Unearthing Hope

The Search for the Missing Victims of ISIS

Syria Justice and
Accountability Centre

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April 2022

The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre

About the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre

The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) strives to prevent impunity, promote redress, and facilitate principled reform. SJAC works to ensure that human rights violations in Syria are comprehensively documented and preserved for use in transitional justice and peace-building. SJAC collects documentation of violations from all available sources, stores it in a secure database, catalogues it according to human rights standards, and analyzes it using legal expertise and big data methodologies. SJAC also supports documenters inside Syria, providing them with resources and technical guidance, and coordinates with other actors working toward similar aims: a Syria defined by justice, respect for human rights, and rule of law.

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Unearthing Hope: The Search for the Missing Victims of ISIS
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Cover Image: The interior of the infamous Point 11 security prison in central Raqqa City.

Table of Contents

Section I: Introduction

Three years after the territorial defeat of ISIS, with the organization resurgent in Syria and Iraq, accountability for the perpetrators of its many crimes and justice for its victims remain elusive. Although the world has long known about the most grisly atrocities that ISIS staged, until now there has been little information about the arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance that the organization committed much more frequently. These violations may constitute crimes against humanity, war crimes, and even genocide in some cases. Between 2013 and 2017, when ISIS ruled northern Syria, the organization arrested and detained thousands of individuals who remain missing and whose families continue to live in a state of grief and uncertainty.

While cities devastated by ISIS rule and Coalition airstrikes have begun to rebuild under the auspices of the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES), the lives of ISIS victims have not been so easily repaired. Families of the missing face particularly difficult challenges. Years after their disappearance, these families are unable to determine the fate of their missing relatives or fully grieve what may be the loss of their loved ones. Moreover, without proof of death, families are often left in legal limbo, unable to access inheritance or remarry. In the absence of a centralized missing persons search under the coordination of local governing authorities, families in Northeast Syria have been forced to search for their loved ones on their own. Many have spent countless hours

tracking down rumors and media reports about the whereabouts of relatives—often said to be wrongfully detained in prisons run by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—and paying bribes to local power brokers who promise information and access.[1] These families have the right to know the truth about the fate of their loved ones.

Meanwhile, approximately 6,000 bodies have been exhumed from dozens of mass graves created by ISIS in Northeast Syria and retrieved from buildings destroyed by Coalition airstrikes. This may amount to approximately half of the total number of missing persons in the Northeast, although estimates of the missing vary. In any case, the vast majority remain unidentified and cannot be returned to families in Syria, Iraq, and beyond. Alleged perpetrators who may hold evidence necessary to identify remains languish in SDF prisons with no fair judicial procedures in sight, or live in their home countries to which they returned after the defeat of ISIS.

In the fall of 2019, SJAC sought to begin to address these problems by **launching** its Missing Persons Program. Through this project, SJAC has worked with families of the missing to amplify their demands for justice, documented cases of missing persons and ISIS crimes in the Northeast, and trained the Raqqa-based Syria Missing Persons and Forensic Team to apply forensic methods in exhumation and identification processes. This report provides an update on the progress that the Missing

Partially Controlled   Core Territory

Figure 1: Areas of approximate territorial control by ISIS at its peak in 2015. SJAC documented disappearances across Northern Syria, focusing on the governorates of Raqqa, Deir Ezzor and Hassakeh.

Created with Datawrapper

Persons Program has made over the past two years. It also indicates the directions that the search for the missing under ISIS should take in the coming months and years. It comes at a critical moment, with ISIS having regrouped since its territorial defeat and begun to mount a resurgence in Syria and Iraq that culminated in the recent assault on Ghweiran Prison in Hassakeh governorate. The permanent defeat of ISIS cannot be secured without justice for the victims of the organization's crimes, including those who remain missing.

In this report, for the first time, SJAC exposes the vast web of detention facilities that were central to ISIS disappearances. Different wings of the ISIS security apparatus systematically used this network of more than 150 police stations, training camps, and secret security prisons to detain kidnapped civilians and members of rival armed groups, in some cases before issuing death sentences or summarily executing them. In this report, SJAC analyzes the nature of ISIS

arrests, prisoner transfers, and the profile of detainees and perpetrators. The report also shows how this information is enabling forensic investigations in Northeast Syria into the fate and whereabouts of those kidnapped by ISIS. The report first presents a preliminary analysis of both oral testimony and written documentation, for the purpose of understanding patterns of ISIS detention and effectively identifying the fate and whereabouts of those still missing. This documentation and analysis represents the most comprehensive study of the ISIS detention apparatus available, relying on interviews with former members of the organization, survivors of ISIS detention, and families of the missing. It also draws on ISIS documents smuggled out of the organization's security offices in Northeast Syria.

The report then describes the way forward in the search for the ISIS missing, based on an application of SJAC documentation. Contrary to the image of wanton violence that ISIS projected, it is precisely because of the organization's systematic methods that there is hope that the Raqqa-based Syrian Missing Persons and Forensic Team (SMFT) can identify missing persons. This section of the report focuses on the SMFT and its training under the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (EAAF) in collaboration with SJAC. It describes the history and background of the SMFT, its current operations, and future trajectory, emphasizing how the SMFT is not just making immediate concrete progress in the search for the missing under ISIS but also laying the foundations for an eventual country-wide missing persons initiative. Together SJAC's documentation and the SMFT's exhumation work have shed light on the geographic and temporal circuits through

which ISIS arrested, transferred, executed, and buried detainees. *The forensic analysis of these circuits is crucial to searching for missing persons, as SJAC demonstrates at the end of this section with an examination one such circuit in Raqqa governorate.* SJAC draws on satellite imagery of a grave site created by ISIS and which the SMFT has excavated, in addition to field documentation regarding nearby detention centers.

The report concludes with a set of recommendations for the continued search for the missing, targeted to different stakeholders. SJAC intends to strike a balance between describing the challenges that confront victims of ISIS and families of the missing and highlighting the progress that has been made on this issue. As the report shows, it is not only crimes and bodies that have been unearthed in Northeast Syria, but also hope for justice and accountability as well.

Figure 2: *An ISIS checkpoint in the border region between Abu Kamal in Deir Ezzor governorate and al-Qa'im in the Anbar governorate of Iraq. Arrests at checkpoints were often carried out by Islamic Police units. Source: "Wilayat al-Furat," Dabiq 4, 19.*

Section II
Inside the ISIS Web of Disappearance

ISIS developed its detention apparatus as a sprawling *network of small facilities that it could rapidly open and close*, rather than large permanent prisons. *Most facilities were located in urban centers and populated settlements*; this is likely because it was more convenient for ISIS to repurpose public institutions and join adjacent private homes into detention complexes than to build new prisons. *ISIS did not hold individuals in the same place for long periods of time but transferred them frequently*—a fact demonstrated by the haunting reports from survivors of ISIS detention, who said that they were often brought to facilities that were otherwise empty. *Most known detainee transfers occurred within the same city or governorate in Syria*, and transfers across governorates tended to move from the Northwest to the Northeast (the stronghold of ISIS control). SJAC documented some killings that occurred in detention facilities in urban areas, but the *execution of detainees and the subsequent disposal of their bodies took place more often in clandestine and remote sites.*

This section elaborates on these key findings. It begins by describing the organization of the ISIS detention network and maps the 152 facilities that comprised this web. It then describes the system of arbitration through which ISIS decided to transfer, release, or execute detainees. SJAC reviews key trends in ISIS arrests between 2013-2017, explaining why the targets of arrests changed over this period. Missing persons investigators will have to ensure that

their methodologies account for this temporal heterogeneity when trying to predict the fates of individual missing persons.

It is important to note that SJAC does not aspire to provide a comprehensive overview of ISIS crimes, or even crimes committed at detention sites, but is rather focused on identifying patterns in ISIS disappearances to assist missing persons investigations. Much of the documentation analyzed in this section also provides evidence of serious crimes committed within ISIS detention beyond those of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance. Survivors of ISIS detention, regardless of the type of facility they were held in, described torture, solitary confinement, deprivation of food and water, and sexual violence, among other alleged crimes.[2] Such testimony is corroborated by internal ISIS documents: of the dozens of detention orders analyzed, only one mentions explicitly that torture should be avoided; while others suggest that a routine Islamic Court ruling could entail 30 lashes and a 48-hour jailing.[3]

SJAC believes that criminal accountability should be pursued in parallel with missing persons investigations, and all documentation analyzed here is also available to justice mechanisms; some of it has already been shared to support active criminal investigations.

ISIS Prison Locations

Figure 3: ISIS detention facilities that SJAC has documented in Northern Syria; see Appendix 1 for profiles of key sites.

A full list of ISIS prison sites can be found in Appendix 5.

Methodology

SJAC relied on a mix of oral testimony and documentary evidence that SJAC has acquired over the past year. During this time, SJAC conducted 221 interviews with families of the missing, 21 interviews with witnesses or survivors of detention by ISIS, and 12 interviews with former members and insider witnesses of ISIS operations. The names of all interviewees have been changed here to protect their security. SJAC also analyzed 277 internal ISIS documents that were gathered by an independent local activist from within abandoned ISIS administrative offices in Tabqa, Raqqa Governorate. The majority of these internal documents related directly to ISIS arrest and detention patterns. SJAC also reviewed

previous local media reporting and human rights documentation on the ISIS security and judicial apparatus.

The patterns of ISIS arrest and detention presented here partly reflect the location of SJAC personnel and where they conducted interviews. Incidents that occurred in Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, and Hassakeh governorates are better represented than those in other areas of Syria that were under ISIS control (such as Aleppo governorate). SJAC's understanding of patterns of ISIS detention may shift as SJAC and the SMFT expand documentation efforts into other parts of northern Syria.

Types of ISIS Detention Facilities

To date, SJAC has documented 152 sites in northern Syria that ISIS used to detain people between 2013-2017. Although most of these facilities were designed to hold individuals whom ISIS arrested for allegedly violating its laws, some were buildings that served administrative and military functions like tax collection offices and training camps for ISIS members. However, because even these sites also served as holding facilities—even if for a short time—SJAC included them in its list of ISIS detention facilities.

It is important to understand the different types of ISIS detention facilities for at least two reasons. First, the different types officially served distinct purposes and the fate of detainees brought there—whether they were released, transferred, or possibly executed— was sometimes contingent on or tied to this purpose. Second, because different branches of the ISIS security apparatus were responsible

for different types of detention facilities, distinguishing between them will help identify perpetrators of violations. *Based on the information it gathered from local communities, SJAC was able to classify about half of the detention facilities it documented in three basic categories*: Hisba centers, Islamic Police centers, and security prisons. Each of these categories corresponded to distinct wings of the ISIS security apparatus and their jurisdictions over particular issues (such as religious vs. criminal law). There were also facilities that specifically held women and operated independently of—but in coordination with—the main security branches. The remaining detention centers either require more information to be classified or were never affiliated with a particular wing of the ISIS security apparatus. Sometimes the different wings of the ISIS security and judicial apparatus shared facilities, as was the case with an apartment in Raqqa that simultaneously functioned as a Hisba detention center, a residence for ISIS members, and a courtroom used by a Hisba judge.[4]

Hisba Centers

SJAC found Hisba centers to be the most common location of detention facilities, often the first link in a chain of detentions and prison transfers. The Hisba was the police force that enforced the version of *shariʿa* that ISIS developed and fell under the control of Hisba Bureau. It often arrested people for even minor violations of this code (such as smoking or using profanity). Detention in Hisba centers tended to be the shortest in duration compared to other facilities, with families of the missing reporting that their loved ones were held in them for a matter of days or weeks. However, the length of detention

Figure 4: *An ISIS repentance course in Deir Ezzor governorate (Source: "Da'wah and Hisbah in the Islamic State," Dabiq 3, 17). In cases when the Hisba police did not transfer detainees to the Islamic Police or the Security Office, it often sent them to nearby mosques for repentance courses that sometimes amounted to further detention and was the last place some missing persons were reportedly taken.*

in Hisba centers could vary based on events that transpired after the arrest or what ISIS learned about the detainee. In the weeks following Yasin Ahmed's arrest, for example, many of his friends were also arrested and detained at the same location. Upon their release three months later, they reported that Yasin had been accused by ISIS of having visited government-held territory. In 2017, ISIS notified Yasin's family that he had been transferred to a prison in Mayadin that was likely a security prison and hence outside the scope of the Hisba; it was at this point that all news about Yasin ceased.[5]

Internal ISIS documents indicate that each *Hisba center was responsible for a particular geographic area* (e.g., the Western Raqqa Hisba Office), even though they fell under the ultimate authority of the Hisba Bureau. SJAC has documented at least 24 Hisba facilities that ISIS operated across Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, and Hassakeh governorates, as well as several more in the parts of Aleppo governorate that

were under ISIS control. However, there were certainly more Hisba facilities than SJAC has documented, as it was common for there to be at least one Hisba center in each of the larger cities and towns under ISIS control. As described further below, Hisba field officers went out on regular patrols to enforce adherence to ISIS's code of *shariʿa* among residents. According to Qahtan Salloum, a former Hisba officer, the branch where he worked operated intake centers out of highly public buildings that once housed state institutions (e.g., police stations, public clinics, schools) as well as in makeshift facilities in private homes. When individuals were brought to the intake centers, ISIS seized their IDs and other identification documents, promising to return them after the detainee had served whatever sentence was issued. Hisba officers interrogated individuals at the intake centers before determining where to send them next. The intake officers often carried out a discretionary punishment on the spot (usually lashing) before sending detainees to a "repentance" course in ISIS religious ideology under the supervision of the Daʿwi Office. This office was closely tied the Hisba Bureau and generally operated its repentance courses out of local mosques, requiring former fighters in particular to stay at the center in what amounted to further detention.

