Inside the Dabbagh Trial #02

TRIAL OF ALI MAMLOUK, JAMIL HASSAN AND ABDEL SALAM MAHMOUD

OR “DABBAGH TRIAL”

Court of Appeal – Paris, France

Hearing Date: May 22, 2024   

 CAUTION: Some testimony includes descriptions of torture.  

Note that this summary is not a verbatim transcript of the trial; it is merely an unofficial summary of the proceedings.  

Throughout this summary, [information located in brackets are notes from our trial monitor] and “information placed in quotes are statements made by the witness, judges or counsel.” The names and identifying information of witnesses have been redacted.

[Note: SJAC continues to provide a summary of the proceedings while redacting certain details to protect witness privacy and to preserve the integrity of the trial.]

Highlights: SJAC’s second trial monitoring report details Day 2 of the trials of Ali Mamlouk, Jamil Hassan, and Abdel Salam Mahmoud in Paris, France. On this trial day, two experts from the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism [IIIM] and the French police office in charge of investigating international crimes gave their testimony in the morning and early afternoon. At the end of the afternoon, the first Syrian witness testified about his detention at the detention centers of the Military Airport in Hama and of Al-Mazzeh Air Base in Damascus. Then, Presiding Judge Raviot read the testimony of Witness 2 as well as an interview given by Jamil Hassan to Sputnik news in 2016. 

Day 02 – May 22, 2024

On this trial day, the proceedings began at 09:44 AM with around 40 spectators in the gallery and around 20 journalists in a mezzanine floor located above the gallery. Among the spectators, Syrians used the headphones available for direct Arabic translations. Only one or two of the journalists used headphones. A separate room located in another building of the Court was open since the first day of the trial. Less than a dozen spectators attended.

Presiding Judge Raviot stated he thought of displaying the Caesar photos but instead chose to show the images during the hearing of the civil parties on Thursday [he changed his mind later and the photos were eventually displayed during the audition of the OCLCH Officer Day Two afternoon].

Counsel Bectarte asked to add complementary files to the procedures, namely family pictures and one message that was sent to a former student of Mazen Dabbagh. 

Expert Witness 4 Catherine Marchi-Uhel (Marchi-Uhel) Testimony, former Head of the IIIM

Marchi-Uhel stated she is 61 years old and has been a French magistrate since 1988. She has worked continuously for the United Nations since October 1998. In August 2017, she became head of the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) responsible for facilitating investigations against abuses committed in Syria. She resigned from the French judiciary on May 1 this year. She is domiciliated in France. Judge Raviot asked her if she knew the defendants, Marchi-Uhel replied she had no connection to them and didn’t know them personally. Judge Raviot asked the same question regarding the civil parties to this case and again, Marchi-Uhel stated she has no connection with them but knows some of the civil parties’ lawyers by profession. She took an oath.

Marchi-Uhel explained she could talk about the detention system in Syria as she knew it from her work. She reminded the court that the IIIM was created in December 2016 by the UN General Assembly, and she took up her position the following August of 2017. The IIIM was created after vetoes from Russia and China prevented referral [of the Syrian case] to the International Criminal Court. The UN General Assembly decided to create a body responsible for collecting, recording, and analyzing material for transmission to national or regional jurisdictions. The IIIM was granted a mandate to act independently and impartially. The IIIM, therefore, had to make strategic choices. It quickly became clear that the Syrian prison system should be part of its investigations. As of 2019, on the basis of the evidence and documentation already available, IIIM decided to focus part of its efforts on this matter.

Marchi-Uhel specified which types of material the IIIM collected:

• Documents emanating from the Syrian government that were previously collected and preserved by various bodies, notably the CIJA and the UN Human Rights Committee's Commission of Inquiry on Syria;
• The IIIM collected a very large number of testimonies recorded by other entities, like audio and video recordings, and sometimes transcriptions signed by the parties concerned. In some cases, interview notes were unsigned and largely redacted, so the IIIM gave them less weight. What the IIIM mainly collected from the Commission of Inquiry on Syria were testimonies;
• Satellite images;
• The IIIM also conducted witness’ hearings, particularly to fill gaps. This included people who had defected, for instance doctors in military hospitals, or people from military intelligence.

Marchi-Uhel intended to present the conclusions reached based on these elements but said she could also explain the methodology, in case it was useful to the court.

Through testimonies of people held in detention centers, defectors from the inside and documentation from the regime, the IIIM acquired the certitude that the Syrian Regime relied on the existing infrastructure to systematically repress the real or supposed opposition. Existing bodies but also entities created on this occasion were used to coordinate the action and were present on the ground. When the armed opposition had taken control of certain areas, the investigators of [the IIIM’s partners], including CIJA, focused its search on the documents available in these military and intelligence premises, such as the Central Crisis Management Cell created on March 27, 2011 to coordinate the governmental response to demonstrations. Significant documentation could be extracted.

Marchi-Uhel said this systematic repression involved several stages: identification of the demonstrators and their coordinators and financers; and compilation of names and the use of torture on those arrested. Arrests took place during various contexts; demonstrations or returns from demonstrations, raids on homes or workplaces, and checkpoints. These names generated lists that were communicated to the Services in various governorates. There were also filters at the checkpoints that led to new arrests.

Violent arrests concerned men, children, and women. Those arrested were sent to the investigative sections of the four Syrian security agencies (military, air force, general and political security). From March 2011 to July 2012, these Intelligence services operated under the control of the Central Crisis Management Cell. Then, following the attack that killed some of the Cell's members, the National Security Office took over this coordinating role. Both the Central Crisis Management Cell and the National Security Office had direct contact with Bashar Al-Assad.

Documents from different sources are concordant regarding information obtained by the Central Crisis Management Cell or the National Security Office. In April 2011, documents indicated that action must be undertaken, and people must be arrested. Based on an assessment that the response was not sufficiently firm, there was a call for greater coordination through the establishment of arrest campaigns and the transfer of arrested people to various agencies.

The conclusions based on many cases showed that detainees were victims of inhumane treatment from the moment of their arrival. In ten centers, including Sednaya and the Adra Prison, the IIIM studied, in detail, the journey of detainees, beginning with “welcome parties” [when they were beaten up] at arrival with the will to harm. Throughout their detention, the aim [of the jailers] was to obtain confessions from the prisoners about their participation in the opposition, but also indications on other people’s names. The desire was to “clean up” as they [members of the Syrian Regime] said, to arrest as many people as possible. Obviously, prolonged torture caused terrible physical and psychological damage. Torture did not solely occur in the torture rooms, but also in the corridors, bathrooms, and shower rooms.

The living conditions in the prison system were completely inhuman and degrading, Marchi-Uhel stated. People were often brought to underground cells, some of which had 70 inmates who couldn’t even sleep without getting up in turn. Inmates had difficulty breathing due to the stale air, there was vermin, food conditions were degraded by the guards, and detainees endured recurrent restriction on drinking. The IIIM studied in detail the accounts of 330 inmates, of which there were 15 children ages 14 to 16 and 125 women. The proportion of women was not necessarily in line with the prison population, as a large majority of detainees were men. Since 2012, the presence of women has increased, so the IIIM chose to include them.

Marchi-Uhel mentioned recurring forms of torture: use of whips to beat feet soles, “doulab” when detainees were placed in tires, electrocution, nail removal, sometimes cutting off fingers, etc. The IIIM corroborated these statements with insiders' testimonies and with forensic examinations of the photographs of the Caesar file. The doctors who examined these photos described abuses that match what the witnesses said. The IIIM also had clear evidence that the inmates were starving, Marchi-Uhel stressed.

Violence was not only used to obtain confessions and additional names. The system has been very violent and used torture before. But the proportion has become exceptional, Marchi-Uhel emphasized.

Marchi-Uhel stressed that the Syrian government received notifications from various bodies, including the UN torture and enforced disappearance committees, regarding the many pieces of information gathered on tortures. Marchi-Uhel said the IIIM viewed the government's response as a willingness to give a [legal permit to what was happening]. Based on numerous reports, the UN reported a large number of deaths. In its communications, the [Syrian Regime] soon indicated that it would no longer be possible to return the bodies to the families. Documents the IIIM was given access to showed that between 2011 and 2014, the presence of mass graves increased.

The instructions [of the Syrian Regime] called for the use of force to be avoided. But there was an obvious contradiction between the effectiveness of arrests, torture, daily reports on the centers [relating these acts], and the instructions from the Regime that were not followed by acts. The Regime could punish its agents who didn’t respect the rules, but when it came to treating its detainees well, there was no one left. The IIIM considered that these communications just aimed to avoid the condemnation and stigma that had being thrown at Syria.

Marchi-Uhel stated she wouldn't be complete if she didn't mention the role of military hospitals, notably Tishreen and Al-Mazzeh. These are the places where medico-legal examination was carried out and death certificates were prepared. The cause of death indicated was always respiratory arrest. Military hospitals were also used to pursue repression; many interviewees said they were victims of ill-treatment inside the hospital, including by medical staff in the Air Force Intelligence Service. For those who did not die in detention, the system foresaw presentations before tribunals. The judicial system was perverted. Detainees said they were brought before judges once the intelligence no longer needed information. Statements made under torture were used by judges, although the government said this was not legitimate to do so. Sometimes detainees were brought [to the tribunals] even without clothes and mentioned ill-treatment and torture [in court]. Many were condemned. Those who were released said their families had paid bribes.

Another recurring element regarding mistreatment was the extent to which sexual abuses were mentioned, Marchi-Uhel remembered. Even if recurrent modes of mistreatment existed, the IIIM realized that torture was used in the most effective [or targeted] way possible, by considering the detainee's origins, the link with the detainee’s family, and so on. Torture not only consisted of physical violence, but also seeing and hearing how other people being tortured. Numerous prisoners spoke of being left with bodies in an advanced state of decomposition. They were punished for saying yes or no, for reciting the Quran, for asking to go to the toilet, etc. Unbelievable things were designed to break them, Marchi-Uhel stated.

Marchi-Uhel could also mention the role played by the three defendants shown by this documentation, particularly the one collected by CIJA.

Ali Mamlouk was the head of General Security. He then became the head of the National Security Office. He played an important role, both in transmitting instructions from the Central Crisis Management Cell and the National Security Office, and in the field where he intervened directly to ensure the release of certain individuals or to request that they be heard again.

Jamil Hassan became head of the Air Force Intelligence and remained in this position until 2017. As head of one of the four [intelligence] agencies, he was a member of the Central Crisis Management Cell and the National Security Office. The Air Force Intelligence is based in Damascus at Al-Mazzeh Airport. In his position, he was communicating [with the field] both by instructions [he issued] but also information he received.

In Al-Mazzeh, there was an Investigation Department [Branch] of the Air Force Intelligence. The IIIM has records of Abdel Salam Mahmoud being the head of this section in 2011 and 2012, Marchi-Uhel stated. The special tasks section [referring to the Special Operation Branch] worked in cooperation with this [Investigative] section [referring to the Investigation Branch].

