissioner she had stated that Hasna A. had stayed 2 months and more than two times with them. Counsel argued that there was a trend in their statements to the Dutch Court Commissioner where they both considerably burden Hasna A. Seebregts concluded that the Defense understood the Plaintiffs’ wish for justice and considered it a legitimate wish for the Yazidi community, but that justice could not be achieved in this manner. He highlighted that there was a requirement for supporting evidence to Hasna A. ’s alleged conduct and clarified that his goal was to prevent the Judges blindly believing the statements by P1 and P2 because of their horrible lived experiences.
Defense’s Final Submission: Legal Aspects to the Slavery Charge
The second Defense Counsel, Dr. Nora Christiansen continued the Defense’s submissions addressing the legal aspects to the slavery charge. She began by citing Chris Jansen [a Professor of Law at the Vrije Universiteit] for sufficient rule of law there was a requirement for supporting and switch evidence derived from Article 342(2) of Dutch Criminal Procedure and jurisprudence. Christiansen posited that Article 342(2) of Dutch Criminal Procedure required that proof that the accused has committed the charged offence cannot be established by the Judge solely based on the statement of one witness. She elaborated that in the case, there was insufficient evidence for the slavery charge against Hasna A. Counsel highlighted that the current charges could be compared to a typical sex offender case, in that there was no other witness besides the Accused and the Plaintiffs. In sex offender cases, even when in cases where there were corroborating statements that were consistent and detailed in accordance with Article 342(2), acquittal had resulted.
Christiansen posited that the central question pertaining to the evidence of the slavery charge was whether the statements by P1 and P2 provided enough support as evidence. She highlighted that in P1’s statement she had not mentioned that Hasna A. had been in P2’s house whereas in P2’s statements she made contradictory statements about P1 and Hasna A. P2 had stated that she was not up to date about Hasna A. staying with P1. P1 also had stated that P2 would know about Hasna A. calling her a servant and giving her instructions, but P2 only stated that Hasna A. had given instructions on the Friday night dinners but not that P1 was called a servant. Christiansen had posited supporting evidence between P1 and P2 could not be established.
Christiansen continued to assess whether P1’s statement could be corroborated by Hasna A.’s statement. Counsel noted that Hasna A. ’s statements and testimony found that Hasna A. confirmed being in P1’s house because of her ex-husband but denied giving instructions and had done her own housework herself. Counsel highlighted that Hasna A. ’s statement indicated that her ex-husband was friends with Abu Ahmad and that Hasna A. had requested to stay elsewhere than a Madafa as it felt like a prison to her. Christiansen posited that mere presence at the crime scene was not enough proof of the commission of a crime which had been supported by Dutch jurisprudence. Christiansen cited the Ali B. case [a very public sex offense case in the Netherlands] in which the Supreme Court posited that supporting evidence was necessary to establish the concrete circumstances of crime, otherwise it would only serve as context statements (Counsel stated that this was the case with P1 and Hasna A. in clarifying the crime scene). In the Ali B. case it was found that when the context for sexual acts [such as being in the bedroom and going to bed together] did not prove the commission of sexual offences. Counsel stated that the discrepancy in P1’s statement thus suggested thickening of the truth [there were technical difficulties with the live translation for the public gallery and P2, and the Court waited until they were resolved before continuing]. Counsel addressed that prior to her statement at the Dutch Court Commissioner, P1 had not mentioned going to Hasna A.’s house to clean (it was not found in her statements to UNITAD and CIJA). P2’s statement also did not corroborate this, when asked whether P1 would work for Hasna A., P2 responded that P1 did not but would work in Abu Khadija’s house (P5’s husband).
Christiansen addressed whether P1’s statement could provide “schakelbewijs”, translated to chain or switch evidence, to the charge of slavery against P2. [Switch evidence, in the Netherlands, is used when there is limited evidence of facts and thus evidence is linked or chained to maintain that the facts and Accused’s conduct is proven, supported by Supreme Court Judgements such as here]. This is only permissible if there are specific and characteristic similarities which establish essential aspects of the crime. Counsel elaborated that switch evidence could show the way a crime is committed (i.e. modus operandi) or highlight specific and typical facts of the crime or the Accused. In the case of P1 and P2, Counsel provided that it must be determined that both have similar specific and characteristic points to support each other to a sufficient degree.