In some cases, however, Hisba officers could also send detainees to a court for arbitration by a Hisba judge, or to an Islamic Police center or security prison for further interrogation. Transfers to security prisons usually occurred if Hisba officers suspected detainees of being in communication with representatives of the Syrian government, the Coalition, or enemy armed groups like the YPG.[6] As described

below in the section on detainee transfers, SJAC documented cases in which ISIS held security detainees in Hisba centers for the sake of convenience (e.g., to facilitate prisoner swaps). Notably, *ISIS divided roles in the Hisba along national lines*. Whereas those who ran the Hisba intake and detention centers were generally non-Syrian Arabs (sometimes holding a European citizenship), field patrols were more often staffed by Syrian nationals from nearby towns and villages. ISIS affiliates who ran the intake centers determined where to transfer individuals brought to the Hisba intake center (see below).[7]

Islamic Police Centers

The second major type of detention facility that ISIS operated was the Islamic Police center. The Islamic Police was mostly responsible for enforcing the ISIS code of civil and criminal law and settling disputes that arose among residents. Whereas few of the families interviewed mentioned the Islamic Police as being responsible for arrests, several survivors of ISIS detention mentioned the unit in reference to its detention facilities. These facilities also recur throughout internal ISIS documents. SJAC has documented at least eight Islamic Police centers across Raqqa and Deir Ezzor governorates. Like the Hisba centers, the Islamic Police centers were organized geographically: in Raqqa, for example, there were four main branches (one for each quadrant of the city).

Also like the Hisba, the Islamic Police appear to have held individuals for relatively short time periods before determining if they were to be transferred to another facility for longer-term detention. Khalil ʿAzzi was only held for several days in his local Islamic Police center after

Raqqa City Prison Locations

#	Facility	#	Facility	#	Facility
1	Thukna Prison Complex 1-4	12	Raqqa Courthouse Prison	23	Sarawi Auto Shop
2	Children's Hospital	13	North Raqqa Islamic Police Center	24	Sinaʾa Security Prison
3	Maraya Prison	14	Saqiyya Street Hisba	25	al-Kahf
4	Darraʿiyya Hisba	15	Rumayla Interrogation Center	26	Dali Bakery
5	Mafraq al-Juzra Hisba	16	Raqqa Detention Prison	27	Zahrat al-Furate Hotel Hisba
6	Idkhar Islamic Police Center	17	Firdaws Islamic Police Center	28	February 23rd Street Prison
7	ʿAbd al-ʿAziz School Islamic Police Center	18	Northeast Raqqa Islamic Police/Hisba Cluster 1-3	29	Martyrs Church
8	White Park Prison	19	Raqqa Hisba	30	Finance Directorate
9	Jamili Building	20	Rumayla Hisba	31	Raqqa Governorate Building
10	Point 11	21	Agricultural Bank	32	Raqqa Municipality
11	Kahraba' Street Security Prison	22	Garage Prison (DMV Prison)	33	Annunciation Church

someone informed ISIS that he had argued with his son (an ISIS member).[8] Likewise Qasim ʿAli was held for several days at an Islamic Police center after he failed to pay a debt, and was released after a fellow detainee helped him pay it off.[9] An internal 2015 ISIS document from Raqqa shows that the Islamic Police took ten days to finish the interrogation of a detainee, although it does not state the reason for the detention.[10] Sometimes the Islamic Police would transfer detainees from one of its centers to what it described as a formal prison; this occurred frequently in Tabqa.[11] It remains unclear if this prison was a run by the Security Office, or if the Islamic Police operated detention centers that ISIS formally designated as "prisons."

Security Prisons

The third major type of ISIS detention facilities was the security prison run by the Security Office, which handled detainees whom ISIS deemed politically sensitive or a threat to the organization. SJAC has documented 21 security prisons across Aleppo, Raqqa, Hassakeh, and Deir Ezzor governorates. S*ecurity prisons were generally administered by non-Syrian nationals,*

especially in the earlier years of ISIS rule. Detention in security prisons tended to be the longest in duration compared to other detention facilities. For instance, the Security Office typically held former members of rival armed groups for a period of approximately 42-45 days, at which point the ISIS judiciary would decide whether to sentence the detainee to execution or a repentance course. Given the secrecy with which the Security Office worked and the likelihood of death for those whom it detained, security prisons were the most feared of the ISIS detention facilities.[12]

Whereas the Hisba and Islamic Police centers held civilians who had violated ISIS laws, *the Security Office—which was also sometimes referred to as the Security Police or the Military Police—was responsible for dealing with individuals whom ISIS perceived as a security or political threat.* Internal ISIS documents suggest that security prisons often held combatants or members of enemy armed groups, such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), and the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). A memo from the Military Police in Western Tabqa district in 2015, for example, explicitly states that a detainee it was holding was to be moved to an Islamic Police center "because the individual in question is a civilian."[13]

However, it is also certain that security prisons held high-profile civilians such as journalists and political activists, which previous reports classified as political prisoners.[14]

According to Aws Malak, an insider witness to a Security Office branch in Deir Ezzor, security prisons in this governorate specifically held civilian detainees, as did the Point 11 facility in central Raqqa City (also known as the "black stadium"). Such discrepancies may also

Figure 5: The interior of the infamous Point 11 security prison in central Raqqa City.

be explained by the nature of transfers in ISIS detention, as explained below. Furthermore, SJAC found that many Syrian Kurdish civilians were detained at security prisons because they were accused of affiliation with the YPG. Additionally, some civilians were detained in security prisons because they had aroused the suspicion of ISIS during interrogation by another branch of the ISIS security apparatus (e.g., for allegedly collaborating with the Syrian government).

Security prisons were generally housed in clandestine locations, unlike Hisba or Islamic Police centers. Most of the security prisons that SJAC identified were housed in the basements of homes of displaced civilians. These facilities were often installed on a temporary basis and linked to one another by tunnels as ISIS sought to avoid increased Coalition airstrikes in 2016.

There was usually no information formally delivered to families of the missing if their loved one was held in a security prison. Gathering further documentation on the security prisons may be the most important for determining the

fate and whereabouts of many missing persons in Northeast Syria, given that individuals were so rarely seen again after being detained by the Security Office.

Women's Prisons

Although ISIS sometimes held women in the same facilities as men, more commonly it detained women in special prisons of their own managed by the Khansaʾ Brigade. This all-female policing force was likely under the supervision of the regional *wali* and comprised of divisions corresponding to the main branches of the ISIS security apparatus (Hisba, Islamic Police, Security Office). SJAC has documented 21 women's prisons across Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, and Hassakeh governorates. According to a former ISIS affiliate, the Khansaʾ Brigade was at one point bringing all women it arrested in Raqqa governorate to its headquarters at the Zahrat al-Furat Hotel in Raqqa City for initial processing. Those who were accused of violating *shariʿa* were taken either to a facility at the Jawari market or to Martyrs' Church, which housed the Daʿwi Office that oversaw the so-called repentance courses in ISIS religious ideology.[15] If ISIS then required the female detainee to complete a repentance course, they were taken to centers for women "sinners." One missing person whose case SJAC documented, Shezza Salim, was taken to one of these repentance centers in Shadadi and never seen again.[16]

Some women, such as local widows, whom ISIS detained to remarry to its fighters, described relatively comfortable conditions within the *madafa* facilities that ISIS maintained for this purpose (see Appendix 1). Other female detainees like Maysam Karimi—who was kidnapped in either 2014 or 2015 with a group of other Yazidi women from their community

in the Sinjar district of Iraq—were subjected to rape and other forms of physical abuse during the process of their sale to ISIS fighters. Other female Yazidi detainees may have endured similar abuses on the basis of their ethnicity, but SJAC does not have enough information yet to know if this was a trend.[17]

Detainee Transfers

While it has long been known that ISIS moved certain populations across borders, the documentation that SJAC collected for this report sheds new light on the scale and frequency of detainee transfers. Most families of the missing whom SJAC interviewed believe that their loved ones had been moved at least once since their initial detention. Likewise, over half of the survivors of ISIS detention said that they had been transferred between locations at least once. Almost a third of the internal ISIS documents obtained by SJAC concern the transfer of detainees from one branch of the security apparatus to another. ISIS transferred detainees as individuals and in groups, often transferring the same individual several times over years and across hundreds of miles of territory in Northeast Syria. Missing persons investigators will need to understand patterns of transfer in order to predict where individual detainees were taken after the place in which they were last seen. Answering this question for each case will require more data, but through initial analysis, SJAC has already collected significant information on why and how transfers were implemented.

Reasons for Transfers

The longest and most wide-ranging series of transfers that SJAC documented involved detainees whom ISIS reportedly sought to use in prisoner swaps. In

Figure 6: The transfers of the security detainee Asaad Khatib between 2014 and 2017, after ISIS reportedly arrested him for use in a prisoner swap with Kurdish armed forces. Asaad was first arrested on the M4 highway near Qamishli before being taken to security prisons in 1.) Tel Hamis, 2.) Shadadi, 3.) Raqqa, 4.) the border area of Yaʿrubiyya, and back to 5.) Raqqa. Asaad was to be released from Point 11 after completing a repentance course, but the local wali reversed the order and Asaad was last seen just before the Battle of Raqqa was launched in June 2017.

February 2014, for instance, a caravan of more than a dozen busses carrying Kurdish civilians was stopped by ISIS on the M4 highway. According to members of this group whom SJAC interviewed, ISIS separated the men and women at the time of arrest and detained some of the men for 3-5 days in a facility near Tel Abyad. One group was then transferred to detention facilities at the Mansoura Dam, in the town of Tabqa, and then finally to Manbij, where they were held in the basement of a school that ISIS had converted into a courthouse. ISIS reportedly prepared this group for a prisoner swap with the YPG at least two times, although these attempts did not materialize into an exchange.[18] Transfers were complex and long-distance in part because prisoner swaps were dependent on shifting battlefield dynamics, and presumably on negotiations between ISIS and the YPG. Notably, survivors of these transfers, such as Faheem Dallal, said that although they followed such winding and drawn-out routes, upon their release ISIS still instructed them to retrieve their IDs at central security prisons like Point 11 in Raqqa. The fact that *ISIS centralized information about detainees* is significant. ISIS records seized by Coalition forces and the SDF likely contain key information on detainees and transfers and need to be shared with investigators.

Detainee transfers were a routine part of the arbitrations and sentences that the ISIS judicial apparatus issued in collaboration with the security apparatus. Internal ISIS documents indicate that transfers could happen as soon as the day of the arrest and initial detention, or within a few days thereafter.[19] In one case from 2015, a detainee was transferred from an Islamic Police center to a facility ISIS classified as a prison—but then released the very same day.[20] In several instances, SJAC learned of individuals who were detained at a Hisba center and then sent immediately to a nearby court for a ruling on their case. When the Hisba judge found them to have violated its version of *shariʿa*, it then ordered they be taken to a nearby mosque to undergo repentance courses in ISIS religious ideology under the supervision of the Daʿwi Office. Repentance courses were sometimes "closed," with participants unable to leave, and therefore they amounted to further detention.

Even in relatively straightforward criminal proceedings ISIS transferred people multiple times over relatively short periods. In November 2017, for example, Qasim ʿAli was regularly smuggling people out of Deir Ezzor, to help them escape hostilities between ISIS and the SDF. On one such smuggling run, Qasim and two others were captured by ISIS and taken to an Islamic Police center. They were then transferred to another Islamic Police facility, where they were held for four days and subjected to torture before being detained at the courthouse for their two-day trial. Qasim was sentenced to 30 days in prison at an unknown location, although his sentence was soon revised (see below).[21]

The most important transfer decision was to move a detainee to a security prison, from which they often did not reemerge. These decisions were often

made by individual ISIS security personnel, on an ad hoc basis rather than by a court decision. As noted above, those whom Hisba or Islamic Police interrogators accused of collaborating with ISIS enemies were sent to prisons run by the Security Office for further interrogation. This was the case with Marwan Zaher, for example, who was transferred from a Hisba center after he was alleged to have used a cell phone to communicate with the SDF while in detention.[22] Former SAA conscripts or state employees were known to complete repentance courses and yet still be subject to further detention and prosecution— usually at the Islamic State courthouse in the Raqqa Finance Directorate building.[23]

Finally, *ISIS transferred detainees for tactical reasons*. Military pressure and Coalition airstrikes forced ISIS to engage in large-scale detainee transfers on at least several occasions. Ibrahim Arif was among a group of detainees at the military judiciary building in Raqqa, having been arrested with a group of workers at a checkpoint near an entrance to Raqqa City and later transferred to the security prison at the judiciary building. When the Coalition bombed this structure in August 2014, Ibrahim was moved with a group to the Raqqa Municipal Stadium, which subsequently became Point 11 and the main ISIS security prison in Raqqa governorate.[24] When the Coalition bombed this stadium, ISIS moved some detainees to a private villa that was connected by tunnel to the Children's Hospital; new detention cells were then built into the walls of this tunnel. *Many of the security prisons between which ISIS transferred security detainees were located within the same city*, as ISIS sought to preserve hostages for use in prisoner swaps and as human shields while evading Coalition airstrikes.