The number of arrests increased exponentially, and it was no longer possible for the investigative section to hold arrested people on its premises. The old and new buildings were used while they were still under construction, and very quickly these buildings were no longer sufficient, Marchi-Uhel explained. There was a need to use other makeshift premises.

Presiding Judge Raviot and his assessors’ questioning of Marchi-Uhel

Judge Raviot reminded the audience that the court was seized of counts committed in a certain period: the crimes all started on the day of the arrest [of Patrick Dabbagh]. The counts of crimes against humanity ended on August 1, 2018 [date when the death certificates were issued] and the counts of complicity in extortion ended on October 9, 2018 [date of the supplementary indictment]. The period is the same period for [the three accused]. Jamil Hassan was identified as the head of the Air Force Intelligence Service. Judge Raviot asked Marchi-Uhel to give the court information on the defendant’s precise activities during the period. Judge Raviot reassured Marchi-Uhel she could take the necessary time.

Marchi-Uhel replied that Jamil Hassan replaced his predecessor in 2009 as the head of the Investigation Branch of the Air Force Intelligence Service. He was [incorrectly] announced dead in 2012 by some media, but others claimed to have conducted interviews with him in 2016. The IIIM believed he was director until 2019 but had no documents to attest to this. That being said, open-source information showed that in summer 2019, media relayed information about new nominations at the head of intelligence services during which Jamil Hassan was replaced by Ghassan Jawdat Ismail.

Abdel Salam Mahmoud is the one for which the IIIM had the fewest allegations against. Marchi-Uhel considered it logical because the people who were interviewed by the IIIM defected in 2012, so the documents signed by Abdel Salam Mahmoud were dated 2012 at the latest.

Marchi-Uhel stated Ali Mamlouk, as he himself said, was appointed in 2009 as head of the General intelligence Service and remained in that position until October 2012. He then became head of the National Security Office. According to some media reports, he was placed under house arrest in May 2015 for plotting a coup against Bashar Al-Assad.

Judge Raviot wanted confirmation that the IIIM had collected testimonials from 332 prisoners. Marchi-Uhel replied the IIIM had more. These 332 people were heard by other entities, through audio and audiovisual recordings, or verbatim written statements sometimes signed by witnesses. The IIIM selected these people because they claimed to have been in, at least, one of the ten detention centers covered by the IIIM’s study. The IIIM examined at least 127 detention centers, so not all of them could be considered [in that study]. The IIIM wanted to look at Damascus, where the agencies or their services [unclear to the trial monitor] were located, as well as a few other places, such as prisons and the Air Force Intelligence in Aleppo. Choices were made based on what the IIIM collected and what was most documented.

Marchi-Uhel said the IIIM wanted to obtain information on the prisoners' backgrounds. One important thing was that centralization of repression has led the Crisis Management Cell to ask one branch to transfer information to another. This process was not linear. The IIIM drew a diagram showing where these detainees went, and recurring patterns were visible: the Air Force Intelligence branch asked for certain detainees to be handed over to them, and another branch would transfer the detainees. The investigation part, which is accompanied by torture, sometimes lasted a very long time. And this was not the end of the cycle.

Marchi-Uhel said that in addition to this documentation and these hearings of CIJA, the Commission of Inquiry, etc., the IIIM had interviews from Legal Action Worldwide [LAW] which conducted hearings of 37 former detainees after their arrival in Jordan. Indications showed that until 2023, the same abuses occurred, and the same bodies were involved in the process.

Judge Raviot asked Marchi-Uhel if she had any time references on the hearings and which periods of detention they covered. Marchi-Uhel stated the hearings covered 2011 to 2015, and until 2023 for these more recent additions. Targets of arrestation widened over time, Marchi-Uhel stated. Initially, they were protesters, coordinators, and financiers, then medical personnel, or people providing food aid. Many said they were not informed of the charges against them, but it was made clear they were being arrested because they belonged to a particular opposition area. In 2011, the CCMC [Central Crisis Management Cell] called for the creation of joint military and security committees in the strongest opposition sectors (Idlib, Hama, Raqqa, etc.). It was a real coordination of efforts, so explanations that it was not coordinated were hard to accept in Marchi-Uhel’s opinion.

Judge Raviot asked Marchi-Uhel if she noticed an evolution in the regime's practices over the years. Marchi-Uhel said she did notice a change in the treatment of corpses. At first, bodies were returned to the families, then death certificates were issued to give them a legal veneer. She then mentioned another evolution; the IIIM’s central directory now had fewer traces of the number of detainees, but it is hard to say whether people were detained less, or if there was less documentation for those years [unclear which years are referred to]. Given the developments in the field, it also became more difficult to obtain testimonials.

Judge Raviot wondered if all detainees were presented before a judge. Marchi-Uhel replied many were, but she couldn’t tell if all were. Judge Raviot understood that judgments were handed down and reminded Marchi-Uhel’s reference to convictions. Marchi-Uhel confirmed and said that use of torture was ostentatious, some were presented [before the judge] in their underwear, and [the judges] would still take their statement into account.

Judge Raviot wanted to know for what type of offenses they were prosecuted and tried. Marchi-Uhel said it was mainly terrorism, and some were brought before military tribunals. Law evolved to allow people to be detained without the involvement of a judicial institution for 60 days. Even if the constitution banned torture, the IIIM found traces of a manual for investigators describing all possible means to try to “convince” [meaning, try to extract confessions under torture], all written black on white. Marchi-Uhel considered this was in direct contradiction to the instructions [of the Syrian Regime] asking for proper treatment of detainees, but without any manual.

Of the 332 testimonies, Judge Raviot asked if they had all been tried. He said he didn’t understand why some were presented to a judge, while others were not. Marchi-Uhel confirmed it was clear that some were not presented to the judge, and the intelligence services could obviously decide to release them. Judge Raviot asked if it happened through corruption and bribes, and Marchi-Uhel said she didn’t have details and thought the inmates would not know themselves.

Judge Raviot related that Mazen Dabbagh was subjected to an expropriation measure and wondered if it was a regular practice. Marchi-Uhel had not noted this element in the 332 testimonies but confirmed that the Commission of Inquiry on Syria clearly signaled it. Marchi-Uhel further stated that the government's legislation allowed [expropriation] because it made it so difficult for detainees to justify their place of residence. That contributed to building this expropriation system. Marchi-Uhel emphasized these elements were not based on the 332 testimonies.

Judge De Mauléon inquired about the fate of the detainees. She asked if Marchi-Uhel thought this was random or not and if it could be related to the liability of the highest level. She reminded Marchi-Uhel’s words that people who spoke could be brought before a court. She asked Marchi-Uhel if in her opinion, there was a concerted plan.

Referring to the diagram she described, Marchi-Uhel said Intelligence branches were involved in arrests, control points, and sending [of detainees] to different branches and sometimes several branches. Marchi-Uhel considered she was not in a position to speak of a concerted plan. Presentation to the court was an obligation for some, but not systematic. Marchi-Uhel couldn’t remember any documentation that would answer Judge De Mauléon’s question.

Judge De Mauléon asked Marchi-Uhel if she could confirm that, in this concerted plan, there was a discriminatory dimension or a particular category of population that was targeted, or not. Marchi-Uhel said she needed to look at her notes concerning profiles. She then wondered if the question related to the use of discriminatory motives in what was said to certain detainees, or in the reasons for their arrest. Marchi-Uhel stated that certain socio-professional categories were targeted like journalists, doctors, teachers, and former soldiers who defected. Discriminatory reasons were mentioned in the statements made to detainees. Some witnesses were told they were Sunni and understood that meant special treatment. Women were asked to remove their headscarves. After, the regime extended its targets.

Judge Simeoni asked if the witnesses mentioned the names of the three defendants. Marchi-Uhel answered that not all of them did, but a certain number. Some said they were interrogated in the presence of Abdel Salam Mahmoud, who allegedly gave specific torture orders. He would have asked the guards to pierce [the witness’] legs. Others mentioned the man they knew to be the head of the Air Force Intelligence, or the presence of some [of the defendants, as trial monitor understood] in the field. The three are mentioned, but not by all.

Judge Simeoni asked her if the people who mentioned the defendants had a specific role in civil society. Marchi-Uhel said not particularly. Judge Simeoni then referred to the manual Marchi-Uhel mentioned to extort confessions and asked where it came from. Marchi-Uhel said she had the information in her notes. It is an Intelligence Service, but she didn’t recall which of the four. Judge Simeoni concluded that it was at least one of the four.

Civil Parties’ Counsels Bectarte and Baudouin questioning of Marchi-Uhel

Counsel Bectarte thanked Marchi-Uhel and said that the IIIM has contributed a lot to this file. Bectarte first focused on IIIM’s mandate and asked if Marchi-Uhel could give the court an idea of the number of jurisdictions the IIIM has shared such elements with and the number of cases to which it has contributed.

Marchi-Uhel said the IIIM received up to 354 requests from 16 different jurisdictions and contributed to more than 200 investigations, but Marchi-Uhel didn’t have the exact figure in mind. She detailed the type of support the IIIM provided: sharing raw evidence, putting jurisdictions in contact with potential witnesses, hearing witnesses at the request of certain jurisdictions, sharing the IIIM’s legal conclusions on the existence of certain crimes, performing analysis to identify and geolocate crime scenes, and conducting open-source research particularly in Arabic.

Bectarte asked if that led to convictions and any judicial recognition elsewhere other than in France. Marchi-Uhel stressed the two judgments of the Koblenz court were the most relevant for this case. The IIIM made direct contributions to this case and also sent elements that led to convictions in Sweden.

Referring to the different types of contributions that Marchi-Uhel mentioned, Bectarte asked if she observed crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the Syrian regime. She then asked if the IIIM could produce any legal analysis on the presence of an armed conflict.

When she took up her position, Marchi-Uhel answered, the IIIM was finalizing a report which conclusions she heavily relied on because it addressed the various aspects of torture in detention. Regarding the existence of armed conflict, the IIIM established a brief [Brief on the Commencement of the Initial Non-International Armed Conflict in Syria] used by certain jurisdictions, notably Sweden, which dated the start of the conflict to the very end of 2011. Other entities dated the beginning of the conflict later, in 2012. As far as the IIIM is concerned, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that a conflict existed in late 2011, based on the degree of organization of the Syrian army and the intensity [of the conflict]. Marchi-Uhel said it was not surprising that different dates were indicated because they were based on different elements. The IIIM didn't have sufficient information at the outset, so they held hearings with people who could describe the level of organization and intensity of the conflict.

Counsel Bectarte asked Marchi-Uhel if she considered that between November 2013 and 2018, an armed conflict was ongoing. Marchi-Uhel confirmed, without a doubt.

Counsel Bectarte referred to an analytical note of the IIIM on the responsibility of Bashar Al-Assad, who is not indicted in this case. The note mentioned a general policy of impunity. Bectarte asked Marchi-Uhel to tell the court more about the measures taken by the Intelligence Service to organize immunity. Marchi-Uhel stated that one of the methods used to organize impunity was to try to give it a veneer of legality [to pretend the situation was officially under control], i.e. to issue regular reminders of the need to treat detainees well and to monitor detention conditions, but without follow up. The documentation proved the Syrian regime was informed [of the abuses], and there was a clear contrast between the use of force that was in fact implemented and the instructions calling for the temperance without any follow up. In all IIIM data, there was not a single trace of a case where people were investigated or punished for not complying with the regime’s instructions, Marchi-Uhel stated.