Christiansen argued that this threshold was not reached in the case with P1 and P2. He relied on Dutch jurisprudence to illustrate the threshold previously relied on. Counsel first cited the Nicky Verstappen case [can be found here] and the Supreme Court Judgement that relied on switch evidence that established characteristics of the crime and made a subsequent connection between these characteristics and the Accused in a manner that was indistinguishable from their “signature” for example. Counsel then addressed the Amsterdam Medicijnen Moord (Medicine Murder) case [can be found here] in which two cases of murder were linked through evidence of the modus operandi used (in both cases the victims were drugged using a substance that was not available in the Netherlands and the Defendant had in possession. Christiansen argued that in the case of Hasna A. the only similarity between the Plaintiffs’ statements was that Hasna A. had stayed in both P1 and P2’s house and that both Plaintiffs were part of the same civilian population. Counsel posited that the similarities did not relate to their treatment or conduct by Hasna A. She elaborated that their statements on Hasna A. making them do household tasks did not have sufficient distinctive elements of Hasna A. ’s modus operandi or details on how Hasna A. behaved or treated them.
Christiansen argued that P2’s statement made to the Dutch Court Commissioner could not be used as switch evidence for P1 as it contained leading questions from the interviewer. She elaborated that in the questioning, P2 had only confirmed acts raised by the Dutch Court Commissioner, and did not raise the conduct of Hasna A. herself. Christiansen quoted the statement made by P2 in which it was asked, “did you have to pray?” and P2 answered yes; she was asked whether Abu Zubair and Umm Zubair (how the wife of Abu Zubair would be called) had given her instructions, to which P2 answered yes, she had to do laundry and cook; when asked whether Hasna A. gave her the instructions, P2 answered yes. Counsel posited that the similarity in P1 and P2’s statement that Hasna A. had been on her phone often was not distinctive enough to reach the threshold of switch evidence. Other characteristics such as that the men, Abu Ahmad and Abu Abdullah were often not home, and that Hasna A. would stay in her room when they were home was considered by Counsel as characteristics of IS and not distinctive of Hasna A. Counsel concluded that P1 and P2’s statements must be considered independent from each other given that article 342(2) of Dutch Criminal Procedure was not met.
[25-minutes-break]
Defense’s Final Submission: Insufficient Evidence of the Slavery Charge
Christiansen continued after the break that there was not enough evidence of slavery as a crime against humanity. She argued that household tasks were not enough to reach the threshold of power attaching to the right of ownership and that Hasna A. had not aided and abetted in the crime. Christiansen continued by “zooming out” of the situation, she stated that P1 and P2’s imprisonment had begun much earlier in 2014 when they were placed on a lineup for the men Abu Abdullah and Abu Ahmad, who selected them to be owned. P1 was forced to marry Abu Ahmad, both women were forced to convert to Islam, to cook and do household tasks. Christiansen posited that the question was not whether the women had been made slaves by the men or IS but about the Accused’s role.
Christiansen elaborated on forced labor in the context of slavery. She referred to the Elements of Crimes at the ICC and confirmed that slavery was not restricted to only traditional forms, but also modern examples derived from the exercise of power attached to right of ownership. Counsel elaborated that jurisprudence of the ICC and ICTY could be relied upon in establishing the boundaries of modern slavery acts. She referred to the list of 10 indicia pertaining to the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership from the ICC Ongwen Judgment. Counsel addressed the ninth indicator of forced labor or subjecting the person to servile status and referred to the ICTY and Special Court for Sierra Leone in which it was required that the victim must have no choice in working. Counsel argued that in the case of P1 and P2 there was not sufficient evidence of their inability to decline working (even in their statements to the Dutch Court Commissioner) and in P1’s case was not detained (P1 had keys to the house). Counsel posited that only the day prior during their right to speak was there reference made to their fear of abuse or death. Christiansen quoted P1’s statement to UNITAD in which she was asked whether P1 could refuse orders and she had answered sometimes and that Hasna A.’s son was hard. Counsel reiterated that according to P1’s statement Hasna A. and her son behaved annoyingly but this was not enough to establish slavery. Counsel continued that Hasna A. was vulnerable given her age, she was born in 1991 which made P1 18 years older than Hasna A. and P2 10 years older. Counsel reiterated that proof that P1 and P2 were financially dependent had not been shown in the Case File and even if it were it would relate to Abu Ahmad and Abu Abdullah, not Hasna A.