Directionality of Transfers

In general, *SJAC found that detainee transfers tended to happen more from Hisba to Islamic Police centers within the same city rather than the other way around.*[25] Families reported detention chains in which their loved ones had been transferred by the Hisba to the Islamic Police after detainees were found to have violated a civil or criminal law. These detention chains are corroborated by ISIS internal documents: in 2015, for example, the West Raqqa Hisba office confirmed the transfer of a detainee from its center to the Islamic Police center because "he was wanted by the Islamic Police in relation to a [different] issue."[26] Internal ISIS documents from Tabqa indicate that more transfers occurred between the Hisba, Islamic Police, and Security Office facilities within this city than beyond it; and several documents further delimit the transfer area to the western district of Tabqa. As noted above, *when it came to the transfer of security detainees across governorates within Syria, these tended to move from the Northwest to the Northeast* and areas where ISIS enjoyed greater military control.

Finally, it is *important to reiterate the practice of cross-border detainee transfers under ISIS.* Detainees were transferred in both directions across the Syrian-Iraqi border: Rafii Salameh is believed to have ended up in a prison in Mosul five years after his initial detention in Shadadi, while Maysam Karimi and a group of other Yazidi women were taken from Sinjar for sale to ISIS fighters in Raqqa.[27] These cross-border transfers underline the need for data-sharing and coordination between ISIS missing persons investigators in both Syria and Iraq.

Arrests Under ISIS

For many missing persons, the date and location of their initial arrest may be the last known information about the individual and are often crucial in determining their fate. ISIS arrests took place in a range of settings, including in urban centers in broad daylight, at private homes during targeted night raids, and at checkpoints between different administrative areas of ISIS control. Most arrests that SJAC has documented took place in the heart of major urban areas such as Raqqa City and Shadadi, which is why witnesses were often present.

Who was Arrested and Why?

The *affiliations and backgrounds of individuals whom ISIS arrested shifted over time from an initial focus on military combatants to civilians.*

Initially, as ISIS sought to establish territorial control in northern Syria *in 2013-2014, it primarily arrested and detained those it classified as security detainees.* Ninety-two of the disappearances that SJAC documented date from this period, i.e., these were the years in which the missing persons were last seen. Multiple former FSA fighters whose families SJAC interviewed were arrested by ISIS in this period and forced to undergo a repentance course. A repentance course was one of two possible fates for many former FSA affiliates held as security detainees.[28] While these courses were only supposed to last several months, the families of some FSA fighters never heard from their loved ones again after they were taken away for these courses. *In this period, Syrian Kurdish civilians were also targeted*, as a means of acquiring prisoners for swaps with the YPG and other Kurdish armed

groups. An example of this was the February 2014 arrest of the Kurdish caravan on the M4 highway, mentioned above. *ISIS also carried out a wave of arrests of former SAA conscripts in 2015 and early 2016*, after seizing the last government-held military installations in Raqqa. Civilians accused of hiding these conscripts to protect them from ISIS were also arrested and punished collectively in this period for allegedly collaborating with the Syrian government. The families of several such conscripts were able to make visits to their loved ones for a period of several weeks while they were detained at Point 11. After this point, they lost contact with their loved ones, barring scattered reports that they had been moved to another detention facility.[29]

In 2015-2016, ISIS increasingly arrested civilians with no clear political or military affiliation. This occurred as ISIS began to implement its system of laws and regulations after having consolidated territorial control in Northern Syria. SJAC documented 58 individuals who were last seen in this period, many of whom were arrested for violating the version of *shariʿa* that ISIS enforced. In October 2015, for example, Yasin Ahmed from Raqqa was arrested by a Hisba patrol for smoking cigarettes and subsequently detained on the grounds that he was working with the Syrian government.[30] In June 2016, Rafi Salameh was arrested at a checkpoint near Rasafa south of Raqqa City, reportedly because texts in his mobile phone referenced the Syrian presidential election.[31] In 2015, at least ten women from the town of Markada in Hassakeh governorate were simultaneously arrested in a private home for playing music at a wedding celebration they were holding indoors.[32] Islamic Police arrested civilians who had allegedly started disputes with one another

ISIS Missing Persons by Year

Figure 6: The year in which missing persons documented by SJAC were last seen, which often but not always corresponded to the year in which they were arrested.

and ISIS members. One document from an ISIS facility in Raqqa in 2016, for example, lists the majority of the detainees as being held on charges related to such disputes.[33] *Sometimes the Islamic Police made arrests at the behest of a judicial entities*, as indicated by several memos from the Islamic Court in Tabqa requesting the arrest of particular individuals by the Islamic Police.[34] In at least several cases from this period ISIS arrested minors, including a group of children in Shadadi whom a Hisba unit detained in April 2015 for the purpose of indoctrination and recruitment into ISIS and who then lost all contact with their families.[35] *Internal ISIS documents* also offer evidence of such mass arrests: one memo from 2016 indicates that almost a dozen members of the same family were arrested on the same day and for the same offense.[36]

From 2017 onward, ISIS arrests of civilians increased and became more arbitrary as the organization sought to respond tactically to mounting military pressure from the Coalition. SJAC documented 63 disappearances from this

period. In this period especially, ISIS detained individuals who were trying to flee areas exposed to the fighting. Although ISIS had always closely regulated movement into and out of territories under its control, it began to arrest and detain civilians for longer periods of time, likely with the intention of using them as human shields to protect ISIS facilities from Coalition airstrikes. In May 2017, for example, Majid Abdallah was living in Raqqa City when he was seized by ISIS and used as a human shield in the Badu neighborhood of Raqqa, where numerous graves of civilians and ISIS fighters were created. Majid survived and was then transported to Baghouz, the last ISIS stronghold in Syria to fall to Coalition forces. There he was able to contact his wife with the intention of escaping but was never heard from again.[37] In the same context, SJAC documented several cases of disappearance in which families believed their loved ones to have been killed by Coalition airstrikes on Raqqa in particular. Some of their bodies were never recovered, while others are believed to have been buried by staff at the National Hospital in central Raqqa City, in mass graves established for civilian casualties during this period.[38]

Who Carried Out Arrests?

SJAC's documentation shows that the three main branches of the ISIS security apparatus— the Hisba, the Islamic Police, and the Security Office—all conducted arrests at different frequencies. Although it was sometimes difficult to distinguish one branch from another, SJAC nevertheless found that *the Hisba conducted the most arrests out of any unit*.[39] The official purpose of the Hisba was to go on general patrols and ensure that individuals' conduct in public as well as private spaces conformed to the form of *shariʿa* that ISIS developed

Figure 7: An Islamic Police unit in the border region between Abu Kamal in Deir Ezzor governorate and al-Qaʾim in the Anbar governorate of Iraq. Source: "Wilayat al-Furat," Dabiq 4, 19.

(which included a ban on music and smoking, restrictions on movement during prayer time, dress codes, etc.).

In practice, the remit of Hisba patrols was larger than the regulation of personal conduct. A former ISIS member interviewed by SJAC, Qahtan Salloum, explained that the Hisba office he worked for often received orders from the *wali* (provincial commander) to go to specific areas and detain particular individuals whom ISIS had targeted, presumably for some reason that did not immediately require a raid by the Security Office.[40] The Hisba patrols were also tasked with making public announcements, such as requests for information about individuals who were wanted by ISIS, and sometimes transferring detainees from intake centers to detention centers.

SJAC found through interviews with families of the missing that *the Islamic Police, which was responsible for "ordinary law enforcement and public safety" was involved at the point of arrest in only a handful of cases*.[41] This is corroborated by documents from the Islamic Police in Raqqa governorate, which detail transfers and punishment more than initial arrests. *Additionally, there was a geographic hierarchy*

within the Islamic Police: in the town of Mansura, for example, Islamic Police prosecutors had ordered a detainee to be released but saw this overruled by the Islamic Police in Tabqa.[42] It maintained a particularly strong presence at checkpoints between different areas of ISIS control, and one facility specifically for detainees arrested at checkpoints was established at the Qaraqozat Bridge outside of Manbij. At the checkpoints, ISIS detained especially Kurds and Christian minorities attempting to flee ISIS territory, after which they took them to secret security prisons to retain for possible prisoner swaps.[43]

Finally, *in just a couple of cases, SJAC found evidence suggesting that the Security Office was involved in arrests of individuals.* The relatively low number of arrests suggests that the branch focused on higher-profile targets (e.g., members of rival armed groups), or that it relied on other branches of the ISIS apparatus to conduct initial arrests before transferring detainees to prisons under its control.[44] According to an inside witness at the Security Office whom SJAC interviewed, this branch often conducted raids at night, after having tracked an individual for a long period of time. These investigations were conducted by undercover and masked Security Office affiliates who were not known to the communities living under ISIS control, in contrast to Islamic Police or Hisba officers.[45]

Detainee Executions

It is widely documented that ISIS engaged in extrajudicial killings on a mass scale in Syria. The Raqqa-based SMFT has exhumed hundreds of bodies of people who were likely killed by ISIS in field executions. In promoting these killings as a form of propaganda, ISIS often advertised

their judicial basis and the legal authority that ISIS judges had accorded the organization (e.g. to enforce prescribed *hudud* punishments).[46] SJAC even learned through interviews with families of the missing that ISIS kept careful lists recording the status of politically sensitive detainees who were among the most frequent victims of execution: in such lists, "K" stood for "Kurdish," "Q" for those killed, "M" for government conscripts, "MQ" for executed conscripts, "H" for FSA fighters, and so on.[47]

However, SJAC found limited written documentation explicitly describing the ISIS judicial process that led to the execution of security detainees in particular. This may be attributed partly to the limited sample size of internal ISIS documents that SJAC possesses, and partly to the *ad hoc* way in which ISIS made decisions regarding security detainees: their ultimate fate often turned on the whims of particular judges responsible for issuing sentences.[48] Internal ISIS documents likewise suggest a lack of coordination that existed at times between the judiciary and security apparatus, when it came to adjudicating the cases of its detainees or even determining where they were taken. In a memo from November 2014, for instance, the Islamic Police in Raqqa requested that the local Islamic Court not release detainees before its agents and prosecutors had coordinated with an Islamic Police official.[49] The absence of documentation of detainee killings may also reflect the way in which ISIS organized its judiciary.

As previous studies have described and internal ISIS documents obtained by SJAC corroborate, ISIS operated a court system that had separate branches and judges for violations reported by the Hisba and Islamic Police.[50] Individuals

detained by these wings of the ISIS security apparatus were generally transferred to a separate judicial facility for sentencing. However, at larger detention facilities like the Mayadin Hisba center, ISIS operated its courts out of the same building as the intake center. Documents from ISIS courts sometimes indicate which branch of the judicial apparatus was handing down an execution order. In documents from the the Islamic Court of Tabqa, for example, the local Hisba was listed as the plaintiff in cases where a detainee had been accused of blasphemy.[51] At security prisons, by contrast, judges usually visited these facilities personally to sentence detainees in one or two sessions over the course of several weeks.[52] Such testimony accords with previous reports on ISIS detainees, which suggest that at least one security prison in Deir Ezzor also functioned as a courthouse.[53] A detainee from that security prison/courthouse was allegedly transferred to a facility in Ma'dan to serve the form of retaliatory punishment known as *qisas*, which often entailed execution for security detainees. *Missing persons investigators will have to determine whether executions actually occurred at this and similar detention facilities, or if it was more often that ISIS killed detainees held in security prisons in remote areas to be buried in nearby clandestine grave sites.*

Figure 8:

A death sentence that the Islamic Court of Tabqa issued against an individual likely first detained by the Hisba police.

SJAC found more references to death sentences handed down by ISIS courts and judges in interviews with families of the missing and survivors of ISIS detention. The family of Samir Sadek, for example, told SJAC that Samir had been arrested (likely by the Islamic Police) in March 2014 for smoking near an ISIS checkpoint and then detained somewhere in Raqqa governorate.[54] Samir's friends who were later released from the same facility reported that he had been executed for apostasy, probably after sentencing by a Hisba judge. Numerous families of the missing also referenced the same legal institutions that are known to have overseen extrajudicial killings, such as the Hisba judge who operated out of the Mansura Dam prison in Raqqa governorate. In 2013, this regularly engaged in torture in the same interrogation rooms where he also presided over sham trials and ordered the summary execution of detainees (see Section III for more on the circuit to which the Mansura Dam prison belonged).[55] According to Qahtan Salloum, the former Hisba officer, *women who were sentenced to death were often executed in public at the Naʿim Roundabout in Raqqa City*. Their bodies were then thrown in the Houta gorge north of Raqqa City, a site that is believed to also contain the bodies of FSA, SAA, and YPG fighters killed by ISIS.[56]

Finally, *survivors of ISIS detention whom SJAC interviewed witnessed extra-judicial killings resulting from torture.* Some members of the M4 caravan mentioned above were tortured to death by ISIS in a detention facility in Tel Abyad.[57] While ISISwas generally not forthcoming about the fate of specific detainees, a few families of the missing shared that ISIS authorities told them their loved ones were killed to discourage

them from inquiring (although these claims sometimes turned out to be incorrect). Families of the missing often speculated that their loved ones had been killed, but few were totally certain. The family of Anwar Kamil was an exception, as they know he was executed at Point 11 in Raqqa but do not know the details of the judicial process resulting in his sentence and have been unable to locate his body.[58]

People living under ISIS rule regularly tried to appeal to the different ISIS courts to gain release or leniency for their loved ones. Sometimes this worked, as in the case of Qasim ʿAli, who was released five days into his 30-day sentence after he appealed to the judge at Busayra and explained that he had a sick wife and a child. He was released after being flogged 79 times.[59] Ziyad Matar was sentenced to death by a Hisba judge in Mayadin and sent to Raqqa. There his sentence was evaluated by a more senior ISIS

judicial authority (a so-called "Central Committee," presumably personnel at Point 11), which overturned the ruling and sentenced Ziyad to three years in prison instead of execution.[60]

The relative lack of documentation currently available on specific executions does not mean it is impossible to determine the fates and resting places of those killed. It does require, however, that investigators adopt a forensic approach to determine the larger geographic and temporal circuits through which people were initially arrested and subsequently detained. By combining diverse kinds of documentation, investigators can establish the likelihood that missing persons were then transferred and possibly executed and disposed of at a particular location. The next section describes this process in greater detail and explains how SJAC is gathering the documentation necessary for full forensic investigations.

