A Problematic Constitutional Declaration
On March 13, Interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa signed a Constitutional Declaration (unofficial English translation) which will dictate the terms of governance in Syria for the next five years. There is something in the document for everyone to love (or hate) which is to say it contains many provisions that are in tension with one another. The overriding concern however is the centralization of power within the Presidency without any real separation of powers or system of checks and balances. Many provisions create the potential for abuse.
Centralization of Power
The Declaration explicitly gives vast authority to President Al-Sharaa for a period of five years. This is far too long for a transitional period without any real checks and balances. The President is the Supreme Commander of the armed forces and responsible for managing Syria’s internal affairs. He is also the head of the National Security Bureau. The President appoints one or more Vice Presidents, his Cabinet, and Ambassadors. But he also appoints a committee that will elect two-thirds of the People’s Assembly (the Syrian Parliament.) Moreover, he directly appoints the other one-third of the Assembly. The President has the power to propose law, with the Assembly given the power to legislate the laws and send them to the President for signature.
It is not clear that the People’s Assembly will provide a meaningful check on the President’s power if it is made up entirely of members who were either directly or indirectly appointed by him. That said, a member enjoys parliamentary immunity (at least as long as they remain in office) and a member can only be removed with a two-thirds vote of the Assembly. This might allow some members to operate independently.
Although the judiciary is declared to be independent, all seven members of Syria’s highest court, the Supreme Constitutional Court, will be appointed by the President. The former Constitutional Court is abolished. These provisions beg the question of what is to become of the former members of the Syrian judiciary. The Declaration is also silent as to the duration of a judge’s tenure which could also impact on judicial independence.
Human Rights and Transitional Justice
The Declaration enshrines an impressive list of human rights, including cultural and religious diversity, the right of women to education and work, and the freedom of expression as well as “all the rights and freedoms in international human rights treaties […] ratified by the Syrian Arab Republic.” However, many of these rights are in tension with other terms within the Declaration. For example, the right against religious discrimination and the right to freedom of belief contrast with provisions requiring that the President be Muslim and indicating that Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation. These last provisions favor one religion to the exclusion of others. In addition, the freedom of religion only respects “divine religions” (likely interpreted as the Abrahamic religions) and is therefore not inclusive of all religious practices in Syria.
As another example, the right to freedom of opinion and expression carves out an exception and criminalizes “the glorification of the former Assad regime and its symbols.” Analogous laws were passed in Europe following World War II, criminalizing Holocaust or Genocide denial and have been found to be acceptable by the European Court of Human Rights. However, the terms within the Declaration are exceedingly broad, criminalizing “the denial or praising of crimes, justifying or downplaying them.” This may make it difficult to discuss the Assad period, or to allow a fair defense against war crimes, without risking criminal liability. This is a significant erosion of freedom of expression.
Finally, there are several provisions paving the way for a transitional justice framework. It provides for a transitional justice commission which shall determine accountability mechanisms. It also recognizes international crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, as well as domestic crimes. Although international crimes were not part of Syrian law during the conflict, the Declaration excludes the possibility of challenging prosecutions on that basis. This effectively recognizes customary international law of these crimes in addition to the human rights treaties noted above.
Emergency Powers
The President may declare a state of emergency of 3 months, without any action of the People’s Assembly, where a “serious and immediate danger” “threatens national unity or the integrity and independence of the homeland or hinders institutions from carrying out their constitutional duties.” The emergency can be extended for another 3 months with approval of the Assembly. International human rights treaties ratified by Syria allow states to suspend the protection of certain rights during emergencies that genuinely threaten the existence of the state. However, the emergency must be limited in scope and duration. Compared with the international standard, the reasons for a suspension of rights cited by the Declaration are overly broad and risk violating Syrians’ human rights, particularly if the provisions are interpreted expansively. A permanent state of emergency would be a straightforward violation of human rights.
Moreover, the Declaration appears to allow for the exercise of emergency powers, even in the absence of a declared emergency. Article 23 provides that “rights and freedoms may be subject to limitations that constitute necessary measures for national security, territorial integrity, public safety, the protection of public order, and the prevention of crime, or the protection of public health or morals.” This provision could be used to nullify the human rights recognized by the Declaration with little to no oversight. Ideally the Supreme Constitutional Court would require there to be a national emergency to exercise this “limitation,” but that is not clear from the text alone.
Decentralization
Syria is composed of 14 governates, 65 districts and 281 subdistricts. Since 2011, it has been governed by several distinct groups, with the country divided into roughly four parts at the time of the Assad government’s fall in 2024. Furthermore, Syria’s diversity, which is recognized and protected by the Declaration, includes dozens of ethnicities and religious groups. It is well known that divisions between ethnic and religious minorities were exploited by the Assads to maintain their hold on power. Therefore, any discussion about the future governance of Syria must include a discussion of these divisions and how best to unify the country.
Decentralization, a way of dividing power amongst regional governments encompassed by a single federal government, should be a part of that discussion. Such forms of government are common throughout the world and allow for a degree of regional autonomy while safeguarding national unity and respect for individual rights. After all, it was an over centralization of power which contributed to the gross abuse of power of the prior government.
The Declaration emphasizes the need to preserve the unity and integrity of Syria, its land and people. It criminalizes “calls for division and secession, requests for foreign intervention or external support.” It further states that Syria is “an indivisible geographical and political unit.” Unfortunately, these provisions could be used to foreclose a discussion of federalism or any form of decentralization or power-sharing.
Conclusion
The Constitutional Declaration is meant to be a temporary governing document until a Constitutional Convention can draft a full document appropriate for a new Syria. The Declaration does much that is consistent with international norms, but it is lacking in its distribution of power. The President’s power should not be unchecked and there should be meaningful ways to balance the Executive with the People’s Assembly and the Courts. Without strong institutional controls, the ambiguities within the Declaration will allow for abuse and centralization of authority. Given Syria’s long history of authoritarianism, the people deserve to have more of a say in their governance.
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