Another element was the denial when the photos of Caesar were leaked. There was documentation showing that the services were aware of what was going on. The third element is the strategy to make the corpses disappear and give the families sanitized information, or to keep the families in the dark. Some families learnt of the death of their loved ones by Caesar.

Counsel Bectarte recalled Marchi-Uhel’s explanations on how regime archives were extracted from Syria; how people were able to get into the buildings, seize certain archives and hand them over to the IIIM. Bectarte asked presiding Judge Raviot to display some of the documents provided by CIJA that were added to the file, in particular those bearing signatures of the three defendants. Bectarte wished Marchi-Uhel could comment on them, but to also tell how these documents came into the hands of the CIJA. She wanted to know if Marchi-Uhel had any reason to doubt the authenticity of the regime's archives, which are now held in the IIIM's central database. Bectarte had selected nine documents, stressing that three were related to Abdel Salam Mahmoud, three to Ali Mamlouk, and three to Jamil Hassan. She asked if Marchi-Uhel could give some general comments.

Marchi-Uhel did not talk about these documents but explained how the IIIM proceeded to be satisfied with their authenticity. The IIIM analyzed both their form and content, taking into account the documents transmitted by CIJA and SJAC. It was interesting to compare the stamps, signatures and formats of these documents, which contribute to the satisfaction of the IIIM on their authenticity. Some documents were submitted to insiders who confirmed they corresponded to documents of this branch. Regarding chain of transmission, between December 2011 and March 2012, seven documents referred to the same set of instructions from the National Security Office. They used a similar language to quote the instructions and were transmitted to different organs. There was coherence, Marchi-Uhel stated, since they were not the same three documents photocopied by different bodies but contained mutually reinforcing information [expressed in different terms].

CIJA provided one document from the National Security Office that was sent to Idlib. It explained how to deal with arrested demonstrators and referred to a Central Crisis Management Cell meeting held a few days before. A letter from the National Security Office with the same date was provided by SJAC [Syria Justice and Accountability Centre] but sent to the Raqqa branch secretary. Marchi-Uhel stated it showed that the same information was sent to different branches. The stamps and signatures were the same and one could conclude that the transmission was coordinated. Bectarte commented that it attested the presence of a chain of command and stressed that signatures of certain defendants were visible. In an analytical note, the IIIM pointed out that instructions could be general, but also very precise. There are examples in the file, Bectarte stated, sometimes containing names of inmates who requested to be transferred.

Marchi-Uhel referred to an example: the Air Force Intelligence sent lists of wanted persons to other branches of the Air Force but also to other intelligence agencies. On August 8, 2011, the head of the Political Security department issued a decision ordering to find three individuals and send them to the Air Force Intelligence. On March 21, 2012, the chief of the Air Force Intelligence issued an order to hinder a lawyer, and if he was found, send him to the Investigation Branch of the Air Force Intelligence. [Marchi-Uhel described another document]. The sharing of information bore its fruits since January 12, when Branch 271 of the Air Force Intelligence of Idlib Governorate notified these individuals had been identified. On February 17, 2014, a communication was sent to Idlib about handing over detainees wanted by the Air Force Intelligence. This communication indicated that after the Air Force Intelligence was done with the detainee, he would be referred to Idlib prosecutor.

• Document 1: Undated document mentioning two detainees from different branches sent to the Air Force Intelligence. Marchi-Uhel recalled that instructions were sometimes general and sometimes extremely precise.
• Document 2: Original Arabic document and its translation [in French]. Judge Raviot read instructions given by the Air Force Intelligence, which requested the surveillance of arrivals of the following people, eight names were mentioned. Instructions were given by Brigadier Abdel Salam Mahmoud, head of Air Force Intelligence’s Investigation Branch. Marchi-Uhel said it was typically the type of documents that could be found in the IIIM’s database.

Counsel Bectarte stated instructions could be given in a horizontal mode, but giving instructions to other Intelligence services was the responsibility of the Director, in this case Jamil Hassan. She asked Marchi-Uhel to describe the vertical and horizontal operating mode. Marchi-Uhel explained how instructions were transmitted: at the same level in a branch, the person in charge of investigations would transmit [the instruction]. When it came to forwarding it to other Intelligence services, it fell under the competence of the chief. This horizontal and vertical operating mode was typical of what the IIIM analyzed in its evaluation of the detention system, Marchi-Uhel stated. Military police were also frequently involved.

• Document 3: Original Arabic document and its translation [in French] signed by Abdel Salam Mahmoud, chief brigadier. Judge Raviot stated it consisted of an instruction to transmit to every branch and department of the Directorate and their checkpoints, until July 15, 2011, a list of 1556 wanted persons in the Idlib Governorate. To Marchi-Uhel, it reflected the role of checkpoints. These lists of names were fed by statements made during interrogation and transmitted to the checkpoints for arrest and transfer [of the person] to the relevant investigative branches. The same applied to information that was used to conduct raids on homes and workplaces.
• Document 4. The document consisted of an instruction by the Brigadier General, Head of Air Force Intelligence, and Jamil Hassan and dated 2006. It referred to date February 10, 2012 and stated [the quotation that follows is not a verbatim]: “We have received information about a plan that the inhabitants want to implement in the town of Jisr Ash-Shoghour جسر الشغور in Idlib governorate, which wants to declare itself autonomous through arms. Flyers were distributed to avoid Military checkpoints and make ambushes to hit the army. The drivers of the transportation company, Al-Sarraj, stop at the checkpoints of the terrorists to hand over the soldiers in their bus in exchange for 5,000 Syrian pounds. The driver indicates an engagement with the people of Khan Sheikhoun خَان شَيْخُون.”.

Counsel Bectarte said that the word “terrorist” appeared and wondered if its use was frequent. Marchi-Uhel replied it was not systematic, but recurrent [next sentence unclear]. Here, it seemed consistent with what was described, but even when people were not violent, the label of terrorists was used, Marchi-Uhel stated.

• Document 5 dated February 27, 2014. An unclarity on the date was pointed out, since Judge Raviot saw May 27, 2014. Marchi-Uhel commented [May 27, 2014] might also refer to date of receipt of the document. She said the court can assume the notes at the bottom [were written] after the document was issued. Judge Raviot explained the document emanated from general Jamil Hassan and quoted [not a verbatim]: “We received a translated version of the documents indicating that after the commander of the Yarmouk brigade obtained ammunition from the Zionist entity, it led to a disagreement with Al-Nusra that turned into an armed clash. Among the dead were many terrorist names. The terrorist front was able to obtain the ammunition from the warehouse of the Yarmouk brigade, in the town of Jalin. Around 150 wounded terrorists arrived in the Ash-Shajarah region.”

Marchi-Uhel recalled the reference she made to the category of wanted people. It clearly appeared that at some point, the army's defectors who took up arms were wanted.

Counsel Bectarte mentioned the following sentence appearing in the document: “please make the decision”. Marchi-Uhel commented that in some cases, the IIIM had documents responding [to such an instruction]. In this very formal instruction requesting [inaudible to trial monitor], no response was expected.

• Document 6: Signed by the head of the Air Force Intelligence’s Investigation Branch [without mention of his name]. The document referred to the arrests of three people whose names were quoted. They were members of the same family. Marchi-Uhel stated it was [again] the same type of documentation. The fact that the name of the person in charge of the branch was not mentioned also happened quite frequently. To Marchi-Uhel, it did not pose an authenticity problem. [An exchange between Judge Raviot and Marchi-Uhel about significance of an English expression was unclear to the trial monitor] Counsel Bectarte asked if “Direction of Inquiries” and “Direction of Investigation” referred to the same body. In the same way, she wondered if the “Special Operations Branch” and “Special Operations” referred to the same entity. Marchi-Uhel confirmed it both referred to the same entities and stressed that the IIIM’s analysts worked on the Arabic version.
• Document 7: The document consisted of different letters. The first letter was a directive containing instructions given by the head of the National Security Office, mixing typed and numerous handwritten mentions, what Marchi-Uhel also considered recurrent. In general, circulars were typed, but a lot of documents were [handwritten]. Judge Raviot added Document 7 gave information about another document linked to an armed group in Tal Abyad. Marchi-Uhel explained the armed conflict was raging at that time and the instructions obviously aimed at preventing certain actions of the armed opposition, while other instructions targeted civilians.
• Document 8: The document consisted of instructions from the National Security Office to arrest people whose names were shared. They were described as [not verbatim] “public service employees originating from Kafr Kuweib [spelling unclear, maybe Kafr Oweid كفر عويد] in Idlib governorate who were active or had participated in terrorist acts. The first was a mathematics teacher who carried a RPG launcher. One worked as a mufti and carried a Russian rifle. Their profession was specified.” Marchi-Uhel commented that at the time of the Crisis Management Cell, intelligence agencies were asked to provide more details on the wanted persons, including information their socio-professional background, etc. Judge Raviot specified the document was dated August 27, 2013 and concerned 85 suspected persons.
• Document 9: the document was dated December 5, 2013 and signed by the head of the National Security Office. It contained information about [not a verbatim] “news that had arrived: on October 23, [2013], the terrorist Ismael J. arrived in the town of [spelling unclear] in the Idlib Governorate and he was joined by leaders of armed groups to launch an assault on the city of Idlib.”             

At that time, Marchi-Uhel commented, Ali Mamlouk was head of the National Security Office. Counsel Bectarte added one could see that the Head of the National Security Office was the one who sent instructions to the directors of its various departments.    

Marchi-Uhel referred again to the socio-professional categories of the 332 inmates and mentioned a document that addressed them: of the 207 male witnesses, there were 23 humanitarian actors, 30 activists, 37 people who took part in demonstrations, 31 students, 4 teachers, 14 members of the media, 15 medical staff, 5 lawyers, 13 civil servants, and 33 military personnel. Categories were also given for women. Judge Raviot noted there were a lot of professions mentioned. Marchi-Uhel said that since these people shared [information about their profession] under the torture, it could be anything. Judge Raviot asked if this list of names has been cross-checked to see if there was correspondence with death certificate and testimonial from someone identifying a deceased person. Marchi-Uhel confirmed it happened.

Counsel Bectarte asked Marchi-Uhel a last series of questions on analytical notes [of the IIIM] concerning Al-Mazzeh detention center and the Branch of Investigation, or Branch of Inquiry. She first mentioned an analytical note on incriminating facts of the Investigation Branch [namely the Crime Base Fact Narrative of the Air Force Intelligence Investigation Branch and Special Tasks Branch] and commented that the IIIM considered all detentions to fall under the responsibility of the Investigation Branch. This assumption was based on a certain number of testimonies (of which 20 were Al-Mazzeh detainees) which showed that all detentions were under the authority of the Investigation Branch headed by Abdel Salam Mahmoud.