Figure 9: *Image with what appears to be a calendar scratched on the wall in Raqqa's "Black Stadium."*

Section III
Ways Forward in the Search for the Missing

This section of the report provides an update on how current investigations are utilizing the types of documentation and findings discussed above in order to support the identification of missing persons. While the search process is complex, initial efforts suggest that there is sufficient documentary evidence available in Northeast Syria to allow for the identification of many of the missing, including through the use of networked forensic analysis. Key to forensic work is the Raqqa-based Syrian Missing Persons and Forensic Team (SMFT), which was established as part of the search for the missing in Northeast Syria after the territorial defeat of ISIS. SJAC concludes this section by using satellite imagery of exhumed grave sites to illustrate how SJAC and the SMFT can use documentation to begin identifying the missing through a forensic approach.

Limited Progress

The search for the ISIS missing has been ongoing since the territorial defeat of the organization in 2018 and 2019, and is a story of heroic efforts but limited successes.

Individual families of the missing, supported by Syrian civil society organizations, family associations, and media outlets initially took the lead in this search as local political authorities failed to do so. The AANES has only made sporadic attempts to address the missing persons file. In May 2020, for example, it established an independent "Committee on Detainees and Kidnapped Persons." However, this body inexplicably sought to address missing persons across the country—rather than focus on the areas under its control—and has not taken significant action to date. Similarly, in October 2021, the SDC announced the creation of an "Office for Detained Persons Affairs," yet this office does not appear to be addressing the problems that families routinely face in trying to determine if their loved ones are in SDF custody.

In the absence of support from local authorities, the grassroots search for the missing under ISIS has mostly focused on independent documentation and advocacy efforts. During the period of ISIS control, media activist outlets circulated open-source visual documentation of forcible disappearances by ISIS and cases where civilians went missing during airstrikes by the Global Coalition. With no local governmental authority to turn to, some families of the missing resorted to international advocacy by forming organizations like the Coalition of Families of Those Kidnapped by ISIS. In collaboration with SJAC, families of the missing in Northeast Syria have sought to pressure the U.S. government to facilitate interviews with detained ISIS fighters and share documents seized after the territorial defeat of ISIS.

Little has come of those admirable efforts, and this is representative of the general inattention to the issue of the missing under ISIS on the part of international policymakers. ISIS fighters currently detained in Northeast Syria may have

information that is crucial to the search for the missing, for instance regarding the location of detention centers and sites of extra-judicial killings; yet there has still been no coordinated effort among governments to interrogate these fighters, or repatriate non-Syrian ISIS affiliates who appear to have occupied higher positions of authority within the organization. These fighters and their families languish in SDF-administered prisons and camps, while families of the missing in Northeast Syria are forced to go through *ad hoc*, non-governmental channels for scattered information about their loved ones. The U.S. government as the leading member of the Coalition, along with its local partners in the SDF, have failed to share the ISIS documents that they captured during the liberation of northern Syria with human rights investigators. SJAC has submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to obtain this documentation from the U.S. government, and continues to petition the SDF to share what it has with SJAC and the SMFT.

The bulk of the documentation of forced disappearance by ISIS has, in effect, been done by the SMFT in Raqqa, a short-lived forensic unit of the First Responders Team in Deir Ezzor, and SJAC itself. The first two organizations have gathered significant amounts of data about the missing under ISIS by exhuming thousands of bodies from mass graves and rescuing them from buildings and streets destroyed in the Coalition airstrikes. Although a lack of technical training, stable funding, and local legal frameworks for justice and accountability have long posed challenges to these organizations, the SMFT in particular has the potential to develop into a model of Syrian-led documentation and recovery work. The SMFT is actively working to resolve cases of missing persons in Northeast Syria, and is developing the skills and methodologies that could be the foundation for a missing persons program covering all of Syria.

The Syrian Missing Persons and Forensic Team (SMFT)

History and Background

The SMFT grew out of a division of the Raqqa-based First Responders Team, an organization created by the Raqqa Civil Council (RCC) in 2018 to provide emergency relief services like search and rescue and firefighting. In the aftermath of the battle to liberate Raqqa from ISIS control in October 2017, the local community began to identify mass graves that ISIS had created throughout the city and surrounding area, as well as the locations of bodies trapped under the rubble created by Global Coalition airstrikes and ISIS explosives. At the same time, thousands of displaced families began to return to Raqqa with the hope of reuniting with loved ones who went missing in the period of ISIS control or the siege on Raqqa.[61]

As a result, in January 2018, the RCC worked to create a branch of the FRT to exhume human remains and rebury them in individual graves. The Remains Recovery Branch of the FRT was formally overseen by different committees within the RCC, but in practice operated relatively autonomously. The team began by investigating graves inside Raqqa City and then moved into the surrounding towns and villages of Raqqa governorate. Some of the graves the FRT exhumed were large and well-known ISIS

sites (e.g., Rashid Stadium in central Raqqa City, where 553 bodies were recovered), while others were smaller cemeteries created by civilian communities to bury those killed during the Battle of Raqqa.

Between the establishment of the Remains Recovery Branch in January 2018 and its reorganization as the SMFT in November 2021, the FRT exhumed approximately 6,000 bodies from 28 graves. It attempted to identify some of these bodies based on the knowledge of families and the presence of ID cards or other personal possessions at grave sites. At the time, team members did not have the skills or supplies necessary for a full forensic analysis and identification, and the focus of donors and local communities was to quickly excavate graves and exhume bodies, rather than to conduct the slow, painstaking investigations required for identification. The team did this work in the face of significant obstacles ranging from booby-trapped grave sites—where ISIS systematically laid explosives—to continued political instability in Northeast Syria, including Turkish-led military campaigns. FRT members took on this difficult work without regular pay or psychosocial support.

In the fall of 2019, recognizing the extent of these challenges as well as the potential for concrete progress in the search for the missing in Northeast Syria, SJAC began to support the FRT's Remains Recovery Branch while developing a plan for its long-term reorganization and independence. A full assessment of the FRT's early work can be found in SJAC's prior report, 'Searching for Missing Persons in Syria: Assessment & Recommendations for the First Responders' Team.'

Figure 10: *map of all grave sites excavated by the SMFT. A full list of exhumed gravesites can be found in Appendix 4.*

Launch of the SMFT
In November 2021, following an in-person forensic training in Erbil with the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (EAAF), the FRT re-launched as the Syrian Missing Persons and Forensic Team (SMFT) and announced its independence from the wider FRT and the RCC. This new status allows the SMFT to operate as a politically neutral Syrian civil society organization, dedicated to the search for the missing.

As part of the re-launch, the SMFT was reorganized into a series of specialized sub-teams, allowing its 43 members to develop specialized skills in exhumation, investigations, analysis, database management, media engagement, and family outreach. The full team is continuing to receive extensive training and support from SJAC, the EAAF, and a variety of other partners with expertise in areas including demining and psychological first aid. In order to focus on these trainings and contextual investigations, the SMFT has paused the opening of graves that are not at risk.

Next Steps and a Forensic Approach to Investigations

SJAC and the SMFT are now moving forward with the next phase of investigations. As noted above, of the approximately 12,000 people who went missing in northern Syria during the period of ISIS control, the SMFT has recovered around 6,000 bodies; only a minority of these appear to have been victims of ISIS execution. There are likely dozens of detention facilities and grave sites that have yet to be discovered. In order to identify individual detainees, SJAC and the SMFT will have to narrow the range of possible identifications at any given grave site. The preliminary analysis in Section II of this report is the first step in this process, as it builds the contextual understanding necessary to predict the arrest, transfers, and ultimate fates of individual detainees. By identifying relevant clusters of disappearances and circuits of detention centers and then linking individuals belonging to these clusters based on shared attributes (e.g., political affiliation, place of residence, date of arrest, etc.), SJAC can utilize solved cases to build hypotheses

regarding unsolved cases with shared attributes. Although the statistical tools that can be used generate more sophisticated clusters and links fall beyond the scope of this report, the basic conclusion of this networked forensic approach is that individuals sharing attributes in the same cluster of disappearance often share the final destination.[62] The next and last part of this section uses satellite imagery of a mass grave excavated by the SMFT in Raqqa governorate to illustrate the forensic approach that SJAC and the SMFT are using to search for the missing.

A Circuit of Detention, Execution, and Burial

As described above, the different wings of the ISIS security apparatus and the detention facilities they operated were organized geographically. According to ISIS documents from the city of Tabqa in Raqqa governorate, for instance, detainees were primarily moved within



Figure 11: *The Mansura Dam prison, west of Raqqa City, and the grave site at Western Salhabiyya to which it was connected in a circuit of detention, execution, and burial.*

A full list of ISIS prisons sites can be found in Appendix 5.

Figure 11: The Mansura Dam, where ISIS operated a detention facility in 2013-2014.

the city and among nearby towns like Mansura. ISIS units in Tabqa likely commanded authority over those in Mansura, as evidenced by one memo from November 2014 in which the Tabqa Security Office requested that the Islamic Police in Mansura transfer a detainee to the Security Office because the individual was "wanted by the Kurds."[63] Here the Security Office likely sought to secure a detainee for a possible prisoner swap with Kurdish forces. The detainee may have been taken to one of the two security prisons that ISIS was operating in Tabqa City at this point in time.

However, it is also possible that this detainee was transferred to another, closer security facility: the Mansura Dam Prison. This facility was particularly active in 2013-2014, during which time ISIS installed detention cells for solitary confinement in and around the dam's outdoor equipment storage space. SJAC documented several cases of missing persons who were last seen at this prison. According to the testimony of individuals held at this facility for several weeks in August 2013, the prison held Kurdish detainees from Kobani; this suggests that ISIS used at least part of it as a security prison. However, it may have also been the case that Islamic Police transferred detainees to Mansura

Dam, as with one teenager sentenced to flogging for the alleged theft of a motorcycle. Interrogations, trials, and punishment all reportedly took place here, under a notoriously vicious judge. Individuals held at this facility were said to have been executed by ISIS on apostasy charges in towns and villages throughout Raqqa Governorate.[64] However, field documentation and satellite imagery analysis suggests a different destination for those sentenced to death at the Mansura Dam prison. It is also likely that they were killed at, or close to the nearby Western Salhabiyya mass grave,which ISIS opened at the very same time as it was operating the Mansura Dam Prison. The SMFT excavated this site between October 2019 and April 2020, exhuming 158 bodies. All of these bodies bore the signs of ISIS field executions, and many of the individuals had been beheaded. *The SMFT has identified at least one of the bodies exhumed at Western Salhabiyya as that of an individual who was reportedly detained at the Mansura Dam prison.* Local residents who happened to be near the site said that they personally observed a nighttime execution and burial of two individuals at a particular part of the grave site. The SMFT subsequently located the area in question and exhumed the remains of the two individuals mentioned.

According to SJAC's partners at the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), which analyzed multi-temporal imagery from a dozen grave sites in Raqqa governorate, the Western Salhabiyya site was likely opened between June 2013 and December 2014. As is visible in Figure 10, in June 2013, the hill at the center of the site was surrounded by agricultural fields. There were no signs of recent digging although several dump trucks and a temporary structure were observed to the

west of the site. Images from a year later showed signs that the terrain had been modified, with five mounds having appeared on the hill and piles of what looked like sand or gravel visible west of the hill. By January 2015, the hill was marked by a series of earthworks and trenches that are characteristic of ISIS burial practices. The area west of the hill, where dump trucks and the sand piles had been located, were graded flat. It therefore appears that ISIS dug most of the graves at the Western Salhabiyya grave between June and December 2014.

More documentation is needed at this point, both to determine who else may have been buried at Western Salhabiyya and to generate patterns that are statistically meaningful and adequate to the scope of ISIS disappearances. To know who ended up in the Western Salhabiyya mass grave specifically, it is necessary to conduct more interviews with local residents who were present during the six-month period in which most individual graves were apparently created. Oral testimony and written documentation from facilities like the Mansura Dam Prison can clarify the extent of the circuit that linked these two sites. The SJAC missing persons database can indicate if certain individuals were detained at the prison during the period in question, and thus if it is appropriate to compare biological samples of relatives of those individuals with samples that the SMFT has collected from Western Salhabiyya.