Christiansen continued that there had been no cases at the international tribunals regarding performance of severe household tasks [such as forced labor in cleaning and cooking for multiple households], as the tribunals target the most responsible persons, such as military leaders, and left such cases for national judges. Counsel continued that German Judges had dealt with eight cases of Yazidi women being bought or borrowed for the performance of severe household tasks. Counsel clarified that there were three cases in which a Yazidi slave was “borrowed” to perform household tasks, the other five cases involved direct owners of Yazidi slaves which was not relevant to the case. First, the Omaima A. case was addressed in which Omaima had “borrowed” a Yazidi slave from a friend for three to four hours. The Defense of the Omaima case had argued that the slave cleaned on her own initiative and that thus merely mopping the floor with the door locked was not enough to establish slavery. Second, the Nurten J. case was addressed in which the Accused had used a Yazidi slave owned by other IS fighters about 50 times. Third, the case of Rumina S. involved the Accused staying in a house where there was a Yazidi slave and put her to work. In the three cases Counsel posited that aiding and abetting must be the extension of powers attached to right of ownership, such as giving instructions. Counsel highlighted that in the case of Hasna A. she had not had any contact nor worked closely with the men who owned P1 and P2. In the case of Nurten J. aiding and abetting was established after the Yazidi slave had been used 50 times and gave instructions. Counsel posited that in the case of Hasna A. she was not able to speak the same language and thus was not able to give instructions to the Plaintiffs.
Defense’s Final Submission: Other Three Charges
Christiansen then addressed the charges pertaining to her participation in a terrorist organization, commission of preparatory acts with terrorist intent and endangerment of her underage son. Counsel requested a shortening of the period surrounding her participation in a terrorist organization [See Trial Report 1 & 2 for charges and dates] to exclude the time she spent in the Madafa upon arrival in Syria and the time after her divorce from her husband Abu Zubeir. Counsel argued that Hasna A.’s alleged participation in a terrorist organization during these periods did not have terrorist intent. Counsel stated that Hasna A. had left the Netherlands out of fear and wanted to lead her own life with her son, Hasna A. had stated that only when she was placed in the Madafa had she realized her mistake. Hasna A. had stated that the Madafa was like a prison and married because it was the only possibility to get out of the Madafa. Counsel also posited that Hasna A. had divorced Abu Zubair after years of barely being able to communicate with him and bad treatment. Counsel described that after Hasna A. ’s divorce with Abu Zubair in 2017 she was vulnerable and alone with 4 children and registered at IS to get necessities, not because she supported IS.
Counsel argued that registration at IS did not immediately mean it was participation in a terrorist organization. Counsel continued that the Defense’s position on the third charge [See Trial Report 1] of commission of preparatory acts with terrorist intent was that while the acts were considered preparatory, they were not with terrorist intent. Counsel elaborated that the evidence of Hasna A. ’s radicalization process in which she had searched information on social media and read a flyer on IS did not necessarily prove extremist thoughts but that this would nevertheless not meet the threshold of preparatory acts with terrorist intent. Counsel elaborated that terrorist intent shown through travel for marriage with an IS fighter could not be established in the case. Counsel posited that Hasna A. had fled the Netherlands after particularly bad months, and that the police visit had been the final straw. Counsel posited that the threshold for propaganda had not been met given that there was no evidence of glorification of IS. Counsel highlighted that Hasna A. had stated that her husband owned 2 weapons and had taken a weapon twice upon request of her husband to defend herself, but that there was no terrorist intent for this to be considered.
Finally, Counsel addressed the charge of the endangerment of Hasna A.’s underage son. According to Counsel, while the Prosecution had argued that Hasna A. could have tried to escape upon arrival in Syria, the risks of doing this were life-threatening. Counsel posited that Hasna A. had thought beforehand that she would be free to live her own life with her son within the Caliphate, when in fact the reality upon arrival was something very different. Additionally, Counsel addressed that for an escape plan to be a possibility for Hasna A., she would need to have the ability to plan properly and consider consequences of her actions, which the psychological report showed she did not have and was not able to do.
Defense’s Final Submission: Damages and Required Punishment
Finally, the Defense Counsels addressed the sentence and requested damages by the Plaintiffs. Seebregts first argued that the requested damages pertained to slavery which they had already shown should lead to an acquittal. Nevertheless, Seebregts posited that the damages requested must be directly causally linked with the conduct of the Accused (which was not possible given the many factors involved in the Plaintiffs’ suffering), and that there was no room for Syrian law. Furthermore, the requested damages of €30,000 and €25,000 are not proportionate to any damages that may have been incurred by Hasna A. Counsel also used Dutch jurisprudence to show that in cases where plaintiffs experienced drastic abuse (such as being financially exploited, humiliated, threatened to be seriously injured) faced much smaller sentences and damages, and were therefore not warranted for Hasna A. ’s alleged conduct.