Marchi-Uhel confirmed and stressed this was the result of the analytical work on the hearings of detainees and insider witnesses. Most of the insider witnesses were in the Special Operations Branch and not the Investigation Branch, but they had frequent contact with the latter. One of the Investigation Branch’s members left before 2011 but described the operating mode consistently.

Counsel Bectarte said Marchi-Uhel emphasized the low defection rate among the Investigation Branch, compared with others, especially the Special Operations Branch. There was [only] one defector before 2011. When asked about her interpretation on this defection rate, Marchi-Uhel responded that there was, for sure, a great cohesion in the Branch; Abdel Salam Mahmoud was also described as a particularly ferocious person who made a real butchery out of the Branch. One of the witnesses heard by the CIJA was in the Special Operations Branch but present daily at the investigation. Marchi-Uhel extrapolated, wondering if the people present in this Branch were more convinced of the legitimacy, but she didn’t know.

Counsel Bectarte referred to the same analytical note where the IIIM described geographical areas of responsibility and mentioned two insider witnesses from the Special Operations Branch who described a system implemented in all directorates creating geographic zones of responsibility for each intelligence agency. Each agency was also assigned specific zones of Damascus. The logic was to avoid overlapping operations. Marchi-Uhel confirmed it corresponded to the IIIM’s observation. For the Air force, it was Darayya et Al-Mo'addamiyyeh. Marchi-Uhel also stressed that the Central Crisis Management Cell requested joint operations, i.e operations involving members of different agencies. Marchi-Uhel confirmed there was a will to cover the whole country.

Bectarte concluded that according to this logic of geographic distribution of the different districts, it would seem logical for a father and a son [referring to the Dabbagh] to be arrested by the Air Force Intelligence. Marchi-Uhel confirmed it was consistent since [the arrest occurred] in the area of responsibility of the Air Force Intelligence. Sometimes, raids could be carried out with the assistance of other departments.

Counsel Bectarte referred again to the same analytical note where the Caesar photos and the expert report were mentioned. Bectarte stressed the IIIM made a more precise analysis of the Caesar photos and stated the medical-legal assessment led to a figure of 352 deceased males from the Air Force Intelligence, some of whom showed signs of ill-treatment, food deprivation, [one mention inaudible], and signs of drowning. It reflected systematic neglect. Bectarte found it interesting to mention the number of Caesar corpses who were detainees from the Air Force Intelligence but stressed that the IIIM couldn’t tell if they originated from Al-Mazzeh or elsewhere. Marchi-Uhel answered that, unlike the other branches of the intelligence services, the Air Force used letters rather than numbers to designate the centers. [Marchi-Uhel added that it did not give indication about the services, but the sentence was unclear to the Trial Monitor]. Some people may have been arrested in the governorates, but if they were requested by the Air Force Intelligence, they were generally transferred to that branch.

Bectarte asked Marchi-Uhel to comment on the different types of violations committed in Al-Mazzeh detention center. She stressed that Marchi-Uhel described the methods of torture and acts committed by the jailers and made a distinction between all types. She also reminded Marchi-Uhel’s mentioning of sexual crimes and violence committed against females as well as male detainees, and of underaged detainees. She wondered if those techniques were corroborated and if the pattern analyzed in Al-Mazzeh also applied to other detention centers. She wanted to know if Marchi-Uhel could talk of a systematic use of torture.

Marchi-Uhel responded that forms of violence could be used during interrogation and in cells and corridors. Different types of torture are recurrent and used in other Intelligence branches. Regarding sexual violence, Marchi-Uhel confirmed that it involved both male and female detainees. Marchi-Uhel said they also had the feeling that the underaged, elderly, and disabled people were subjected to special treatment and a more intense form of violence. Some inmates said they morally suffered from knowing that this type of treatment was inflicted on these people. Marchi-Uhel listed some forms of torture like fingernail removal, burning with plastic film, sexual violence, torture of the genitals, and [inaudible]. The IIIM commissioned psychologists to assess the physical, but also the moral damage caused to these people. Marchi-Uhel said there was a stigmatization of having been detained in this system so that those who came out were still trapped in it. Women were considered to have likely been subjected to sexual violence, as were men. This violence left traces of stigmatization that could be even more significant for female inmates. Reintegration into their families was even more complicated. 1,332 inmates said they never really came back.

Counsel Bectarte then referred to an analytical note [of the IIIM] on the organizational structure of Al-Mazzeh Air Base [namely the Organizational Structure Narrative of the Air Force Intelligence Investigation Branch and Special Tasks Branch]. It included a detailed analysis of various detention centers with satellite images showing the evolution of buildings and construction over a period between June 2009 and April 2016. Bectarte asked presiding Judge Raviot to display six images of the Air Base at different dates and asked Marchi-Uhel to comment on how the buildings have multiplied inside the Air Base. Marchi-Uhel explained that the old prison was a square building, and one could see [on the image] the new prison rising. Some of the inmates in the new prison were held while the construction was still ongoing. Buses arrived regularly and there wasn't enough room, so the airbase hangar was used as well as a hall. On the image dated May 2012, the new prison should be visible. Counsel Bectarte stressed the IIIM used these images to qualify these buildings as makeshift detention centers, since this was not their original purpose.

Counsel Baudouin said it gave the feeling that torture was used in a completely autonomous way, not necessarily for confessions, but rather for terror. Based on the IIIM's testimonies, he asked Marchi-Uhel if she could affirm that use of torture went beyond obtaining confessions. Baudouin concluded that it would characterize a slightly different system in terms of horror. In Marchi-Uhel’s opinion, the system clearly aimed at breaking and destroying people. The use of torture persisted, Marchi-Uhel added.

Baudouin concluded that [torture] became like an end in itself. He understood the IIIM worked on [evidence documenting crimes committed over] a period [from 2011] until 2015 but also a bit later thanks to more recent elements. He stressed that the characteristics of torture seemed to be maintained, which Marchi-Uhel confirmed. Fewer testimonies are now available to allow comparison, but those who did speak evoked techniques that are consistent with what the previous detainees had described.

Attorney General Viguier questioning of Marchi-Uhel

Attorney General Viguier said she would base her questions essentially on two reports [the same which were previously mentioned by civil parties’ Counsel 1 on the organizational structure of Al-Mazzeh and the Investigation Branch, namely the Organizational Structure Narrative of the Air Force Intelligence Investigation Branch and Special Tasks Branch and the Crime Base Fact Narrative of the Air Force Intelligence Investigation Branch and Special Tasks Branch]. There, the IIIM described the role, function, and attributions of the Investigation and the Special Operations Branches and mentioned five functions: 1- communication between people concerned, 2- repression, 3- arrests, 4- transfer of detainees to the external Investigation Branch [the term “external” might refer to the location of the Investigation Branch in a different building], and 5- assistance and support force. Viguier quoted Marchi-Uhel words on the necessary coordination and support of forces to one another. She asked Marchi-Uhel to name the commanders of these support forces and recalled that in mid-2011, as Marchi-Uhel said, the Air Force Intelligence of Al-Mazzeh Air Base were reinforced by forces known as “aid and support forces” with Souhail Hassan and Abdel Salam Mahmoud.

Marchi-Uhel consulted her notes and said Souhail Hassan began in early 2010. Attorney General Viguier wondered if it was possible to consider that the alliance between the Air Force Intelligence and the 4th Armored Division was significant for the regime. Marchi-Uhel confirmed it was. Viguier asked Marchi-Uhel to say some words about the 4th Division, but Marchi-Uhel said she didn’t feel capable.

Attorney General Viguier understood that Abdel Salam Mahmoud could have directed these raids and asked Marchi-Uhel if, based on the report, she could recall if he could have been implicated in direct acts of torture. Marchi-Uhel confirmed Abdel Salam Mahmoud was implicated by several of the witnesses, who spoke of direct acts of torture, but also of his orders to the guards to interrogate and torture detainees. Marchi-Uhel remembered one detainee who recalled Abdel Salam Mahmoud asking to have holes drilled in his leg. The people who worked with him said they heard [from Abdel Salam Mahmoud] that it was out of the question for inmates to leave without being broken.

Attorney General Viguier quoted Abdel Salam Mahmoud’s words [that Marchi-Uhel referred to]: “I don’t want anyone to go out in one piece”. As for Jamil Hassan, Viguier recalled Marchi-Uhel’s mention in her spontaneous deposition that some witnesses were released after having met with him. She asked if Marchi-Uhel remembered what they said about these meetings and Jamil Hassan’s role when he received these people. Marchi-Uhel said she didn’t remember but looked at her notes, where she wrote remarks attributed to Jamil Hassan, praising Hafez Al-Assad's methods during the massacre in Hama, suggesting that if the regime's response had been equal to the response in Hama, they wouldn't be here today. As reported by the media, Jamil Hassan also considered that it was not so bad to go back to the population living in Syria before, suggesting a reduction in the number of civilians. Marchi-Uhel knew that the people who were heard spoke specifically about them [Abdel Salam Mahmoud and Jamil Hassan], but she didn’t have the exact terms in her head.

Attorney General Viguier asked Marchi-Uhel if she remembered what Jamil Hassan said about the prison under his control. Marchi-Uhel recalled he mentioned the problems of corruption in the prison and was proud that he had regained control and knew everything that happened there. Viguier quoted Jamil Hassan: “What you have seen in the prison is the truth, not a day goes by that I don't check what is going on there”. Viguier wondered if it was possible for a person to have gone months or even years without being tortured and wished to have Marchi-Uhel’s opinion.

Marchi-Uhel said it would seem possible regarding the testimonies analyzed but expressed prudence: the very small number of people who didn’t mention being tortured were heard for a very short time, and it seemed that they were not asked any specific questions about torture. Marchi-Uhel stated she was unable to draw any conclusion, and if she was, it would be from a very, very small proportion. She emphasized it was a system where torture was practiced on a systematic basis. Viguier asked if Marchi-Uhel considered these people lucky to have been released, which Marchi-Uhel confirmed.

Judge Simeoni wondered if the people heard from had left Syria and Marchi-Uhel said that some were still there. Judge Simeoni wondered what freedom of speech they had then. Marchi-Uhel clarified it was a period when the armed opposition had regained control of certain areas, and these people were no longer in areas controlled by the government. Marchi-Uhel didn’t think this had an influence on their freedom of speech.

[A last circular from the section of Raqqa referring to the arrival of three people was mentioned, but it seemed to be by mistake]

Proceedings were adjourned at 12:19 AM and resumed in the afternoon at 2:21 PM

 Expert Witness 5 Véronique Sadys (Sadys) Testimony, from the Central Office for Combating Core International Crimes and Hate Crimes [in French, Office central de lutte contre les crimes contre l'humanité et les crimes de haine, referred to as “the OCLCH” or “the Office”]

[The Arabic translation was medium-good during this testimony]

Sadys presented herself, Major Véronique Sadys, 53 years old, domiciliated in Paris, Head of the Middle East team at the OCLCH. Judge Raviot asked her if she knew the accused or had links with the civil parties, which she denied. Judge Raviot stated she was summoned by the prosecution. Sadys took an oath.