SJAC and the SMFT must gather much more information about clusters of disappearances and detention circuits throughout northern Syria to establish statistically the probability that individuals with shared attributes ended up at the same place. The preliminary forensic analysis presented here, however, gives a preview of the kind of investigations that SJAC and the SMFT can pursue based on the documentation they have collected.

Figure 13: *The grave site at Western Salhabiyya between June 2014 and January 2015, with trenches of graves gradually appearing on the hill on the right-hand side. Source: AAAS/ Human Rights Center, University of Dayton.*

The SMFT excavates a mock grave during a training in Erbil with the EAAF

The SMFT in a Wider Context of Forensic Investigation

The growth of the SMFT fits into a wider trend in the use of forensic methods to investigate human rights violations. This interdisciplinary approach, which entails using archaeological and anthropological methods to investigate disappearances and exhume grave sites, was first applied in human rights investigations in the 1970s. In 1984 and 1990s, a group of anthropologists and archaeologists in Argentina, in collaboration with the American anthropologist Clyde Snow, created the EAAF in order to apply their skills to a human rights context. The EAAF represents one of the earliest examples of this application as they unearthed gravesites containing the bodies of civilians who were disappeared in Argentina's Dirty War (1973-1984).

Since that time, similar locally-led teams have developed around the world, relying on organizations like EAAF for training and initial support. A cluster of forensics organizations developed in Latin America, but they have also sprung up further afield.[65] For example,

the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMPC) was established in April of 1981, through an agreement between Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus. CMPC spent the next twenty years conducting investigations to determine the fate of the missing and develop a comprehensive list of those who disappeared. In 2006, CMPC began excavating and exhuming graves on the island, while receiving forensic training from the EAAF. Since 2008, the CMP forensic team has operated with ten sub-teams that each pursue the same five-stage approach, which involves investigation, excavation, anthropological analysis, identification, and remains returns. CMP has exhumed 1,179 bodies and identified 1022 individuals, returning the remains to families and providing them with psycho-social support.[66]

These examples demonstrate that the model of a locally-led team trained by experts from abroad and focused specifically on missing persons is increasingly common and historically successful.

Section IV
Conclusions and Recommendations

The missing persons file has been one of the most protracted and painful dimensions of the Syrian conflict. Tens of thousands of individuals remain missing in government-held territory—with many likely in detention by the Syrian government—and thousands more in Northeast Syria, having disappeared during the period of ISIS rule. Their long-term disappearance and the uncertainty regarding their fate and whereabouts have had serious emotional and material consequences for families of the missing. Families are unable to know the fate of missing relatives, fully grieve what may be their loss of their loved ones, and hold out hope for post-conflict justice and reconciliation processes.

Thus far, an unfavorable political and legal landscape has perpetuated this situation and obstructed progress at the highest levels of international engagement around the Syrian conflict. Nevertheless, as this report demonstrates, there remain significant opportunities in Northeast Syria, both to make immediate progress in the search for the missing under ISIS and to lay the groundwork for a country-wide missing persons initiative in Syria. The documentation that SJAC has collected in Northeast Syria over the past year revealed basic patterns of ISIS arrests, detention, and extra-judicial killings that can support identification processes. When combined with the work of the SMFT, these efforts represent the most significant progress to date in the search for the

missing. With support from SJAC and outside experts like the EAAF, the SMFT have begun to address the technical and organizational obstacles that had previously hindered its efforts to identify the thousands of bodies it has exhumed in Northeast Syria.

However, the search for those who went missing under ISIS is a long-term process that will require sustained support from and coordination between multiple stakeholders. As ISIS threatens to re-emerge in Syria, it is more urgent than ever that stakeholders support local efforts in the Northeast, which will enable meaningful justice for ISIS victims and accountability for perpetrators. SJAC has therefore targeted its recommendations to different stakeholders, as follows:

Autonomous Administration and Local Authorities in Northeast Syria

- Allow ICRC access to all SDF detention facilities, and allow communication between families and their detained loved ones. To date, thousands of families in Northeast Syria have been unable to determine whether their loved ones are in SDF detention. This access should come alongside wider release of information regarding the nationality of alleged ISIS fighters held in SDF facilities.

- Continue to support the SMFT by granting access to gravesites and laboratory facilities and facilitating access for outside documentation and forensics experts like SJAC and EAAF to train the SMFT.

- Authorize the expansion of the SMFT beyond Raqqa governorate, beginning with Deir Ezzor governorate where it can pick up where previous exhumation efforts stalled.

- Grant SJAC access to ISIS fighters detained in SDF facilities, for the purpose of collecting documentation relevant to the search for the missing.

- Share internal ISIS records captured during the liberation of areas of Northeast Syria from ISIS control for the purpose of forensic analysis.

- Reinvest in previous efforts to establish an office for missing persons affairs that can support the SMFT by referring families seeking to report the disappearance of loved ones. The AANES should ensure these offices receive adequate funding and training.

The U.S. Government and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS

- Share internal ISIS documents captured during the liberation of Northeast Syria with SJAC and the SMFT, for the purpose of determining the possible locations of the missing. SJAC has submitted FOIA requests for these documents, and is awaiting a response, specifically from U.S. Central Command.

- Support SDF allies in allowing access to detained ISIS fighters for human rights interviews.

- Establish an amends program in Northeast Syria—along the lines SJAC has **proposed**—to provide targeted and community support to those who were injured or lost a loved one in Coalition airstrikes. Some families whom SJAC interviewed believed that their loved ones disappeared during a Coalition airstrike. Although the U.S. admits responsibility for deaths, injuries, and property damage, it has made no amends to victims.

International Justice Actors

- *International Impartial and Independent Mechanism on Syria (IIIM)/International Prosecutors*: institute bilateral data sharing agreements with organizations investigating missing persons, so that relevant documentation can be shared and effectively support both criminal and truth-seeking processes.

- *Prosecutors pursuing ISIS crimes*: coordinate with SJAC to ensure that ISIS perpetrators are questioned regarding any knowledge of ISIS detention systems and victims.

- *UNITAD and KRG Commission to Investigate and Gather Evidence*: continue to coordinate investigations between Syria and Iraq through bilateral data sharing with SJAC and the SMFT, and grow such efforts as investigations proceed (e.g., by sharing information on victims of enforced disappearance, providing access to ISIS perpetrators detained across the border, and establishing a joint Syria-Iraq DNA database).

International community

- Provide financial support for the SMFT to allow for continued training and capacity building.

- Support the ICRC or other organizations with expertise in psychosocial support in providing psychosocial accompaniment programs to families of the missing in Northeast Syria. Support for families within the country is currently quite limited, but the ICRC has had success in working with Syrian communities in neighboring countries.

- Repatriate foreign nationals currently held in SDF prisons for prosecution in their home countries and provide financial and capacity support to the AANES to ensure that other alleged ISIS fighters receive fair trials.

- *UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights/ Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic*: integrate the work of SJAC and SMFT into ongoing UN discussions around a new mechanism dedicated specifically to the detainees and missing persons file. These discussions should focus on opportunities for concrete progress on the ground in reuniting families with missing loved ones.

Figure 14: *Building in Raqqa destoryed during the fight against ISIS. Image taken 2021.*

Appendix 1:
Detention Facility Profiles

Figure 15: *Makeshift Prison Cells in Point 11 Prison*

Point 11 (Raqqa Governorate):

Point 11 was the most prominent of all security prisons that SJAC documented for this report, and the military stronghold of ISIS and its central security facility in Raqqa. It was also known as the municipal stadium or "the Black Stadium." Numerous civilians who had initially been arrested by the Hisba or Islamic Police on non-security charges were later seen at Point 11. Several alleged PYG members and Syrian Kurdish journalists who had been detained for the purpose of prisoner swaps with the YPG were eventually moved to Point 11. However, Point 11 also housed different kinds of detention facilities—not all of which were for security detainees—within the same complex. The fact that it housed Islamic Police and Hisba detainees is one reason why it was the most common detention facility that SJAC documented for this report.

Mayadin Prison Complex (Deir Ezzor Governorate):

ISIS assembled this complex of detention facilities by joining houses on the same street in the city of Mayadin. The smallest facility held Hisba detainees, while the larger facilities were reserved for general detention and judicial arbitrations that often ended with execution orders. Missing persons whose disappearance SJAC documented and who were last seen at this prison complex included former FSA and YPG fighters, as well as civilians initially detained by the Hisba but then accused of collaboration with the Syrian government.

Shadadi *Madafa* (Hassakeh Governorate)

This facility was the most prominent of the *madafa*s in which ISIS housed women whom it intended to re-marry to ISIS fighters, and which have received minimal media coverage compared to other detention facilities. Women detained here included widows, pregnant mothers, and Yazidi women kidnapped from Iraq. Hence, although *madafa*s did not hold individuals who had violated any ISIS law, people were still detained in them arbitrarily and in several cases disappeared after having been taken to the Shadadi *madafa* specifically.

Appendix 2:
ISIS Detention Facilities by Governorate

Deir Ezzor Prison Map

Created with Datawrapper

Aleppo Governorate

© OpenStreetMap contributors

Hasakeh Prison Map

Created with Datawrapper

Note: these maps do not indicate the location of all detention facilities that SJAC has documented. SJAC discovered clusters of facilities in the towns and villages of Hajin, Kasra, and Ghranij in Deir Ezzor governorate that could not be included for reasons of space, but which readers can view online at the **Truth After ISIS Website**

A map of detention facilities located in Raqqa can be found on page eight. A full list of ISIS prisons sites can be found in Appendix 5.

Appendix 3:
Grave Site Satellite Imagery Analysis

Rashid Grave

This site is located near the National Hospital in central Raqqa. The SMFT excavated a grave at this site in April-June 2019 and exhumed the bodies of 553 individuals. The majority of the bodies the SMFT recovered appear to have been civilians killed in military operations, including men, women, and children. Others appear to have died in the hospital, as indicated by the fact that some of the bodies were in body bags that belonged to the National Hospital. Some of these people may have been ISIS victims who were slain at the hospital. Finally, the grave also included the remains of fighters who may have belonged to ISIS and who were unable to be buried in the city's major cemeteries owing to the siege. The image below shows the vicinity of Rashid Grave in May 2017, with a red polygon representing area of landscape in which significant changes had occurred in the previous two months. The site was an open space before March 2017, yet by May this open space has changed to the trench-like landscape that characterized ISIS grave sites. These trenches remained visible until July 2018, after which they gradually disappeared. Multi-temporal satellite imagery analysis suggests that the grave site was established between March and May 2017 but ceased to be in use by May 2018.

Rashid grave, May 2017.
Source: AAAS/ Human Rights Center, University of Dayton

Taj Grave

This site is located in Sector 5 of Raqqa City, south of the city zoo. The SMFT excavated the grave at this site in June-July 2019 and exhumed the bodies of 402 individuals. Most of the bodies are believed to be women and children who were killed by Coalition airstrikes. The grave also contained the bodies of civilians who died at the National Hospital and ISIS fighters who could not be buried outside the city, as would have been normal, due to the siege on Raqqa in 2017. In the image to the right, from May 2017, a red polygon indicates the area that saw landscape change and a blue triangle represents a tall building in the vicinity that had been demolished by February 2017. The trenches which covered the site in the image to the right had begun to be dug between March and May 2017, but began to disappear after July 2018.

Taj Grave, February 2017
Source: AAAS/ Human Rights Center, University of Dayton

Taj Grave, May 2017
Source: AAAS/ Human Rights Center, University of Dayton

Appendix 4:
Graves Exhumed by the SMFT

Graves Created by ISIS						
Grave	**Exhumation start date**	**Exhumation end date**	**Location**	**Number of exhumed bodies**	**Coordinates**	**Description**
Panorama mass grave	2/12/19	1/10/19	In Panorama Park, north of the new bridge	793	N 35.940424 E 38.989925	As it had been a dedicated cemetary before the period of ISIS rule, all of the bodies had been buried in an orderly and proper manner (with tombstones, shrouds, etc.). Two families of ISIS members said that they were there when their sons were buried in the cemetery. Women in the family tried to visit the graves, but ISIS would only let the mother visit once and then refused visits altogether.
Fkheikha grave	1/20/19	6/9/19	In agricultural land located south of Raqqa	673	N: 35.54475 E: 38.58482	Most of the bodies were of ISIS members and had been buried in an orderly and proper manner.
Al-Talai Camp grave	6/9/19	9/18/19	In agricultural land in the former Al-Talai camp, south of Raqqa	815	N: 35.54475 E: 38.58482	Contained the bodies of ISIS members who had been buried in an orderly and proper manner, as well as civilians killed en masse in field executions while wearing orange uniforms.
Jabal al-Shamiya grave	10/6/19	10/20/19	South of the city, at the Jabal a-Shamiya dumpsites	42	N 35.885297 E38.972515	All of the bodies were of civilians buried en masse after having been killed in field executions while wearing orange uniforms.
Western Salhabiya grave	10/30/19	4/9/20	West of Raqqa, in the town of Western Salhabiyya	137	N 35.940012 E 38.7491220	All of the bodies were from field executions and had been decapitated, with only heads remaining in some cases.
Maqla grave	11/5/19	Work ongoing	Southwest of Raqqa, in a quarry in Jabal al-Shamiya	46	N 35.868030 E 38.925927	**All of the bodies were from field excutions that are thought to have occurred at the same place as al-Maqla camp, which according to the local community was a training camp for ISIS fighters and a prison run by ISIS.**
Tell Zeidan grave	4/13/20	Work ongoing	East of Raqqa, near al-Hamrat in the area of Tel Zeidan	234	N 35.9608280 E 39.1058550	All of the bodies were buried en masse after field executions and are thought to have been soldiers in the Syrian army, as they were all young men wearing the army uniform.