The sentence requested by the Prosecution was also addressed by Seebregts and requested that there be consideration for Hasna A.’s personal circumstances, highlighting that Hasna A. had not realized the reality of the situation in the Caliphate. Counsel emphasized that Hasna A. had testified that she was on a different internet than other people. Counsel argued that she was in an information bubble, a concept addressed by the UN as well [read more here]. He cited an article by NBC that showed research that 60% of Republicans continued to hold that Biden did not win the 2020 election [the article can be read here]. Counsel explained that this was to show that Hasna A. had been in an information bubble where she believed she would go to the Caliphate and not be required to participate in the atrocities but simply abide by Sharia law. Seebregts highlighted that she had not thought the possibilities through which is exactly what the psychological report confirmed.
Counsel also asked for the previous 24 months of her pre-trial detention to be credited in her sentence. He argued that the duration of the investigation was unwarranted and could have been limited. Counsel highlighted that only two witnesses were interviewed, P1 was brought by the Defense and P2 by the Prosecution Office. He also posited that the facts were from 10 years ago and that Hasna A. was also restricted as a woman in her movements and not being able to decline her husband. Furthermore, in the length of the penalty Counsel argued that the German cases, such as Sarah O. which involved an accused who had owned 7 slaves and was involved in their rapes, was sentenced to 6 years and 6 months and would have a chance after 50% of the sentence to be freed. Additionally, Seebregts highlighted the case of Nurten J. in which the person was found guilty of the crime against humanity of slavery, participation in a terrorist organization, endangerment of a child and plundering, was sentenced to 4 years and 3 months. Counsel argued that in Hasna A. ’s case, while the crimes were all comparable, plundering was an additional charge and Nurten J. was sentenced to less time than the sentence proposed for Hasna A.’s case (8 years with no chance of shortening). Counsel highlighted that in Germany convictions can face a 50% shortening which was not enabled in the case of Hasna A. Counsel also asked for consideration to be made for the 3.5 years she spent in a camp prior to rescue in which very limited medical supplies were made available. Additionally, Seebregts argued that Hasna A.’s future without a slavery charge would give her a chance to not lose her Dutch citizenship (which is much more likely if she is found guilty of slavery). With the loss of her Dutch citizenship, Morocco will be unlikely to accept her, and she will as such likely fall into crime and live irregularly in the Netherlands. Counsel thus posited that she needs long-term support and guidance to rehabilitate and resocialize (as stated in the NIFP report).
[90-minutes-break]
Rebuttal of Injured Party Claim brought by the Plaintiffs’ Counsels
Vossenberg responded to the Defense’s arguments as well as questions from the day before posed by the Judges. Vossenberg argued that given the universal/international nature of a crime against humanity, damages must stem from the perspective that human suffering knows no nationality. Vossenberg quoted several articles from the Syrian Penal Code (Articles 171 and 223 of the Syrian Civil Code were referenced), in which moral damages can be derived from the experiences of victims. Vossenberg highlighted that the victims were deeply degraded, forced to pray, and made a slave, and thus warranted damages.
Van Straaten highlighted Dutch national laws (such as Article 10(2)(b) of Book 10 of the Civil Code and Article 511 of Book 7 of the Civil Code) that enable damages to be taken from foreign laws and addressed jurisprudence that did this (the MH17 trial and Fescher trial were cited). In the MH17 trial, consideration for many victims and international jurisdiction was made which Van Straaten argued was also present in the case of Hasna A. Van Straaten also addressed the causality argument brought by the Defense, she posited that the Accused had contributed and worsened the damages incurred by both Plaintiffs and that Syrian law did not distinguish between perpetrators but rather adopted a principle of solidarity in collective punishment.
Vossenberg concluded that the perspective adopted by the Defense on slavery was an oversimplification, in that the acts of forcing household tasks, taking care of her son, and preparing food were all part of IS and the widespread, systematic attack against the Yezidi community. Vossenberg posited that it was not possible to cut Hasna A. out of the context of IS.