Sadys gave a rapid presentation of the OCLCH. A unit was created within the Paris research section in 2009 to receive information, and in 2013, the Office was created. The Office is composed of three divisions: hate crimes, strategy, and crimes against humanity. The latter is composed of sections on the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and America. The Office is composed of 40 investigators and works on 175 files from 34 different countries. The section on the Middle East is composed of seven people who work on 70 files about an estimated 10 countries. Most files concern Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka.

There are different ways of referral to the OCLCH: Article 40 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure [which stipulates that any constituted authority, public officer, or civil servant who, in the course of his or her duties, becomes aware of a crime or misdemeanor is required to notify it to the public prosecutor], request for mutual assistance in criminal matters from foreign countries, referral from the public prosecutor, or initiative of the Office itself.

The Office has quasi-universal jurisdiction. It is difficult for the OCLCH to investigate in these countries, and they have established different strategies and networks to be able to investigate. At the national level, they work with the Military, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), the General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI), and local police units. At the international level, they work with EUROPOL, INTERPOL, EUROJUST, and the UN (notably the IIIM). A joint investigation team on Syria was also created with Germany in the context of the Caesar files, and more recently with Sweden. They work with NGOs to find witnesses or have access to reports, such as Amnesty International. They also use open-source research, press articles, books, reports, or sometimes conduct hearings of researchers and academics.

Sadys related the history of the Caesar files. On September 9, 2015, Mr. Fabius [Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time] sent a letter to the Division on Crimes Against Humanity based on Article 40 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure to denounce abuses committed by the regime. He accompanied this file with a CD of 4,600 photos of approximately 6,700 victims. Around 30 services were responsible for the abuses. Caesar was heard anonymously by the public prosecutor. His audition enabled them to understand the inscriptions on the bodies: the first number belonged to one detainee, then a second number corresponded either to the number of the Intelligence service or the prison or department holding the person, and a last number corresponded to the report of the forensic doctor.

At first, there were five to seven bodies a day, then it went up to 30-35. The forensic doctor initially issued CDs but stopped doing so because it put pressure on the families. In the CDs, it was claimed that the individuals died of cardiac or respiratory arrests. In the summer of 2013, Caesar felt that the Intelligence services were getting closer, and it took him six months to sort out the photos and present them to the international community. Various experts from the USA, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany attested the authenticity and veracity of these photos. An English expert, Yann Kuller, [spelling uncertain] even said that it was direct evidence of crimes against humanity committed by the regime. In 2019, a German forensic expert [Dr Rothschild] published findings.

Caesar also said that the Intelligence services were always present when he took the photos and they sometimes insulted and hit the corpses. He took care of their burial with discretion. The number of bodies arriving was such that the morgues could no longer contain them and piled them up in garages and refrigerated trucks. Caesar took photos for the branches of Tishreen, Al-Mazzeh, and of Branch 220. An estimated 150 bodies came from the Air Force Intelligence. Following this, the OCLCH was appointed to investigate the Caesar file.

The structural investigation had two objectives: 1- to determine the presence of French victims, 2- to establish precise organization charts of the services involved in the abuses (if there were no French victims) as this would allow the perpetrators to be confronted in France based on these elements. Today, [the OCLCH conducted] more than a hundred witness and victim interviews. This structural investigation now allows the OCLCH, when they have satellite files, to take elements from the Caesar file or to add some to it.

The regime not only bombed the population, Sadys explained, but carried out chemical attacks, fired live ammunition, conducted executions, and laid siege to towns. The regime also arbitrarily arrested people and committed acts of torture. These elements are also highlighted by auditions and reports of NGOs and international organizations.

One purpose of torture was to extract information and to put pressure on families, who never knew why their loved ones had been arrested, and didn't always know if they were being detained, or if they were alive or not. As a result, the relatives were also afraid to go to the services because they feared being stamped as terrorist families and therefore arrested. At the same time, the regime released enough Syrians to explain what they had gone through and distill terror.

According to the testimonies received by the OCLCH, in addition to the beatings and insults, Sadys mentioned conditions of detention: 70-90 people were squished into nine square meters and had little access to the sanitary. One witness explained that the heat was suffocating and that a kind of wax was deposited on the walls. Detainees were regularly taken out to be tortured: hair and beard hairs were pulled out, flesh was also pulled out by pincers, suspension, crucifixion, German chair, electric shock, rape, sometimes people were forced to watch people being raped or beaten. Sadys remembered a video of two people being detained and tied up with their hands behind their backs, having liquid poured down their throats that was set on fire. Their screams were unbearable, and the guards stood next to them laughing and threatening them to do the same to their families. Sadys mentioned the torture called the tire [Doulab]: the detainee was put in a tire, unable to move and then beaten. She then mentioned blows to the soles of the feet, and the German chair, which consisted of sitting in a position that was stressful for the body. She added malnutrition, little and poor-quality food that led to diarrhea and illness. After torture, detainees had wounds and sores.

Most of the time, intelligence services were the one operating, Sadys argued. They were headed by President Bashar Al-Assad, and according to the organizational chart, which the OCLCH established, by the head of the National Security Office, Ali Mamlouk. Sadys then listed different departments at the: Ministry of Interior, the Internal and External services, and the Branch of Palestinian Affairs. Branch 225 corresponded to internal security and Branch 251 to state Security, Sadys explained. Intelligence services were called Mukhabarat.

Sadys said the Military Intelligence Directorate coordinated activities of armed forces across Syria and Libya and were present on foreign territory to monitor dissidents. Sadys said it is possible that some are watching us [the trial] now.

Sadys added that the three Branches 215, 227, and 235 were nicknamed “Branches of death”. Branch 220 was from the Military Intelligence Directorate.

The Air Force Intelligence was headed by Jamil Hassan and was already used before to control opponents, Sadys stated. It had seven branches in Damascus and the regions. At that time, their members were also found in foreign embassies and in the [Syrian] national airline.

Investigation on the Dabbagh case

Sadys explained that the Office was not involved much in the case, the investigative magistrates worked a lot on it. But Obeida Dabbagh wished to be heard by the OCLCH. He explained that his brother had French and Syrian citizenship and was the Principal of Education at the Damascus French school, behind the presidential palace in a particularly heavily guarded zone.

Sadys related that one evening the Air Force Intelligence arrested the son at home. They searched the house and took money, phones, and computers. The next day, they came back to arrest Mr. Dabbagh on the grounds that he had given his son a bad education. They tried to take the vehicle, which was blocked -in by the vehicle of the former Cypriot ambassador who lived in the same building. The brother-in-law also appeared and was arrested. The driver of the ambassador was also beaten up. The ambassador's apartment, where Mazen Dabbagh was said to have hidden money, was also searched.

They were taken to one Air Force Intelligence’ Office. The brother-in-law said that the driver and his son were released the next day. They stood for 14 hours, with their hands tied and heads bowed. The son said everything was fine when he appeared before them but bore marks of torture.

Mazen Dabbagh’s spouse tried to find out what was going on, and she contacted Obeida Dabbagh, who contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, apparently without success. Mrs. Dabbagh paid 15,000 dollars to Abdel Salam Mahmoud of the Investigation Branch at the Air Force Intelligence, to see her husband and her son, and to request their transfer to Sednaya prison. Mahmoud took the money but announced that her son and husband were dead. The information was later confirmed on websites managed by Syrians, where they identified the number of people who died in Syria.

In 2016, Mrs. Dabbagh and her daughter were evicted from their home by the Air Force Intelligence and Abdel Salam Mahmoud occupied it.

A preliminary investigation was launched by the OCLCH. They first had to confirm the French nationality [of Patrick and Mazen Dabbagh] to assert the Office’s jurisdiction. Sadys stated they contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which said it was informed of the situation, but since the arrest was not the responsibility of the official services of a State, the Ministry was not competent.

The Office was also in charge of hearing witnesses, like Dabbagh’s family and former colleagues. Then, a judicial investigation [information judiciaire] was opened; other witnesses were heard, documentary and press articles were gathered and added to the file.

The Official Journal of the European Union had a publication in April 2013 [right date is May 31, 2013] that dealt with restrictive measures taken against people in the regime; on the list, No 1 was Bashar Al-Assad, No 3 was Ali Mamlouk, No 10 was Jamil Hassan, and No 132 was Abdel Salam Mahmoud [link to the decision https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:147:0014:0045:FR:PDF].

Sadys concluded that at present, the Office still did not know the reasons for the arrest of the Dabbagh’s.

Presiding Judge Raviot questioning of Sadys

Judge Raviot asked Sadys if he had any information on the respective personalities of the Dabbagh’s. He noted she didn’t have any information about their arrests, but wondered if she had information about their lives in Syria that would explain the possibility of their arrest. Judge Raviot recalled Patrick Dabbagh was a psychology student, and his father a teacher. Sadys had no other information on the son but added that former colleagues said that his father tended to criticize the regime.

Judge Raviot wanted to clarify that Mazen Dabbagh had the reputation to criticize [the regime] at his workplace, but understood that his family didn’t have that reputation. Sadys confirmed.

Judge Raviot asked Sadys to confirm that a member of Mazen Dabbagh’s family-in-law was related to a dignitary of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, which Sadys couldn’t tell. Judge Raviot asked Sadys if, in his place of work, particular information could be collected, like testimonials from people who had contact with him. Sadys stated a former principal and a teacher [were heard], but she didn't conduct the hearings herself. One of the former principals was called [name redacted] and Sadys recalled he had said that Mazen Dabbagh was known for openly criticizing the regime.

Judge Raviot wondered if there was any explanation as to why the son was arrested first and the father the next day. He asked if that could mean the son was suspected of an “insulting plot” [Judge Raviot used the term “complot injurieux” in French, whose sense was unclear to the trial monitor. The main idea is that the son could have been suspected of a plot]. Sadys said the investigation did not provide information.

Judge Raviot asked if it was of interest to display the structure of the Caesar files, which was denied. Judge Raviot added that the civil parties wished the court to display 27 of the Caesar photos that all stemmed from the Syrian Air Force Intelligence.

Judge Raviot asked Sadys if, out of all the photos, the Office was able to determine how many bodies corresponded to photos taken at the Air Force Intelligence. Sadys answered about 150.

Presentation of the 27 Caesar photos in chronological order

Judge Raviot said he would let Sadys comment on them.