Graves Potentially Containing ISIS Victims						
Grave	**Exhumation start date**	**Exhumation end date**	**Location**	**Number of exhumed bodies**	**Coordinates**	**Description**
Al-Taj mass grave	6/21/19	7/26/19	South of the zoo in Sector Number 5, on the outskirts of Raqqa	402	N 35.938398 E 39.010829	Most of the exhumed bodies were men, women and children killed in military operations in the city. Some of the bodies were in body bags that belonged to the National Hospital in Raqqa, indicating that some may have died at the hospital. Some of the bodies may not have been buried in the main cemeteries outside the city due to the siege.
Al-Rashid mass grave	4/17/18	6/9/18	In the Al-Rashid stadium, east of the courthouse, in Sector Number 8 in Raqqa	553	N 35.952234 E 39.007695	Located next to the National Hospital. Most of the bodies were civilians (men, women and children) who were killed in military operations in the city, although some may have died at the hospital since some of the bodies were in body bags that belong to the National Hospital in Raqqa. The grave also contained some bodies of soldiers who were not buried in the main cemeteries outside the city due to the siege.
Hattash grave	8/13/20	9/19/20	Approximately 45 km west of Raqqa City	45	N 36.06156 E 39.0105.0	All of the bodies were soldiers in the Syrian army carrying military IDs or dogtags, having been killed in field executions and armed clashes

Grave	Exhumation start date	Exhumation end date	Location	Number of exhumed bodies	Coordinates	Description
Firusiyya grave	8/24/20	9/20/20	An agricultural area 5km west of Raqqa City	25	N 35.967538 E 38.9708180	Most of the bodies were young women killed in field executions and beheaded, in addition to several male individuals; notably, the women were wearing the clothes typical of rural women, which is significant because in 2014, a group of about 25 women in the area who had been working the seasonal cotton harvest were reported as disappeared, at the same time, there were rumors in Raqqa of a mass kidnapping of 20-25 women by ISIS
Hajjana grave	9/10/21	9/19/21	Approximately 200m west of Firusiyya grave	7	N 35.963693 E 38.975543	The bodies at this site were a mix of Syrian army soldiers and FSA fighters killed in clashes, as well as several women; there are several other graves nearby, but the SMFT is unable to access them due to the presence of Coalition military installations in the area

Graves Created by Local Communities

Grave	Exhumation start date	Exhumation end date	Location	Number of exhumed bodies	Coordinates	Description
Old Mosque grave	8/26/19	9/16/19	North of February 23rd Street, next to the old mosque in Sector Number 3, in Raqqa	94	N35.952019 E 39.020883	All of the bodies were civilians who were killed as a result of military oprations and during the siege of the city.
Grave in the house of Ahmad al-Shehabi, in the Bedouin Quarter	7/30/18	8/2/18	South of the yellow warehouse in a lane in the Bedouin Quarter in Sector Number 7, in Raqqa	23	N 35.960181 E 39.008832	All of the bodies were civilians and soldiers killed as a result of military oprations and during the siege of the city.
Grave at the Najjareen neighborhood park	8/1/18	8/5/18	South of the White Park in the Al-Nahda neighborhood, in Sector Number 9 in Raqqa	27	N 35.959312 E 38.999811	All of the bodies were civilians killed as a result of military oprations and during the siege of the city.
Grave in the house of Fayyad al-Akkari, in the Bedouin Quarter	7/3/18	7/9/18	South of the yellow warehouse in a lane in the Bedouin Quarter in Sector Number 7, in Raqqa	41	N 35.960173 E 39.008677	All of the bodies were civilians and soldiers killed as a result of military oprations and during the siege of the city.
White Park grave	3/14/18	6/12/18	Inside White Park in the Al-Nahda neighborhood, in Sector Number 9 in Raqqa	33	N 35.960535 E 38.99767	All of the bodies were civilians and soldiers killed as a result of military oprations and during the siege of the city.
Grave in a neighborhood park in the Bedouin Quarter	6/15/18	6/18/18	In the park east of the al-Hawary School, in the Bedouin Quarter in Sector Number 7 in Raqqa	14	N 35.962673 E 39.004007	All of the bodies were civilians and soldiers who were killed as a result of military oprations and during the siege of the city.
Children's playground grave	4/16/18	9/20/19	In the park in the al-Firdous neighborhood in Sector Number 8 in Raqqa	5	N 35.953835 E 39.00645	All of the bodies were civilians killed as a result of military oprations and during the siege of the city.
Grave in al-Nahda neighborhood park	6/14/18	12/18/18	In the garden next to the Jawad Anzour School, in Sector Number 10 in Raqqa	19	N 35.956064 E 38.995174	All of the bodies were civilians and soldiers killed as a result of military oprations and during the siege of the city.
Grave in the triangular park at al-Jazra Junction	12/12/19	12/13/19	In the park opposite the Bilal Mosque, east of al-Jazra Junction in Sector Number 12 in Raqqa	7	N 35.953613 E 38.985678	All of the bodies were civilians who were killed as a result of military operations and during the siege of the city.
Grave in a neighborhood park in the Bedouin Quarter	12/15/18	12/19/18	In the park west of the Al-Shuhada Mosque, opposite al-Bayan chicken market, in Sector Number 7 in Raqqa	12	N 35.963639 E 39.003227	All of the bodies were civilians killed as a result of military operations and during the siege of the city.
Grave in a residential house in the Bedouin Quarter	8/27/19	9/11/19	Inside a traditional house belonging to Ali al-Dakal, west of the yellow warehouse in the Bedouin Quarter	21	N 35.963689 E 39.003237	All of the bodies were civilians and soldiers killed as a result of military oprations and during the siege of the city.

Kasra Afnan grave	9/21/19	10/5/19	South of the city on the main road	40	N 35.54407 E39.00582	All of the bodies were civilians killed as a result of military oprations.
Kasra Faraj grave	9/24/19	9/30/19	Southwest of Raqqa, in al-Maqs Park on the main Aleppo road	15	N 35.906127 E38.992093	All of the bodies were civilians and soldiers killed as a result of military oprations.
Al-Mansoura School grave	10/21/19	10/23/19	South of the town of Mansoura, southwest of Raqqa	18	N 35.816221 E38.756890	All of the bodies were of civilians who, according to people present during the burial process, were killed in the 2017 bombing of al-Badiya school
Al-Wadyan grave	3/28/19	3/30/20	West of Raqqa, in the town of al-Wadyan	8	N 35.8425 E 38.721546	All of the bodies were of soldiers killed during military operations (they had been wearing the uniform of the Syrian army)
Hajjana grave	9/10/21	9/19/21	Approximately 200m west of Firusiyya grave	7	N 35.963693 E 38.975543	The bodies at this site were a mix of Syrian army soldiers and FSA fighters killed in clashes, as well as several women; there are several other graves nearby, but the SMFT is unable to access them due to the presence of Coalition military installations in the area
Farhaniyya grave	9/1/20	9/13/20	Near Tel Abyad	15	N 36.34255575 E 38.8414238	All of the bodies at this site were Syrian army soldiers killed in clashes with the FSA.

Appendix 5:
ISIS Prison Locations

Raqqa				
Prison name (EN)	**Prison type (EN)**	**Location**	**Misc. Info**	**Location (EN)**
Thukna Prison Complex 1-4	Misc.	35.94707966902373 N, 39.00852058895788 E	One of four private houses on the same street in which ISIS detained civilians	**Opposite Banque BEMO - Thukna neighborhood - Raqqa City**
Children's Hospital	Security	35.944009 N, 39.004471 E	A basement in the Children's Hospital that was still under construction when ISIS began to use it as a prison in early 2016; some detainees had been sentenced to death and others allegedly were later taken by SDF forces to an undisclosed location; a new grave was recently discovered here	**Raqqa city center - Raqqa**
Maraya Prison	Security	35.948744 N 39.005866 E	A women's athletic club that ISIS used as a security prison in 2017	**Thukna neighborhood - Raqqa City**
Darraʿiyya Hisba	Hisba	35.94168533084046, 38.99281047994431	The first hisba center opened by ISIS in Raqqa; the Martyrs' Church Prison was connected to it	**Environment Directorate building - Darraʿiyya neighborhood - western Raqqa City**
Mafraq al-Juzra Hisba	Hisba	35.953496 N 38.980321 E	A civilian home that had been converted into a hisba center for the western area of Raqqa	**Mafraq al-Juzra neigbhorhood - Raqqa City**
Idkhar Islamic Police Center	Islamic Police	35.954951 N, 38.988761 E	A house that had belonged to a Kurdish family who fled Raqqa and which ISIS then seized	**Idkhar neighborhood - Raqqa City**
ʿAbd al-ʿAziz School Islamic Police Center	Islamic Police	35.957087 N, 38.986213 E	A high school that ISIS converted into a prison in 2016	**Neighborhood of ʿUmar bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz School - Raqqa City**
White Park Prison	Misc.	35.962472 N, 38.996667 E		**White Park - central Raqqa City**
Jamili Building	Misc.	35.95763222391329 N 39.00147581639249 E		**Beneath the Jamili building - central Raqqa City**
Point 11	Misc.	35.95744722369262 N, 39.00605346044566 E	Originally the municipal stadium in which Point 11 was housed was only a headquarters for ISIS; the western part of the underground space of the stadium (opposite Baj'a Park) was converted into a prison and named Point 11; it housed dozens of group and single-person cells, rooms for torture where chains were suspended from the ceiling; there were also rooms for provisioning the facility, an archive related to detainees (including their pictures); most of the interrogators and wardens were Raqqa natives and not foreign nationals	**Municipal stadium - Raqqa City**
Kahraba' Street Security Prison	Security	35.960892 N, 39.011627 E	Located in what was once a private four-story house, with the basement reserved for torture and cells and offices on the first floor reserved for security detainees	**Kahraba' Street - next to Muʿamiri School - Raqqa City**
Raqqa Courthouse Prison	Misc.	35.959843 N 39.011443 E	In 2015, after the expulsion of most Kurds from Raqqa, ISIS seized the home of a Kurdish resident and converted it into a prison serving the ISIS court; detainees awaiting trial were held here; airstrikes targeted the perimeter of the building in 2016 and destroyed part of it, with some of the detainees escaping during the airstrike.	**Near Bozan Station - Train Street - Raqqa City**
North Raqqa Islamic Police Center	Islamic Police	35.964465, 39.019823	A facility that the Islamic Police used to hold detainees temporarily before their transfer to courthouses	**Next to the Silos Bridge - Raqqa City**
Saqiyya Street Hisba	Hisba	35.962597, 39.022530	Housed in what was once a private home; the ground level of the building comprised of cells and offices	**Saqiyya Street - Rumayla neigbhorhood - Raqqa City**
Rumayla Interrogation Center	Misc.	35.962547 N 39.022486 E	A center for investigation and interrogation that ISIS operated out of a two-story house belonging to a Kurdish resident who was displaced from the property; the first story contained offices and the second story cells/dormitories where various kinds of detainees were held both for religious and criminal infractions - before they were distributed among hisba and security prisons	**Rumayla neighborhood - Raqqa City**
Raqqa Detention Prison	Misc.	35.9626252 N 39.0231827	Housed in a home belonging to civilian Kurdish residents whom ISIS expelled before taking the house as a prison; at one point, it was bombed and then rebuilt	**Firdaws neighborhood - Raqqa City**
Firdaws Islamic Police Center	Islamic Police	35.9623994 N 39.0264295 E	Housed in a home belonging to civilian Kurdish residents whom ISIS expelled, before taking the house as a prison; at one point, it was bombed and then rebuilt.	**Firdaws neighborhood - Raqqa city**
Northeast Raqqa Islamic Police/Hisba Cluster 1	Islamic Police/Hisba	35.960413, 39.024192	A cluster of detention facilities that ISIS established in a series of adjacent homes of Kurdish residents whom it had expelled. At one point, these houses had been bombed and rebuilt, with ISIS members moving between them through holes that they had opened in the walls of the structures.	**Rumayla neighborhood - Raqqa City**
Northeast Raqqa Islamic Police/Hisba Cluster 2	Islamic Police/Hisba	35.9604184 N 39.0241416 E	A cluster of detention facilities that ISIS established in a series of adjacent homes of Kurdish residents whom it had expelled. At one point, these houses had been bombed and rebuilt, with ISIS members moving between them through holes that they had opened in the walls of the structures.	**Firdaws neighborhood - Raqqa city**