Rebuttal of the Prosecution
The Prosecution then conducted their rebuttal of the Defense’s submissions, first addressing the slavery charge followed by the participation in a terrorist organization and preparatory acts with terrorist intent charges. Prosecutor Blom first provided that statements obtained by UNITAD are intended to be used by different countries to identify potential suspects. The Prosecutor posited that the statements were not intended to uncover every detail especially regarding a period as limited as in the case of Hasna A. The Prosecutor reaffirmed their interpretation of the timeline surrounding P1’s charge of slavery and argued that the Defense’s claim that P1 and P2’s statements were unclear could be said for Hasna A.’s as well. The Prosecutor also elaborated that the switch evidence argument by the Defense and the allegation that the Dutch Court Commissioner’s questioning was leading were unfounded. The Prosecutor emphasized that in the statements of P2, she had said without question that Hasna A. forced her to wash and cook. Prosecutor Blom also reiterated that the requirements for modern day slavery did not require the actual exercise of ownership as is understood in purchasing and bartering of persons. The Prosecutor argued that it can also be indicated in psychological or physical control, as highlighted in Ongwen. She stated that this had occurred in the case of the Accused as P1 and P2 were forced to pray, given tasks and autonomy was taken from them. The Prosecutor reiterated the requirements from international case law and stated that focus on German jurisprudence was far too restrictive [See Trial Report 2 for international cases]. The Prosecutor also stated that a strict understanding of slavery would be detrimental to the modern-day examples present today.
With regards to the terrorism charge, Prosecutor Kroon provided that the restriction of a timeline was not viable as those periods were also relevant to Hasna A. ’s participation in a terrorist group. The time in the Madafa was not accepted as an option to be left out as the Prosecutor argued that her marriage to an IS fighter was intended to aid as a woman in IS through marriage and taking care of men at home. Following her divorce from her husband, Hasna A. registered in IS and the Prosecutor argued this was indicative of her allegiance to the organization. The Prosecutor continued that the arguments by the Defense that Hasna A. had committed preparatory acts but without terrorist intent was not well-founded given that the link was present. The Prosecutor posited that arguments that Hasna A. was naïve in knowing what she would face, traveling to a war zone with a 4-year-old son should have clearly presented risks even despite her mental disabilities. The Prosecutor also addressed the Blackwell case in the Netherlands, in which the victim was found after the first instance and is still ongoing.
With regards to the penalty, Prosecutor Kroon stated that the information bubble argument was nothing more than an indication of polarization in the United States and argued that IS did not hide that the Caliphate was violent (which would have corroborated with the Accused’s said information bubble). Regarding the duration, the Prosecutor clarified that it was a complex case with considerable context, and the Plaintiffs were abroad which should justify the duration of pre-trial detention. Furthermore, the fact that Hasna A. was in a camp was due to her own actions and as such it should not be a factor in the sentencing. The Prosecutor posited that the threat of loss of nationality was also possible with a terrorism charge and so could only be addressed with the sentence later. Prosecutor Kroon concluded that justice plays a pivotal role in this case and there are important public interests involved.
[30-minutes-break]
Surrebuttal of the Defense
The Defense concluded with a surrebuttal in which they reiterated their arguments. Christiansen posited that for the slavery charge, consideration for German cases remained relevant given their considerable similarities. She also posited that forced labor should consider freedom of choice and cited the Peace Chamber. Seebregts continued that causality of Hasna A.’s acts in the damages incurred by the injured party’s requested damages had not been established. Counsel reiterated that the information bubbles argument was based on the idea that Republicans believed that the election was stolen and was not only polarization. Seebregts concluded that there was a requirement for nuance in the terrorism charge to regard Hasna A.’s possible loss of nationality, he argued that she should be entirely acquitted on the slavery charge. He also thanked the Court, all Counsels and the Prosecution for their cooperation in the case.
Closing of Proceedings
The Presiding Judge then asked Hasna A. whether she had anything else she would like to say, to which she responded no and that her counsels had stated everything she had wanted to say.
The Judge then concluded the proceedings and clarified that the final judgement would be made available on December 11, 2024, at 10AM at the Schiphol Judicial Complex. The investigation would close two weeks prior on November 27, 2024 in the Hague at 9AM. The Accused would be welcome as well as the Plaintiffs and that video livestream would be made available.
The proceedings were adjourned at 4:30 PM
The next trial day will be on December 11, 2024, at 10AM.
___________________________
For more information or to provide feedback, please contact SJAC at [email protected] and follow us on Facebook and Twitter. Subscribe to SJAC’s newsletter for updates on our work