• Photo 1: Judge Raviot explained that two labels and two inscriptions appeared on the body. Sadys confirmed there was an inscription on the body, and an adhesive that remained. A label was held in the hands of the person. Judge Raviot asked what the numbers corresponded to, Sadys first replied she didn’t speak [Arabic] and then explained they corresponded to the detainee number, the number of the service which had the detainee, and sometimes the third number which corresponded to the report of the forensic doctor. Judge Raviot asked if she had any indication on the date when the photo was taken, Sadys said between 2011 and 2013. Judge Raviot understood they were digital photos transferred to computer and Sadys said it was possible to obtain the dates from the metadata.
• Photo 2: [swollen face]: Sadys commented that malnutrition was visible on the first picture. On the second one, there were marks of blows. The patch suggests that he received treatment. Sometimes detainees hid their wounds to not go to hospital, because some doctors tortured them by treating them without anesthesia, or they were rehabilitated so that they could be tortured again.          
• Photo 3: [starving body and blue left eye]: Marchi-Uhel said the fact that all these bodies were naked or in underwear was part of the conditions of detention. The report of the German forensic doctor did not focus on the Air Force Intelligence but given the state of the bodies, the advanced malnutrition was cause of death.
• Photo 4: [bearded face]: Sadys commented they were all rather young men. She also noted scratches on the sides.  
• Photo 5 [swollen face]: Sadys said she couldn’t tell if the marks on the side were from a bullet or from pliers as mentioned before.
• Photo 6: Sadys noted the bodies were on the ground, and suggested they were possibly part of the bodies piled up in garages or on the floors of certain hospitals or branches. Counsel Bectarte said that Mazen Darwish and the civil parties explained that the term Jawiya جوية appearing on the corpse referred to the Air Force. Judge Raviot asked if they referred to the mention on the skin, and the translator explained this was both written on the bodies as well as on the label.
• Photo 7: Sadys said sometimes people had received bullets during the demonstrations and were brought to the Intelligence services without being treated.
• Photo 8: Judge Raviot said at least four corpses were visible [one in the middle, and three around].
• Photo 9 [three bodies]: Sadys commented that malnutrition was visible on most bodies.        
• Photo 10 [swollen face]: Sadys said Caesar also explained that he took photos from a certain distance, a photo a little closer and a photo of the face. Judge Raviot concluded he took three photos [of each body], which Sadys confirmed. Judge Raviot inquired about the inscriptions on the chest. The translator said there was two numbers, and between both numbers, the name of the Branch (جوية Jawiya). Judge Raviot asked what was written on the forehead, and the translator explained there was a number and under it the term Jawiya.               
• Photo 11: Sadys said it was visible that the person received treatment.         
• Photo 12: [Two bodies appeared next to the one in the middle]. Sadys commented that the many marks on the legs of the person on the left could be burns. Judge Raviot understood it was wounds and saw that there were at least seven bodies intertwined.
• Photo 13: a face [no comment]
• Photo 14: bodies [no comment]
• Photo 15: Judge Raviot commented bodies were lying on the ground [end unclear].
• Photo 16: Judge Raviot said Sadys could comment if she wished to say something.
• Photo 17: the face was blown off. Judge Raviot wondered if the marks were traces of blood or burns and asked Sadys if she could explain, which she denied. Counsel Bectarte mentioned the medico-legal expertise of Dr Rothschild that CW3 [Garance Le Caisne] referred to and stressed that only a German and English versions were available. The findings of the expert's report were added to the report. The German judgment was translated [into French] and included these findings.             

Attorney General Viguier specified that there were three reports concerning two branches. Judge Raviot concluded that the photos exploited by the German justice system did not correspond to the photos displayed today, what Attorney General confirmed. Judge Raviot said at the instruction phase, the question was raised to conduct a medico-legal expertise on these photos. Attorney General Viguier stated it was considered that the elements transmitted in the joint investigation team [with Germany] corresponded to the photos displayed today. Sadys said it was sometimes difficult to determine the wounds and the age. Judge Raviot concluded that it was difficult for an expert to take a stand on the cause of death solely based on photos.               

• Photo 18 [no comment]
• Photo 19: only the number of the Air Force appeared [no comment]
• Photo 20: striated face, with only numbers [no comment]
• Photo 21: a face, with a number and the mention of the Air Force [no comment]
• Photo 22: a face [no comment]
• Photo 23: a face [no comment] The translator explained that the letter – J – appeared on the other photos, but here [the entire word] Jawiya [Air Force] was written, which meant that these services were concerned.            
• Photo 24: Sadys commented it was the same type of image. Judge Raviot stated that no matter which branch or services, the types of images were similar.           
• Photo 25: Judge Raviot asked why they would unclothe a body. Sadys replied it was to humiliate them.   
• Photo 26: Judge Raviot commented that on other bodies it seemed even smaller [unclear]
• Photo 27: Sadys said one must know that, daily, a detainee would carry corpses of the deceased ones on trucks. Judge Raviot stressed it was the second photo which showed a transparent plastic film that might suggest a medical facility. He asked if Sadys had any explanation, which she denied. Attorney General Viguier mentioned Dr. Rothschild’s expertise to stress that in the three reports about Branches 251, 220 and the military branch, Rothschild considered there were three causes of death, namely natural, unnatural, and indeterminate. Viguier reminded the court that the precise cause of death couldn’t be determine but given the injuries, Rothschild concluded that death was unnatural.

Judge Raviot asked if the OCLCH was seized of equivalent proceedings concerning Syria, which Sadys confirmed, mentioning files concerning doctors in military hospitals whose roles the Office still works to establish. When asked if they have many files, Sadys said the OCLCH works on 68 files on about 10 countries, 30 of them concerning Syria. She stressed that as Caesar said, the Intelligence Services are very discreet in burying the bodies. The Office found reports from NGOs using satellite images over several years, showing mass graves getting bigger every year. One is close to military bases, which enables them to bury the corpses in complete tranquility. Others mass graves were identified south of Damascus.

Judge Raviot asked Sadys if other investigations conducted by the OCLCH concerned people with dual nationalities. Sadys mentioned the Chaban file. Attorney General stressed that Chaban was not a French national, but a Syrian national, but that there are ongoing proceedings concerning people with dual nationalities.

The Civil Parties’ Counsel had no questions.

Attorney General Viguier questioning of Sadys

The Attorney General said a translation of Dr. Rothschild's analysis appeared in the report transmitted by the IIIM which was referred to this morning. Viguier read the translation of a conclusion on p.27 of the report: “On the whole, the forensic evaluation of photos resulted in the figure of 352 deceased male persons [caused by the Air Force Intelligence]”, stressing if was because of mistreatment, systematic neglect and that many bodies bore marks of torture.

Judge Raviot thanked the audience and suspended the proceedings.

[Break at 3:19 PM until 3:56 PM]

******

[Proceedings resumed at 15:56 pm]

Testimony of Witness W1

Presiding Judge Raviot asked if the translation was working well. He reminded the witness to speak slowly to facilitate his testimony. He specified that W1 didn’t have to take an oath because his audition was a discretionary choice of the President.

Judge Raviot stated that W1 was born in August 1973, worked as a pharmacist and was domiciled at the FIDH [International Federation for Human Rights]. W1 confirmed. Judge Raviot explained that W1 was heard under the discretionary power of the President of the Assize Court and the testimony is for information purposes only since he didn’t take an oath. Still, Judge Raviot asked W1 to speak with as much sincerity as possible, like other witnesses. W1 confirmed he will.

Judge Raviot asked W1 if he has any family or professional ties with the accused or civil parties. W1 denied. Judge Raviot reminded that before an Assize Court, the spontaneity of the testimony is important which explains how the judges must not influence the witness by the questions they ask in the first instance. So, Judge Raviot said he will give W1 the floor, stressing that W1 is free of his declaration about the case that concerns the court today, namely the indictment of the three accused for criminal offenses that fall under Crimes Against Humanity regarding the disappearance followed by the death of Mazen Dabbagh and his son. W1 said he understood. Judge Raviot told W1 to make himself comfortable and to ask if he needed a glass of water or a break.

W1 said he will talk about his arrest and incarceration at the Air Force Intelligence Services. On August 21, 2011, he was in his pharmacy when two armed men arrived and extracted him from the shop. They put him in a car and blindfolded him, then brought him to a place outside the city in the surrounding area. They left him in a room for half an hour while he was still blindfolded. Then, they put W1 in a vehicle again with two people and they drove to the Military Airport of Hama. They put the three prisoners in a cell. Of course, the floor wasn’t straight, and the window had iron bars. W1 stayed there for two days. Bathroom breaks were scheduled at specific times [every day] and under violence and insults. The food was very bad.

On September 1, they [the jailers] took them outside in a small cell [with other people]. There were in fact two cells. All were blindfolded and had their hands tied behind their backs. They started beating them on the body and the head. Then, they took them on a bus, each one tied to the pelvis of the one in front and all of course beaten with electrical cables. After they got off the bus, they put the detainees in another vehicle which W1 thought to be a bus, but it was a helicopter. W1 thought he and the others were going to be thrown into the desert. After one and a half hours, the helicopter landed in a location that W1 later understood to be the Air Base of Al-Mazzeh. The detainees were welcomed with blows and undressed.

W1 was then placed in an isolated cell and only had a small bottle of water. He stayed there for approximately six days. He could only go to the toilet three times a day, under blows and screams and they had to hurry. Once, W1 was asked [to come out of the cell] and a jailer took him out, put him on the floor, and beat him on his foot so that he would respect the rules. W1 was then summoned for the first time, still with his hands tied and blindfolded. The person asked for his identity. He turned around him giving him electric shocks. Then, they brought him back to his cell.

The second time, the investigator asked W1 if he protested. W1 was surprised and thought he should deny it. The investigator ordered W1’s hands to be untied and they brought him a chair. The investigator asked him again why he took part in the demonstrations and gave him a lecture محاضرة about the fact that the State had gotten better and that if W1 managed to buy bread, it was thanks to the support of the State and if he could study, it was thanks to the State. After that, the investigator questioned him on his connections and discussions اتصالات he had with different Arab Media channels, which W1 denied. The investigator said he had recognized his voice. W1 further denied and said he was ready for any interrogation. At that moment, the investigator got mad and asked him to lie on the ground. They beat him and tortured him, while asking the same questions about his calls to Media channels. W1 said he healed wounded people [as a pharmacist], and they got out to demonstrate peacefully. The jailers continued to torture W1 for a good while فترة منيحة and placed him back in the cell afterwards.

After six days, they moved W1 to a common cell جماعية with 14 people. Every time the door opened, they had to turn to the wall, the number of detainees increased, and the number of people went up to 28. There was a toilet and a sink [in the cell]. Their [physical] state was very critical سيئ. They had to sleep on the side to have room. They stayed in that state. W1 met people from his town. Some were released before him, and for others, they [the prisoners] heard of their death. Among them, [name redacted] was killed [by them]. W1 was then transferred to a bigger cell with around 150 people [translation said 50, but trial monitor heard 150]. People were from different governorates محافظة One person was wounded in his leg which was immobilized. The inmates helped him move. He received no medical care.

Then, they brought someone from W1’s town who had problems with his back. His name was [name redacted P1]. He had such severe pain that he had to walk slowly. But on the day of the interrogation, one must walk fast to not be beaten. The same night, they asked him for interrogation. He came back completely soaked مبلل بالماء and he had traces of torture on his body. They tied his hand to the cell’s door, and he stayed standing all night. Of course, he got diarrhea. [W1 made a break]. Of course, this person didn’t get out and his family was informed of his death. The same night, [named redacted P1] told the inmates that they had brought [name redacted P2] from W1’s town. He stayed several minutes and after that, he was told that they chose the wrong cell. Of course, this person never came out.