Northeast Raqqa Islamic Police/Hisba Cluster 3	Islamic Police/Hisba	35.960376 N, 39.024182 E	A cluster of detention facilities that ISIS established in a series of adjacent homes of Kurdish residents whom it had expelled. At one point, these houses had been bombed and rebuilt, with ISIS members moving between them through holes that they had opened in the walls of the structures. This particular house was a two-story structure, with the first story converted into offices and the upper story into detention cells.	Raqqa City
Raqqa Hisba	Hisba	35.961488 N 39.032193 E	A large traditional Arab courtyard house that belonged to a Kurdish resident who was displaced from the property; it was then converted into a hisba center	Raqqa City
Rumayla Hisba	Hisba	35.9609872 N 39.0319589 E	Housed in a home belonging to civilian Kurdish residents whom ISIS expelled, before taking the house as a prison; at one point, it was bombed and then rebuilt	Rumayla neighborhood - Raqqa City
Agricultural Bank	Security	35.954622 N 39.026965 E	A building that once housed the agricultural bank; after consolidating control over Raqqa, ISIS converted it into a security prison to house those who opposed ISIS, security detainees, and former FSA affiliates (hence likely a security prison); the operations of this facility were later transferred to Point 11 after it was destroyed by an airstrike	Central Raqqa City
Garage Prison (DMV Prison)	Misc.	35.953910 N, 39.027676 E	A facility that ISIS began to use as a detention center to hold former FSA fighters and opposition figures (hence likely a security prison) after airstrikes destroyed the prison facility at the military judiciary building; in 2013, Amnesty International suggested that it was a detention facility used as a gathering point before detainees were released	Next to the Batani Roundabaout - Raqqa City
Sarawi Auto Shop	Misc.	35.953910 N 39.027676 E		Central Raqqa City
Sinaʾa Security Prison	Security	35.943235945280314 N, 39.03108248189752 E	Held ISIS fighters and civilians; located next to Harat al-Badu Grave (14 remains)	College of Sciences - Sanaʾa neighborhood - Raqqa City
al-Kahf	Misc.	35.955925, 39.012474	Housed in the basement of a liquor shop that ISIS seized after taking control of Raqqa; known to house Islamic Police detainees in particular, though it is unclear if it was formally under the jurisdiction of the Islamic Police	Dalla Roundabout - Raqqa City
Dali Bakery	Misc.	Possibly: 35.95176671371633 N 39.012924679953215 E	Held civilians	A basement next to al-Dali Bakery on al-Wadi Street - Raqqa City
Zahrat al-Furate Hotel Hisba	Hisba	35.95020995228139, 39.013715600278395	A women's hisba center that was destroyed in an airstrike	Zahrat al-Furat Hotel - Raqqa City
February 23rd Street Prison	Misc.	35.950000 N, 39.014694 E		February 23rd Street - central Raqqa City
Martyrs Church	Women's prison	35.949263 N 39.010655 E	An Armenian Catholic Church (the largest in Raqqa), used by ISIS as a prison for women. The church was first taken by ISIS as an advocacy office for publishing media publications and promoting ISIS ideology in the city.	Rashid Park - central Raqqa City - Raqqa Governorate
Finance Directorate	Misc.	35.946562 N, 39.012193 E	ISIS converted this facility into a headquarters and courthouse, with detention spaces in the basement; it was targeted repeatedly by airstrikes subsequently, forcing ISIS members to flee the facility after it was largely destroyed	West of the Education Directorate building - Raqqa City
Raqqa Governorate Building	Misc.	35.94555377923959 N 39.01109324531073 E	One of the first buildings that ISIS used to hold detainees, and prior to this it was under the control of Jabhat al-Nusra; civilians were held here; summary trials were conducted here	Raqqa Governorate building - Raqqa City
Raqqa Municipality	Misc.	35.94435156024831 N, 39.00904945490811 E		Raqqa municipality building - Raqqa City
Annunciation Church	Misc.	35.945898 N 39.008398 E	Our Lady of Annunciation Church is a Catholic church (the second-largest church in the city) which ISIS used as a temporary prison and hospital	Adnan Maliki Street - Raqqa City
ʿAdnaniyya Farm	Misc.	36.013806 N, 38.881851 E	Located in what was once a private home, which ISIS seized in 2016; was used to detain civilians trying to flee Raqqa as SDF approached the city, via ʿAdnaniyya Farm	ʿAdnaniyya Farm - Raqqa Governorate
ʿAkirshi Security Prison	Security	N/A	An oil facility 20km east of Raqqa City that held detained ISIS fighters and civilians; in 2013, Amnesty International reported that ISIS first used it as a training camp, and then as a place to detain civilians and its own members who were accused of being infiltrators, some for as many as 55 days	ʿAkershi village - Sabkha sub-district - Raqqa Governorate
ʿAyid Prison	Misc.	N/A	Held civilians, including children	South of Tabqa City - Raqqa governorate
Badr Police Station	Misc.	35.945139 N 39.131222 E	A police station that had been operated by the Syrian government; subsequently used by ISIS for purposes of temporary detention	Hamrat (Ghinam?) village

Brick Factory	Misc.	35.938472 N 39.119472 E	A former brick factory that ISIS converted into a temporary prison, as well as a military headquarters and security point	Hamrat village - Jarniya Sub-district - Thawra District - Raqqa Governorate
Hamrat Ghinam Prison	Misc.	35.924895 N 39.141612 E	A health facility that ISIS used for temporary detention; community members reported witnessing someone tortured to death at this facility	Hamrat Ghinam
Hamrat Nasir Prison	Misc.	35.910806 N, 39.166667 E		Hamrat Nasir village
Idkhar/Bayt al-Akrad Prison	Misc.	N/A	A private house that belonged to a Kurdish resident of this neighborhood	Idkhar neighborhood
Jarniyya Prison	Security	N/A	Housed in either the municipality or post office building, which were in the same square as a garage that ISIS used to deposit cars which it confiscated	Town of Jarniyya
Mansura Dam Prison	Security	35.88324323500814 N 38.753566707836455 E	Various cells created in and around an outdoor equipment storage space in the Mansura Dam; near the Mansura Dam grave (18 remains); in 2013, Amnesty International documented an official at this prison who was responsible for interrogation, trials, and punishment, as well as the presence of a Shariʿa court judge that oversaw summary trials; children accused of theft were reportedly brought here, as well as individuals from as far away as Kobani; solitary confinement and beating of detainees in view of others was reportedly common, with those whom ISIS sentenced to death sometimes being executed in public in Raqqa City	Mansura Dam
February 23rd Street Hisba	Hisba	N/A		Cellar next to electricity shops on February 23rd Street - Raqqa City
al-Muʿawa School Hisba	Hisba	N/A		al-Muʿawa School, next to the Raqqa Women's Union - Raqqa City - Raqqa Governorate
Ihsan Mosque Hisba	Hisba	N/A		A building next to Ihsan Mosque in Rumayla neighborhood - Raqqa City
Raqqa Juvenile Detention Center	Misc.			Raqqa City - Raqqa Governorate
ʿAbd al-ʿAziz School Security Prison	Security		Held ISIS fighters as well as civilians	ʿUmar bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz School - Raqqa City
Rumayla Women's Prison	Women's prison	N/A		Street 16 - Rumayla neighborhood - Raqqa City - Raqqa Governorate
Sinaʿa Yazidi Prison (Kafirat (Prison	Women's prison	N/A	Used to hold Yazidi women specifically	New electrical company building - Sinaʿa nighborhood - Raqqa City - Raqqa Governorate
Haramiyya Yazidi Prison	Women's prison	N/A	A two-story house used to hold Yazidi women specifically	Haramiyya nighborhood - Raqqa City - Raqqa Governorate
Tabqa Dam	Misc.	35.857604807578305 N, 38.559533338989944 E	Civilians held in rooms beneath the dam	Tabqa Dam
Tabqa Security Prison 1	Security	35.84479290664462 N, 38.544227297643765 E	A former women's athletic club that was used by ISIS as a security prison in 2017; has housed a post office at one point	Tabqa City
Tabqa Security Prison 2	Security	35.841160499037215 N, 38.5445797160626 E	Housed in the municipality building	Tabqa City
Tabqa Tower	Misc.	35.503155 N,38 32 11.93 E	One of the highest and strongest buildings in Tabqa City; and once housed the Land Reclamation Department, the construction of which was never completed and ISIS subsequently used the building as a prison (from which several prisoners escaped in 2016); upper floors partially destroyed in an airstrike	Former Land Reclamation Deparmtent building - Tabqa City
Tala'iʿ Camp	Misc.	N/A	Located next to Tala'iʿ Camp Grave (815 remains: the bodies were of people killed in mass executions, and were found in orange clothes typical of ISIS detainees)	Tala'iʿ Camp - South of Raqqa City
Tel Abyad Security Prison	Security	N/A		Tel Abyad

Aleppo

Prison name (EN)	Prison type (EN)	Location	Misc. Info	Location (EN)
Sarin Security Prison	Security	36.582441572365646 N, 38.29920012649937 E	Group and single-person cells were housed in the basement of this facility	Basement of Cultural Center - Town of Sarin
Manbij Security Prison	Security	36.527476 N, 37.950854 E	Group and single-person cells as well as security offices and interrogation rooms were housed in this facility	Manbij Hotel, near Amal Hospital - Manbij City
Manbij Courthouse	Misc.	36.52564741549591 N, 37.94323826417695 E	Used as a courthouse by ISIS	Zaydan Hunaydhal School, opposite Barkal Hospital - Manbij City
Al Bab Shariʾa Office	Misc.	N/A	Used as a facility for overseeing Shariʾa courses for detainees	Al Bab City
Manbij Cultural Center	Misc.	36.52870087868947 N, 37.93964295556511 E	Individuals as young as 14 years old were held here	Manbij City

Hassakeh

Prison name (EN)	Prison type (EN)	Location	Misc. Info	Location (EN)
Markada Prison 1	Misc.	35.750667 N, 40.764000 E	Housed in the large village mosque	Town of Markada
Markada Prison 2	Misc.	35.777083 N, 40.790417 E		Inside the silos near the street market - Town of Markada
Shadadi Security Prison	Security	36.038334 N, 40.729236 E		New water station next to the Coalition airbase - Shadadi
Hadaj Prison	Misc.	36.045271 N 41.1631405 E		Hadaj village
Shadadi Prison	Misc.	36.049848 N, 40.718943 E		Sub-district building - Shadadi
Hardan Prison	Misc.	36.0591655 N 41.108582 E	Used to temporarily detain women	Hardan village
Satamiyya Prison	Misc.	36.0901362 N 41.1814296 E	The outer hall of this facility was used for temporary detention	Satamiyya village
Tel Hajr Shelter Prison	Misc.	36.52479392712789 N, 40.73570396192151 E	Housed in a traditional Arab courtyard home; used to temporarily detain women	Tal Hajr neighborhood - Hasakeh City
Dashisha Hisba	ISIS police prison	N/A		Town of Dashisha
Ghweiran Yazidi Prison	Women's prison	N/A		Basement of house - Ghweiran
Hol Prison	Women's prison	N/A	Housed in a traditional Arab courtyard house	A building on al-ʿAzm Street - town of Al Hol
Humar	Women's prison	N/A	Used for temporary detention	Humar village
Jabsa Prison	Misc.	N/A	Housed in a private home	Jabsa
Kishkish Jabur Prison	Women's prison	N/A		Kishkish Jabur village
Qana Hisba	Hisba	N/A	Detainees typically were only held here for a matter of days	Red-brick structure on Jamiʿ Street - Qana village

Prison name (EN)	Prison Type (EN)	Location	Misc. Info	Location (EN)
Sabʿ al-Sukur Prison	Misc.	N/A	Used to hold widows and women who had committed religious infractions	Elementary school - Sabʿ al-Sukur village
Sabih Hisba	Hisba	N/A	Used for temporary detention	Sabih village
Shadadi Hisba	Hisba	N/A	After ISIS took control of Shadadi, the sub-district building was taken as a prison for temporary detention purposes, holding detainees on non-security charges for several days,	A building behind the Shadadi exhobitions hall - Shadadi
Shadadi Madafa	Women's prison	N/A	A water station that ISIS converted into a security prison, turning the building's several rooms into individual cells for security detainees	Madafa building - Shadadi
Shadadi Municipality	Misc.	N/A	Housed in the village clinic	Municipality building - Shadadi
Tal Barak Hisba	Hisba	N/A	Housed in a traditional Arab courtyard house	Tal Barak village
Tal Majdal Prison	Women's prison	N/A	An animal shelter near Kababa Road that had been converted into a detention center	Directly opposite the mosque - town of Tal Majdal
Umm al-Rajim Hisba	Hisba	N/A	Housed in the village mosque	Umm al-Rajim village
Umm Kuhuf Hisba	Hisba	N/A		The mosque square - Umm Kuhuf village
Youth City Prison 1	Women's prison		Used to detain women temporarily	Youth City complex Building 3 - Qamishli
Youth City Prison 2	Misc.			Youth City complex Building 2 - Qamishli