Before last week, they were transferred to another location. They were all tied up, on a bus and driven to a location where the floor was damaged. They of course endured the welcoming party استقبال حافل. The jailers gave them clothes from the Air Force. [Civil party interrupted to asked for clarification on the interpretation. The interpreter confirmed the witness mentioned Military clothes]. W1 continued explaining they took their clothes and gave them blue military clothing that W1 kept during all his detention until he got pimples. There was a doctor who saw them on his body and tore W1’s clothes. [In the next sentence W1 mentioned many blows, but it was unclear to the trial monitor]. He [unclear who, but trial monitor thinks the jailer] took them down in a cellar, in a room with clay floor تراب where there was nothing but walls. They remained there for a night and were then transferred to another room with over 50 people. W1 realized after that, according to the prisoners, it was the 4^th Division. W1 stayed there a week. Every time a guard entered; the prisoners had to kneel. They gave them a thing [unclear what it was] they had to put on their eyes every time the guards entered.

On the last day, W1 got out and was sent back to Al-Mazzeh Air Base. The detainees were told to clean themselves. A hairdresser came outside and told them that they would meet someone important. They left in a bus حافلة to the Air Force Intelligence where they entered into an investigation office. It was the day of the arrest of Al-Khaddafi which appeared on TV. They were brought to the office of Jamil Hassan and told that the President had forgiven them, but that, in his opinion [Jamil Hassan], they didn’t deserve it. They were given a lesson on nationalism محاضرة وطنية and then brought on the bus حافلة and to the train station. They were then released.

Presiding Judge Raviot questionning of W1

Presiding Judge Raviot said that W1 was heard by the investigative magistrate on January 24, 2019. There, he specified that his arrest occurred on August 31, 2011 and that he was a pharmacist in a city called Salamiyah located 30 km from Hama and around 200 km from Damascus. He said he was released on October 23, 2011. W1 confirmed. He added he had a cerebral hemorrhage on November 5, 2011 and stayed at the hospital for 16 days in a coma. Judge Raviot said W1 was then operated on and described the consequences of this surgery. He asked W1 if the reasons for his arrest were explained to him and if it was only for having taken part in demonstrations. W1 said they didn’t explain at all and threatened to take his wife and to throw his children onto the street.

Judge Raviot said W1 was detained for six days and then released by a judgment. He asked W1 to explain. W1 said he was arrested on May 12, 2011 by the State Security أمن الدولة and brought to Hama where they asked him to sign a pledge that he will never demonstrate again. [His interrogators] mentioned the uprising in Arkam and Jarfiyeh [names and spelling uncertain] and the state of emergency, wondering why people would still demonstrate after it was lifted W1 explained he refused to sign and consequently was transferred to the tribunal because of his participation in demonstrations. He got out after a judgment, but after a while, there was an annulation by the President. W1 remained in custody for 6 days.

Judge Raviot asked W1 if he was already subjected to violence during that period. W1 denied and explained that in 1989, at the time of Hafez, he got arrested in this unit for three months and endured the most terrible torture, namely torture by water and electricity. He was accused of having read a document that belonged to a non-authorized party.

Judge Raviot inquired about his conditions of detention, mentioning what W1 declared about individual cells and then a common cell that was 2.5 to 3 square meters large and houses that held up to 28 detainees and who were mentioned to have been blindfolded. W1 answered that they were at first 14 and then they became 28 detainees and specified that they were not blindfolded at Al-Mazzeh Air Base but had to cover their eyes when the jailers entered the cell. They were told only for the last week to keep a band on their head and use it to cover their eyes when the jailers entered. Judge Raviot wanted to understand why they were asked to cover their eyes. W1 said it was to not be able to recognize the agents.

Judge Raviot asked W1 how many times he was interrogated over the complete period. W1 said twice at the Air Force Intelligence Services. One time, the detainees were taken outside just so they could be asked about information regarding a sports coach. They brought several detainees from W1’s town and the Professor [name redacted], alias كنية [alias redacted]. W1 said he only knew he was a sports coach. That day, he waited to be interrogated, blindfolded and with his hands tied. An agent عنصر saw his long nails, because he had already been detained for a long period. The agent took a wooden board and started to slap his nails. That was right before the interrogation.

Judge Raviot asked how long he stayed at Al-Mazzeh Air Base, because he left and then came back there and met Jamil Hassan before his release. W1 replied he stayed two days at the Military Airport of Hama and was brought to Al-Mazzeh on September 2. Before October 23, he was shortly transferred to the 4^th Division. Judge Raviot asked where it was located. W1 said it was in the Sumariyeh بالسومرية not far from Al-Mazzeh Air Base from what he heard.

Judge Raviot said W1 encountered Jamil Hassan. W1 answered that he did not know him personally. Judge Raviot asked how he knew that it was him. W1 replied that he was the most important person. He presented himself, said he was retired, and the President asked him to come back. Judge Raviot asked W1 if he benefited from a pardon, and W1 confirmed that the President granted them [W1 and other detainees] a pardon سامحنا. But he [Jamil Hassan] told W1 that in his opinion, they did not deserve it. Judge Raviot recalled W1’s words of a prepared scenario [i.e. the scene with Jamil Hassan talking about the pardon given by the president to detainees was prepared and nothing other than a manipulation]. W1 confirmed. Judge Raviot mentioned the letter of thanks they prepared. W1 said of course, they contacted him [Jamil Hassan] saying that prisoners wished to thank him.

Judge Raviot said W1’s family was aware of his release, and that he belonged to a particular confession. W1 explained that his community was involved تدخل من الطائفة. The Confessional Ismaeli Council مجلس الطائفة الاسماعلية acted as an intermediary with the President to obtain the pardon. Judge Raviot confirmed that it was what he had explained before. W1 added that famous people were also arrested. One was 73 years old and used to work with Hafez and was imprisoned for 23 years.

Judge Raviot reminded W1 about his declaration of Abdel Salam Mahmoud. Judge Raviot wanted to know in which terms he had heard of him. W1 said that he doesn’t know him but heard of him سمعان بس ما بعرف عنه شيء he does not recall.

Judge Raviot mentioned the violence W1 endured after his arrest and its after-effects. W1 confirmed he had a cerebral hemorrhage after his arrest that spread on the right side of his brain. Judge Raviot stressed that it required hospitalization, particularly because of memory loss and the lack of balance he was suffering from. W1 recalled he had balance problems after he got out of the hospital. He remained there for 16 days in a coma between life and death. He couldn’t recognize his daughters.

Judge Raviot asked if the jailers used violence on a daily basis or not. W1 said no, violence was mostly used when they moved from one place to another, for instance from the toilets and back to the cell, or if the jailers heard a voice and took all inmates out collectively. Judge Raviot asked if all exerted violence against him. W1 said no, when it comes to torture. But when he was blindfolded, he couldn’t tell who it was. Judge Raviot wanted to know if W1 had discussions with the inmates that made clear they were also victims of violence. He wanted W1 to shed light on his inmates’ fate during his detention. W1 said of course, stressing that his experience was nothing compared to others, because they didn’t attach his wrists, and he endured normal torture تعذيب عادي . Judge Raviot mentioned wounds on his head resulting from physical violence. W1 confirmed he endured physical torture, since they [the detainees] were beaten on their head. W1’s wife took a picture of his back but unfortunately deleted it for fear of reprisal. W1 had whip marks on his back. He concluded by repeating that he had endured much less than the others.

Judge Raviot asked if he benefited from care in detention, apart from what was organized before his presentation to General Jamil Hassan. W1 denied. Judge Raviot asked when W1 left Syria and W1 replied on June 22, 2018. Judge Raviot understood that W1 stayed in Syria after his arrest and detention. W1 confirmed he stayed in his hometown after his arrest. Judge Raviot asked if he could continue practicing his profession. W1 said that in his absence during his hospitalization, his wife and his friend took care of the pharmacy. After his release, he was capable of working again. They hoped for a transition. Judge Raviot asked if particular events pushed him to leave. W1 mentioned the disease of his mother that made him stay, and that he couldn’t leave his brother. But they reached the point where there was no more hope ما عاد في أمل. On February 25, 2018, W1’s mother died. W1’s daughter was studying in Latakia and he recalled it was a kind of torture to let her leave [because of the risks she could be arrested on the way]. W1 heard that his name was wanted for imprisonment مطلوب على الاعتقال and that was what motivated him to leave.

Judge Raviot asked if he is left Syria illegally. W1 denied, he went several times to the French Embassy; but for the route between Syria and Lebanon he had to verify if his name was on the list of the people who must not leave. W1’s brother-in-law gave him the information. He was the husband of W1’s sister and as a well-placed officer, he knew who appeared on those lists. That is how W1 could go to Lebanon. He went to Beirut once for the interview and the second time, on June 21, he left with his wife and daughters.

Judge Raviot mentioned a copy of a document from the Head of the Investigative Branch of the Air Force Intelligence Services where information on the detainee was shared. The declaration was signed by W1. W1 confirmed and explained that the people who were about to be released had to sign this paper. At the end, seven people were released. W1 said he made a mistake and presented that to the investigative magistrate. He explained that September 2, 2011 is the date when he arrived at Al-Mazzeh Air Base and that he got the paper back on October 23, 2011 and as well as his identity card and 50 Syrian pounds. W1 left his fingerprints on the document. Judge Raviot asked why they gave it to him. W1 repeated that seven people had to be released and that he took the paper by mistake, it was not voluntary, they did not give it to him. It was proof that they had been released. 

Judge Raviot explained that the document is an engagement to respect the rule inside the prison, and read [the notes of the trial monitor are not a verbatim of what was read by Judge Raviot] “do not cooperate with detainees, do not ask for their address or personal numbers, inform the prison’s head of every acts contrary to his directives, or if a detainee hands over a letter, etc. If the detainee doesn’t respect that, he bears full responsibility.” That is why it can be considered as an act of engagement in which he [or they] handed over money.

Judge Raviot asked if W1 still had family in Syria. W1 confirmed he still had brothers and sisters. Judge Raviot wanted to know if he feared for their security, W1 confirmed. Judge Raviot asked if he could contact them on social networks, and if they might be under surveillance even there. W1 confirmed that one can be under surveillance at any time. Once they called W1’s brother and then his sister, and W1’s niece replied. W1 was inquiring about administrative issues with the Syndicate of the Pharmacists who were asking if W1 left the country or not. She replied that she didn’t know.

Judge Raviot recalled that the case which was referred to the court concerns people who disappeared and died. Judge Raviot asked W1 if he was able to observe that people endured acts like what the Dabbagh’s had gone through. W1 replied that his brother-in-law [husband of his sister-in-law] endured the same fate. He was arrested. He was a merchant and was a wealthy man. W1 didn’t know which service [took him]. They took his money. His name was [name redacted - spelling unclear to trial monitor]. They received his death certificate in 2013. W1 further mentioned people named [four names redacted] who W1 met in custody. There might be other people W1 said. There was a lawyer called [name redacted] from Homs. When W1 was released, he gave W1 his number and W1 called his father who had a PhD in civil law and was a professor. [name redacted] was released but arrested again and died in prison. Otherwise, W1 doesn’t know about the fate of other people [detained with him] because they were from other towns.

Civil Parties’ Counsel Bectarte questioning of W1

Counsel Bectarte thanked W1 for having agreed to appear in court today and emphasized that it required courage to publicly testify for those acts. W1 said it was his duty and the least he could do.

Bectarte said that in this town, many demonstrations occurred after 2011 and asked W1 to draw the key trends of what happened in Salamiyah. W1 relayed that Salamiyah belonged to the Hama Governorate and was among the first cities where demonstrations occurred in front of people in charge of their surveillance. Salamiyah drew Hama into the movement. They demonstrated 100% peacefully and it lasted. The city of Salamiyah had the particularity of having many Ismaelis [a Shia sect]. There were also Sunnis, and the surroundings villages were Alawites. There never were any confession issues between these communities but the regime tried to play on religious affiliations. The way the regime treated them تعامل in detention  was not very rough because of W1’s [and his co-prisoners'] confessional affiliation, to send a sort of message to the communities that the regime was protective to them. [The regime] tried to play with that card, also by pushing Daesh to attack Salamiyah to be able to say that the group represented a danger to the communities. The demonstrations went on and reached an important number, thousands of people. It was hard to bear for the regime because the population was composed of minorities and it was hard to accept that they continued. Salamiyah was also particular, historically speaking. There were many opponents in this town, so Salamiyah was not very much liked by the regime.

Bectarte recalled the insults directed to W1 and other inmates and asked if he could give examples. W1 said he heard all kinds of insults, that affected his honor. He didn’t recall precisely but can’t repeat them.

Bectarte asked for clarification on the fact the [name redacted] had been released, as W1 related. Bectarte asked W1 to specify who he was and what he knew about this man who was detained for 23 years. W1 replied that [name redacted] formed under Hafez a sort of regional command مكتب and was among Hafez comrades. After the coup, they put him in jail as other leaders. They took W1, [name redacted] and another to Hama and sent them by plane to Al-Mazzeh.

Bectarte stressed that it was historical facts related to the takeover of Hafez and elimination of his opponents. Presiding Judge Raviot recalled that the events which interest the court are the ones that W1 had experienced.

Becarte further asked if W1 ever had the chance to file a complaint on the facts that he was submitted to, in Syria or somewhere else. W1 responded that it was, of course, impossible in Syria and that he was not considered a prisoner there but had been submitted to informal and arbitrary [detention].

Bectarte asked W1 what this trial meant to him. W1 said that meant a lot, of course, that criminals got their punishments.

Civil Parties’ Counsel Baudouin questioning of W1

Counsel Baudouin had a last question, he first saluted W1 courage and asked if he had hopes for him and for the punishments of the criminals. Baudouin meant the idea of justice for victims and for himself, even if he is not a party to the trial [question was unclear to the audience]. W1 said that justice should be above all, for all criminals there needs to be a punishment, wherever they are.

Attorney General Viguier questioning of W1

Attorney General Viguier mentioned the common cell where up to 28 detainees were detained. She asked W1 if, in his opinion, all detainees of that cell were submitted to interrogations and acts of torture. W1 said for sure.

Judge Raviot recalled the solidarity between detainees that W1 mentioned. After his session [of interrogation], W1 had obviously been violated and seriously injured so the inmates gave him space. Judge Raviot asked if W1 saw injuries as serious as his in his cell, and if yes, which ones. W1 said people were tortured as much as him, and others worse. When he was brought back to the cell after he had been hospitalized, [name redacted]’s legs were in a terrible state, he had whip marks on the back that looked like a geographical map. As a result of being hung by the hands, some couldn’t move their hands anymore.

Attorney General Viguier reminded the court that W1 was a pharmacist and asked if he couldn’t provide medical care with the means at hand and helped some detainees. W1 said he could do little things but had no medication, nothing. The only thing they could do was to offer them some relaxation راحة,

Presiding Judge Raviot thanked W1. W1 said “thank you all”.

[Testimony ended at 17:29]

******

Testimony of W2 – Testimony read by the Presiding Judge in Absence of the Witness

Judge Raviot explained that Witness W2 should have been heard this afternoon and he would read his testimony instead. W2 was heard by the Investigative Magistrate on January 24, 2019 with an interpreter present. W2 was born in Damascus and worked as a dental technician.

The Investigative Judge asked him to confirm that he was detained at Al-Mazzeh Detention Center and when. W2 replied he was arrested on April 17, 2012 in the region of Kafr Soussah كفر سوسة, a neighborhood of Damascus where he worked with the coordination committee [structures created at the start of the uprising]. He oversaw two medicine storage warehouses that were managed by coordinating doctors from Damascus. One of the doctors was arrested the same day and a ‘Plan B’ to evacuate the drugs was implemented. Around 7:30 pm, five people in charge of the evacuation were arrested by the Air Force Intelligence Services because the doctor had confessed.

W2 was first detained at the Umayyad Square premises of the Air Force and after a month and a half, at the Military Airport. Two weeks later, he was repatriated to the same location and released on July 8, 2012. Before they arrived at the Air Force premises, they had a special welcoming with slaps and kicks. The detainees that were already there told them they had arrived at the Air Force Intelligence Services.

W2 described the detention at the Umayyad Square. There were 40 to 45 people in a 4m by 4.5m large room. The place W2 had was not larger than the seat he sat on [before the investigative judge]. They had 40 seconds to go to the toilets. The food was bad, they received a bowl and a bag of bread and shared the portions. The shower lasted two minutes for each detainee and occurred once a week.

During the investigations, W2 recalled electrical sticks and slaps on the foot crease with tubes. He got a metatarsal fracture. They were blindfolded and hooded. The detainees were hung by their hands on the ceiling, their hands behind their backs and their feet tied. Before they were brought to the torture room, they could put on their clothes. The cell was such a confined space, and it was so hot that they took off their clothes.

The Investigative Magistrate asked for details of the detention conditions at Al-Mazzeh. W2 explained there were around 40 people in a cell that was 4m by 3.5m large. The conditions were even worse there. They used to take alternate turns resting. W2 also ate alternately because the new detainees found the food so bad that they didn’t eat anything. Torture sessions started with questions, the hands tied behind the back and with kicks. If they didn’t answer, they received a dozen blows, and so forth. So, most of the questions were related to detention and weapons cache. Because W2 did not confess, the jailers developed methods: they tied their handles on the windows so that he was suspended without his feet touching the floor. The jailers hit and spit on them while they passed. They were not involved in arm trafficking but in humanitarian aid, but questions were still asked about that.

W2 recognized one of the white buildings of Al-Mazzeh Air Base as his place of detention.

They received daily blows. They had to bend over backwards. Going to the toilets lasted no more than 45 seconds, three times a day. Once, W2 wanted to avoid going out to the toilets and urinated in a plastic bag but they forced him to drink his urine.

The Investigative Magistrate asked him about the names of people, but W2 said it was too difficult to remember. The Magistrate asked him if he met Jamil Hassan, which W2 denied. But he mentioned a memory at the Umayyad Square where he entered an office of someone that seemed very important. W2 was blindfolded. Jamil Hassan would have said that even if Bashar Al Assad himself had asked to be released, he would refuse because he had to do his job.

After that stay at Al-Mazzeh, he returned, around June 15-16, to the Umayyad Square premises until July 5, 2012. He was then transferred to Adra, in the Damascus suburbs of Duma and presented before a judge. The Antiterrorism Jurisdiction was created later. W2 heard that his file was sent there.

W2 was arrested a second time by the Palestine Section of the General Intelligence and detained not far from Yarmouk [likely in the area of Al-Hajar Al-Aswad], in the south. He recalled having been beaten until he lost consciousness. Women on the side heard of W2’s serious state and someone came to inject him with serum and offer him a cigarette to raise his blood pressure.

Seven people, among them five men and two women, were transferred to Adra. The judge ordered W2’s liberation on July 23, 2013. W2 said they could provide a document relating to this.

W2 related that he felt pain above all in winter when he had to take painkillers. He had psychiatric treatment after his release and continued to have nightmares.

Reading of Jamil Hassan’s interview to Sputnik News

Counsel Bectarte mentioned an interview given by Jamil Hassan to the Media Sputnik News, stating that some paragraphs could be interesting to read, so that the court could listen to him despite his absence today. The interview was dated November 3, 2016. Presiding Judge Raviot started to read the interview [only part of the interview is reproduced here]: “The Director of the Air Force Intelligence Services [Jamil Hassan] presented a summary of the Military and Political situation in Syria in an interview with the Sputnik correspondent in Syria, since it is subject to conspiracy. But in fact, it is a wonderful setting within national unity. A country deserves to live, to endure, and to enjoy freedom. It is recognized by every rational person who knows the nature of Syria and the cohesion of its social fabric. It's a good idea to compare Syria to what it was before the crisis, with no discrepancies. The conspiracy was led against Syria with the support of Israel, head of the snake in the universe, and the Saudi’s, famous for their dirty attitude towards Arabs. Syria is presided by a young and enlightened commander who places the interest of his people beyond any consideration. That dissatisfied the Israelis. It's a pity that some of these people have been fooled by the slogans of the dirty Islamists who were confused by the strength of national unity. They supported extremism. Some Syrians allied themselves with these dirty radicals in what claimed to be a revolution, supported by Qatar and Youssouf Al-Qardawi. Why is Syria fragmented? We have the right to ask ourselves why Al-Nusra cooperates with Israel? What justifies such cooperation? And why does Daesh manage to get its hands on a small part of the Golan Heights? Heretics of the world have gathered and distributed the roles in preparation for the Syria’s conflagration. France, Germany and Great Britain gathered to tear Syria apart. That's how big Syria is when you bring them all together. Europeans will be the hardest hit if Syria, represented by a young and open-minded leader, collapses.”

Counsel Bectarte mentioned another passage which could answer the last question that was asked by François Burgat [Day 1 of the trial]. Presiding Judge Raviot read this part, beginning with the question of the journalist: “I deduce from what you say that you're in favor of using the same tactics as those used in Hama?” Jamil Hassan replied “I am in favor of using the same tactics, but in a different way. I would add that Turkey was not so dirty then. Saddam was the one supporting the terrorists in Syria. The Jordanian regime defiantly supported the extremists in Syria on the orders of Prince Hassan, the King's brother. That's why an overwhelming reaction was necessary. If we had behaved at the start of the current crisis as we did in Hama, we would have stopped the bloodshed and would not have come to this today.” The journalist further asked “Isn’t it strange that the West supports extremism? What would they win with the partition of Syria?” Jamil Hassan replied “There is no doubt that the first beneficiary is Israel. If they mentioned democracy, we remind them that 90% of Syrians support Assad.”

 [Proceedings were adjourned at 5:55 pm]

___________________________

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