Deir Ezzor

Prison name (EN)	Prison Type (EN)	Location	Misc. Info	Location (EN)
Abu Khashab Tempoary Prison	Misc.	35.962056, 39.984222		Abu Khashab village
ʿAshara Courthouse	Misc.			Courthouse - ʿAshara
ʿAshara Hisba	Hisba			Behind the Muhdatha School - Makhfar Street - ʿAshara City
ʿAshara Khawna Prison	Security		Used to house ISIS fighters who left the organization, so it was likely a security prison	A house with a traditional Arab courtyard and a fig tree - Kamari neighborhood - ʿAshara
ʿAshara Prison 1	Women's prison		Used to detain women and guarded by female ISIS affiliates holding foreign nationalities	- Muhdatha School - Makhfar Street ʿAshara City
ʿAshara Prison 2	Women's prison			Traditional Arab courtyard house - Kamari neighborhood - ʿAshara
Bu Hamid Hisba	Hisba	35.781589 N, 39.738315 E	This facility simultaneous served as a Hisba center, temporary detention facility, and police station that held and punished individuals who were detained at checkpoints	Bu Hamid train station - Kasra sub-district
Busayra Prison	Misc.	35.158028, 40.429056		Town of al-Busayra
Ghranij Travel Office	Misc.	34.773600, 40.728392	An office for examining entry and exit papers to regulate movement within ISIS territories; those who had incorrect travel papers or permits were detained here, and transferred to repentance centers if they did not carry proof of previously completing a repentance course	Hamad al-Majazi commercial complex - Ghranij village
Ghranij Field Hospital	Misc.	34.776000, 40.723378	A field hospital that had been erected in the Nawwaf commercial complex in Ghranij	Nawwaf commercial complex - Main Street - Granij village

Arnous Hisba	Hisba	34.776339, 40.723353		Arnous shop complex - Ghranij village
Ghranij Madafa 1	Women's prison	34.770455 N, 40.722637 E	Located in what was previously a private home	Ghranij village
Ghranij Madafa 2	Women's prison	34.77023 N, 40.727194 E	Located in what was previously a private home	Ghranij village
Ghranij Madafa 3	Women's prison	34.771351 N, 40.733385 E	Located in what was previously a private home	Ghranij village
Ghranij Mentally Disabled Persons Detention Center	Misc.	34.774183, 40.717553	A detention center that was housed in what was previously a private home near the Ghranij water station; it was maintained by ISIS to police individuals with mental illness who were accused of violating shariʿa	Near the water station - Ghranij village
Ghranij Prison 1	Women's prison		Used to detain women on a temporary basis; housed in what was previously a private home	Ghranij Village
Ghranij Prison 2	Women's prison	34.773597, 40.727997	A center for women who had violated ISIS dress code or other aspects of its shariʿa code. The women were required to complete a course in shariʿa	Near the ʿUmar bin Khattab Mosque - Ghranij village
Ghranij Recruitment Office	Misc.	34.779139, 40.720636	A regional recruitment office housed in the home of displaced civilians; detention could occur here if an ISIS affiliate had exceeded his leave period or if an individual resisted the mandatory recruitment that ISIS imposed in the later period of its control over Northeast Syria	Next to municipality building - Ghranij village
Ghranij Security Prison 1	Security	34.773599 N, 40.728495 E	Located in what was previously a private home	Main road - Ghranij village
Hajin Courthouse	Misc.	34°41′43.81″N 40°49′41.34″E	Located in what was previously a private home; it is not known if this courthouse was attached to the Islamic Police, since the other courthouse documented in Hajin was apparently attached to the Hisba Office	Hajin sub-district
Hajin Tax Violation Prison	Misc.	34.692408 N, 40.826487 E	Located in what was previously a private home; often was used to detain individuals found to have not paid taxes to ISIS, before transferring them to an Islamic Police center if taxes remain unpaid	Hajin sub-district
Hajin Field Hospital	Misc.	34.696338 N, 40.826809 E		Hajin sub-district
Hajin Hisba	Hisba	34.691401 N, 40.827399 E		Hajin sub-district
Hajin Hospital	Misc.	34.698881 N, 40.82708 E	A public hospital converted into a detention center by ISIS soon after taking control of Hajin	Hajin public hospital - Hajin sub-district
Hajin Madafa 1	Women's prison	34.695622, 40.828117	Located in what was previously a private home	Hajin sub-district
Hajin Madafa 2	Women's prison	34.692164 N, 40.826876 E		Hajin sub-district
Hajin Munitions Depot	Misc.	34.687352, 40.828737		Next to Khalid bin Walid Mosque - Hajin sub-district
Hajin Police Headquarters	Islamic Police	34.693579 N, 40.827173 E	Located in what was previously a private home	Hajin sub-district
Hajin Prison	Misc.	34.6693479 N, 40.827729 E	Located in what was previously a private home	Hajin sub-district
Hajin Recruitment Office	Misc.	34.692473 N, 40.826554 E	Detention could occur here if an ISIS affiliate had exceeded his leave period or if an individual resisted the mandatory recruitment that ISIS imposed in the later period of its control over Northeast Syria	Naʿira Shops - Hajin sub-district
Hajin Security Prison 1	Security	34.69091 N, 40.826476 E	Located in what was previously a private home	Hajin sub-district
Hajin Security Prison 2	Security	34.694517 N, 40.829389 E	Located in what was previously a private home	Hajin sub-district

Hajin Shariʾa Court	Misc.	34.690991 N, 40.824717 E	The Hajin Shariʾa Court was likely affiliated with the Hisba Office, since it regulated violations of ISIS code; this facility was housed in what was previously a private home.	Hajin sub-district
Hajin Shariʾa Office	Misc.	34.693375, 40.826516		Umid School - Hajin sub-district
Hajin Weapons Factory	Misc.	34.679941 N, 40.837135 E		Hajin sub-district
Hajin Zakat Prison	Misc.	34.699373 N, 40.826774 E	Individuals were detained here if they did not carry proof of having paid taxes to ISIS; people were typically arrested for such violations at special zakat checkpoints	Hajin sub-district
Ibn Qayid Reptenance Center	Misc.	35.60072 N, 39.889417 E	A mosque that was used for 'closed' and long-term repentance courses (e.g., for former FSA fighters) that more closely resembled prison detention	Ibn Qayid Mosque - Haramshiyya vilalge
Kasra Hisba	Hisba	35.556161 N, 39.9254261 E	Located in what was previously a private home, before ISIS converted it into a hisba center	Town of Kasra
Kasra Hospital	Misc.	35.5595220, 39.9191690	When ISIS entered the area, it took control of the construction of the Kasra hospital and, because of its location and size, used it as a prison	Hospital building - town of Kasra
Kasra Islamic Police Center 1	Islamic Police	35.561697 N, 39.919050 E	Located in what was previously a private home	Town of Kasra
Kasra Islamic Police Center 2	Islamic Police	35.561917, 39.915389	Located in what was previously a private home, and which ISIS turned into an Islamic Police center	Town of Kasra
Kasra Temporary Prison	Misc.	35°33′40.38″N 39°55′02.14″E	A temporary prison that ISIS established toward the end of its period of control over Kasra; Located in what was a private home prior to its seizure by ISIS	Town of Kasra
Khasham Park Prison	Misc.	35.308972, 40.289444	Detainees held in a cellar that ISIS dug underneath this park	Khasham Park - Town of Khasham
Khasham Prison	Misc.	35.298583, 40.293306		Town of al-Khasham
Conico Oil and Gas field	Misc.	35.339549 N, 40.314955 E	The Conico field was used as a prison by ISIS after it took control of the area in 2014; it then served as both a camp and a detention center due to its location and large area	Town of Khasham
Mahlaja	Misc.	35.371547 40.216821		Ma'amil region
Mayadin Prison	Misc.	35.017250, 40.456278		Mayadin City
Arbaʾin Street Prison	Misc.	35.017250, 40.456278		Arbaʾin Street - Mayadin City
Mayadin Prison Complex	Misc.		Several adjoining prisons, all on the same street, for purposes of hisba (the smallest prison), severe sentences (qisas, i.e., often execution), and general detention (the largest prison)	Mayadin
Muhaymadiyya Recruitment Office	Misc.	35.457176 N, 40.075951 E		
Ruz Prison	Misc.	35.125583, 40.427056		Village of Ruz
Salihiyya Prison	Misc.	35.347806, 40.173361		Town of al-Salihiyya
Suwar Prison	Misc.	35.508250, 40.662806		Town of Suwar
Tayyana Prison	Misc.	34.974778, 40.540861		Tayyana village

Ghranij Security Prison 2	**Security**	**34.776000, 40.723378**	**Part of a complex on the Ghranij main street that also housed a Hisba center and an ISIS field hospital**	**Next to Nawwaf commercial complex - Main Street - Ghranij village**
Hawaij Recruitment Office	**Misc.**	**35.456823, 40.075986**	**A recruitment office located in what was previously a private home**	**Hawaij village**
Safira Repentance Center	**Misc.**	**35.418091, 40.0925**		**al-Imam al-Shafi'i Mosque - Safira village**

Endnotes

1   Human Rights Watch, *Kidnapped by ISIS: Failure to Uncover the Fate of Syria's Missin*g (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2020), 3-5.

2   However, some of those security detainees held for the purpose of prisoner swaps reported better conditions in their facilities; see interview with Yasin Farhan.

3   ISIS document 5.01.2018 22 32 06 (5); ISIS document 5.01.2018 22 04 23 (1).

4   Interview with father of Nasser Dawoud. The interviewee emphasized that there were clear signs of torture in this Hisba center, including chains hanging from the ceiling and traces of blood on the walls.

5   Interview with brother of Yasin Ahmed.

6   Interview with Qahtan Salloum.

7   Ibid.

8   Interview with Khalil ʿAzzi.

9   Interview with Qasim ʿAli.

10   ISIS document 5.01.2018 20 12 16

11   ISIS document 5.01.2018 20 15 58

12   Interview with Aws Malak.

13   ISIS document 5.01.2018 22 32 08 (6).

14   Revkin, "The Legal Foundations of the Islamic State," 27.

15   Interview with Qahtan Salloum.

16   Interview with daughter of Shezza Salim.

17   Interview with Maysam Karimi.

18   Interview with Faheem Dallal

19   ISIS document 5.01.2018 22 04 43

20   ISIS document 6.01.2018 10 20 59 (9)

21   Interview with Qasim ʿAli.

22   Interview with sister of Marwan Zaher.

23   Interview with Qahtan Salloum.

24   Interview with brother of Ibrahim Arif.

25   ISIS document 5.01.2018 21 34 49.

26   ISIS document 5.01.2018 20 11 45.

27   Interview with mother of Rafii Salameh; interview with Maysam Karimi.

28   A DeirEzzor24 report on the repentance programs suggests that it was the Security Office in Mayadin which managed this process. This is plausible given that former FSA fighters were perceived by ISIS as a security threat. See DeirEzzor 24, "Repentance or Death... the FSA Rebel and Daesh," https://deirezzor24.net/en/repentance-or-death-the-fsa-rebel-and-daesh/.

29   Interview with brother of Nazih Wahba; interview with stepsister of Reyhan Jalil; interview with sister of Adham Darwish.

30   Interview with relative of Yasin Ahmed.

31   Interview with mother of Rafii Salameh.

32   Interview with sister of Afra Semaan.

33   ISIS document 5.01.2018 20 37 11 (1)

34   ISIS document 5.01.2018 22 05 02

35   Although they were not "arrested" as such, with their detention supposed to have been temporary, these children were reportedly permanently transferred to an ISIS facility likely located at Conico Gas Fields.

36   ISIS document 5.01.2018 20 37 11 (1)

37   Interview with wife of Majid Abdallah.

38   Interview with father of Hoda Bishara.

39   Some families were unaware of which specific arm of the ISIS security apparatus had initially arrested their loved ones. Many simply referred to "ISIS'" in general or sometimes "patrols" (*dawriyyat*).

40   Interview with Qahtan Salloum.

41   Mara Revkin, "The Legal Foundations of the Islamic State" (Brookings: Washington, D.C., June 2016), 25.

42   ISIS document 5.01.2018 20 07 23

43   Interview with Qahtan Salloum.

44   ISIS document 5.01.2018 21 43 43

45   Interview with Aws Malak.

46   Revkin, "The Legal Foundations of the Islamic State," 27.

47   Interview with father of Nasser Dawoud.

48   Interview with Aws Malak.

49   ISIS document 5.01.2018 20 12 28

50   Revkin, *The Legal Foundations of the Islamic State*, 26

51   Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, *Judge, Jury, and Executioner: The ISIS Bureau of Justice and Grievances* (Washington, D.C.: Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, 2020), 10.

52   Interview with Aws Malak.

53   Human Rights Watch, *Kidnapped by ISIS*, 34.

54   Interview with brother of Samir Sadek.

55   Amnesty International, *Rule of Fear: ISIS Abuses in Detention in Northern Syria* (Amnesty International: London, 2013), 6

56   Interview with Qahtan Salloum. On the Houta gorge, see ICMP, "Missing Persons in Northeast Syria," 14.

57   Interview with Faheem Dallal.

58   Interview with mother of Anwar Kamil.

59   Interview with Qasim ʿAli.

60   Interview with brother of Ziyad Matar.

61   For more on the history of the FRT, see International Commission on Missing Persons, *Missing Persons in Northeast Syria: A Stocktaking* (International Commission on Missing Persons: The Hague, May 2020).

62   Ines Caridi et. Al. "A Framework to Approach Problems of Forensic Anthropology Using Complex Networks," *Physica A* 390 (2011), 1663.

63   ISIS doc 5.01.2018 20 13 52.

64   Amnesty International, *Rule of Fear*, 10, 13-14.

65   See, for example, the work of the Peruvian Forensic Anthropology Team (EPAF) and the Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundation (FAFG)

66   Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, "Origins of the Committee," https://www.cmp-cyprus.org/origins/.